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SUMMARY
Summary
As power systems increase in complexity due to higher shares of intermitting RES-E,
so increase the requirements for power system modeling. This thesis shows em-
pirically, with examples from Germany and Texas, that the increasing RES-E share
strongly affects current power market operation. The markets further create price sig-
nals, which lead to system adaptations in the long-run.
To get an estimate of the adaptation effects, ’The High Temporal Resolution Elec-
tricity Market Analysis Model’ (THEA) has been developed. In a first application for
the ERCOT market in Texas, particular model attributes are tested and compared to
some complexity reducing approaches, i.e. the reduction of temporal resolution and
the reduction of operational constraints. In both cases, the results show significant
differences compared to the results when the full spectrum of THEA’s capabilities is
utilized. The ERCOT case study additionally shows that the adaptation to RES-E
in an isolated, mainly thermal-based power system is quite severe. Market signals
which underline this conclusion are the severely reduced value of wind energy, the in-
creasing curtailment and the strong shift towards peak-oriented generating capacities.
The second application of THEA models the German power market with its intercon-
nected markets. This analysis increases the complexity significantly by modeling a
well interconnected system, increasing the amount of different RES-E technologies
and adding CAES investment options. In order to assess the impact on the differ-
ent system component’s supply, demand and grid infrastructure, specific measures
are applied to compare several scenarios. Each scenario represents a policy option,
which either reduces or increases the flexibility of the power system. The scenario
comparisons capture the effects of a lower RES-E share, a larger baseload capacity
fleet, higher interconnector capacities, various RES-E support scheme designs and
the capability of RES-E to participate in the reserve power market. In general, the
results show that if the flexibility of one system component is reduced, the flexibility
values of other system components increase, which suggests a careful, integrated
and long-term oriented policy setting.
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Zusammenfassung
Zusammenfassung
Der stark wachsende Anteil dargebotsabhängiger erneuerbarer Energien (EE) im
Strommarkt erhöht die Komplexität des Elektrizitätssystems und die Anforderungen
an die Strommarktmodellierung. Die vorliegende Arbeit zeigt anhand empirischer
Beispiele aus Deutschland und Texas, dass der steigende EE Anteil die Marktabläufe
stark beeinflusst. Die daraus resultierenden Preissignale ziehen in der langen Frist
Systemanpassungen nach sich.
Um eine Abschätzung der Anpassungseffekte zu erhalten, wurde das Strommark-
tmodell ’The High Temporal Resolution Electricity Market Analysis Model’ (THEA)
entwickelt. In einer ersten Anwendung wird das ERCOT Marktgebiet in Texas mod-
elliert um die spezifischen Modelleigenschaften zu testen und mit komplexitätsre-
duzierenden Methoden hinsichtlich der zeitlichen Auflösung und der betrieblichen
Detailschärfe zu vergleichen. In beiden Fällen zeigen die Ergebnisse deutliche Un-
terschiede im Vergleich zu den Resultaten der vollen Modellnutzung. Der ERCOT
Anwendungsfall zeigt darüber hinaus, dass die EE induzierten Anpassungseffekte in
einem isolierten, hauptsächlich thermischen Strommarkt sehr deutlich sind. Mark-
tergebnisse, welche das Fazit unterstreichen, sind der starke Wertverlust des Wind-
stroms, das zunehmende Einspeisemanagement und die deutliche Verschiebung zu
spitzenlastorientierter Erzeugungskapazität.
Die zweite Anwendung von THEA modelliert den deutschen Markt unter Berücksich-
tigung der verbundenen Nachbarmärkte. Die Komplexität der Analyse steigt deutlich
durch die Modellierung eines stark vermaschten Systems, die Berücksichtigung ver-
schiedener EE-Technologien und die Zubaumöglichkeit von CAES Speichern. Um
die Rückwirkungen auf die Systemkomponenten Angebot, Nachfrage und Netz zu
untersuchen werden verschiedene Szenarienanpassungen vorgenommen. Jedes
Szenario untersucht eine Politikoption hinsichtlich der Flexibilitätsteigerung oder -
reduzierung des Stromsystems. Die Szenarienvergleiche beinhalten die Effekte eines
geringeren EE Anteils, einer größeren Grundlastkapazität, höherer Interkonnektorka-
pazitäten, verschiedener EE Fördersystemdesigns und der Möglichkeit der EE Teil-
nahme am Regelenergiemarkt. Zusammenfassend lässt sich feststellen, dass die
Einschränkung der Flexibilität einer Systemkomponente den Wert der Flexibilität an-
derer Systembestandteile erhöht, woraus eine behutsame, integrierte und langfristo-
rientierte Energiepolitikempfehlung abgeleitet werden kann.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in Germany be-
gan in the early 1990s. Since 2000, the deployment of RES-E capacities has grown
considerably due to the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). In 2009, 16.1% of the
gross electricity production stemmed from renewable energy sources (RES), of which
6.5% came from wind power alone (BMU, 2010a). With a total installed capacity of
25.8 GW at the end of 2009, Germany is the largest wind power market in Europe, in
absolute terms.
Since most RES-E are not able to compete in the power market, additional financial
support is required to trigger investments. The EEG is a feed-in tariff system (FIT)
which remunerates each renewable generated energy unit fed into the grid. The rapid
increase of the RES-E share can be attributed to this low risk investment scheme.
One crucial support scheme design element is the obligation for the transmission
system operators (TSOs) to integrate each generated RES-E unit independent of the
actual demand.
The remaining power market faces increasing challenges toward integrating the grow-
ing RES-E share due to the intermitting nature of wind and solar irradiation. Since
each RES-E unit must be integrated, the conventional side of the power market has
to provide the flexibility to adjust itself to the fluctuating residual demand. Throughout
the entire thesis, the residual demand perspective is applied, since the later analy-
sis focuses on the optimization of the conventional supply side. Consequently, the
RES-E are seen as a part of the demand side, which also bears the support costs.
The integration challenges for the supply side can be translated into requirements for
the long-run development of the electricity market. Besides the technical challenges
of following the fluctuations, the economics of the power market are also challenged.
Since an increasing share of the demand is met by out-of-market supported RES-E,
the remaining power market faces different requirements, which in the long-run lead
to adaptations of the generating capacity. Therefore, the main research question is
how different policy decisions affect interdependent system components in high RES-
E scenarios.
In order to enable the analysis of the new challenges for the power market, the re-
quirements in electricity market modeling also mirror the additional complexity. There-
fore, ’The High Temporal Resolution Electricity Market Analysis Model’ (THEA) has
5
1 INTRODUCTION
been developed, which takes these additional requirements, in particular the increased
temporal resolution, into account. This model is tested against other approaches
found in the literature and applied to two case studies. The first case study repre-
sents the ERCOT power market in Texas. The primary purpose of this case study
is to test particular model attributes in a medium-sized, isolated power system. The
second case study represents the primary analysis of this thesis and focuses on the
German power market, however taking into account the surrounding interconnected
markets as well. Here, the analysis focuses on the impact of various policy options
on the ability to integrate RES-E, the flexibility of the market and its corresponding
economic impacts. The particular scenario specifications are defined on the basis of
previously identified design options.
The thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter provides the motivation and an
overview of the literature. The evolution of the research questions is provided on the
basis of the literature and further research potential is identified. Chapter 3 is partially
based on Nicolosi (2010) and explains in greater detail the particular RES-E integra-
tion challenges. Empirical data are analyzed to provide an intuition on market reac-
tions in times of high RES-E infeed. In addition, alternative integration approaches
are discussed and long-term adaptation effects explained. Chapter 4 explains the uti-
lized methodology, which enables the detailed analysis. Chapter 5 is partially based
on Nicolosi et al. (2010) and provides the first model application on the Texas case
study, compares different model attributes found in the literature and thereby shows
how the detail provided by THEA impacts the results. In chapter 6 the German power
market is analyzed under consideration of the interconnected neighboring markets.
Particular scenarios and their impact on the power market are compared in order to
identify solutions for further increasing the RES-E share efficiently. Finally, chapter 7
discusses the results, identifies further research potential and concludes the analy-
sis.
6
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2 Motivation and Literature Review
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on RES-E market integration and
identifies gaps which are filled by the research presented in this thesis. First, liter-
ature on short-term market effects and their economic interpretation is discussed.
Second, the literature on market adaptation which projects the short-term effects into
the longer term, is reviewed. Finally, literature on market design is presented, which
intends to solve the previously identified market challenges.
2.1 Short-Term Effects
Adding a high share of intermitting RES-E to an existing power system changes the
optimal operation of the remaining power plants. With low, near-zero variable costs,
intermitting RES-E technologies are usually the first generating units that are dis-
patched in the power system. Additionally, FIT support schemes usually have a
RES-E infeed obligation for TSOs. It is therefore common to subtract the RES-E
generation from total demand to form the time-varying residual demand according to
which the remaining generation units must be dispatched. This perspective is fol-
lowed throughout the entire thesis. Due to these dynamics, wholesale power prices
tend to be lower in hours with high RES-E infeed because the lower residual demand
can be met by cheaper marginal units (see e.g. Neubarth et al. (2006) or Bode and
Groscurth (2006) for a discussion on these wholesale power price-reducing effects in
Germany; Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008) for Denmark; and Miera et al. (2008) for
Spain).
Since Germany has a significant RES-E growth (see Figure 2.1 for an overview of the
capacity development), the discussion on this wholesale price-reducing effect and on
its economic interpretation is still ongoing.
The German Federal Ministry of Environmental Affairs (BMU) published a report al-
ready in 2007 which discussed the so-called ’merit-order effect’ and its economic
interpretation (see BMU (2007)) and was used to inform the EEG amendment. To
calculate the merit-order effect, a power market model simulated the power prices of
one particular year with and without RES-E. The resulting average power price dif-
ference amounted to 7.73 EUR/MWh. The aggregated hourly price differences were
denoted as the volume of ’cost reduction’, which was compared to the EEG remuner-
ation volume. The total amount of the merit-order effect was thus reported to be 4.98
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Figure 2.1: Historic RES-E capacity development in Germany
Source: own illustration, based on BMU (2010a).
bn. EUR, while the total RES-E support was 3.3 bn. EUR in 2006 (BMU (2010a)).
Wissen and Nicolosi (2008) initiated a critical discussion on this approach. First,
the conventional capacity adaptation since the introduction of the EEG in 2000 was
not considered. It is questionable if a power system without any RES-E would have
had exactly the same installed capacity mix as the reference case. Second, interna-
tional exchange was assumed to be identical in both model runs, since neighboring
markets were not included in the modeling approach. Thus, the considerable export
volumes that especially result in hours of very high RES-E infeed were assumed to
occur indifferently in the second model run without RES-E. As a consequence, the
national capacity portfolio had not only to serve the national demand, but also the
assumed export amount. Consequently, in the first run, the power price was very
low in these hours while in the second model run, they were very high due to the
exponential shape of the supply curve. Sensitivities concerning capacity adaptation
and a discussion on cost savings versus rent redistribution was provided in Sensfuss
et al. (2008) and confirmed the power price-reducing effect of RES-E. Even though
the economic interpretation of the RES-E-induced power price reductions has been
questioned, important research questions can be derived from these early research
results:
• How does the power price evolve with a dynamically increasing RES-E share
over time?
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• How does this influence the value of RES-E and consequently the support costs
for consumers?
• How does the power market adapt to the increasing RES-E share?
• Which market design options enable further integration of increasing RES-E
shares?
Eventually, the discussion on the ’merit-order effect’ inspired the research that is pre-
sented in this thesis.
However, before an economic interpretation of the RES-E-induced effects can be de-
rived, a better understanding of the underlying fundamental effects is required. In the
course of the discussion, different studies have applied diverse approaches to as-
sess the price-reducing effects. Since observations of changes in the market prices
initiated the debate, Neubarth et al. (2006), Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008) and
Jónsson et al. (2010) analyzed empirical data and compared hours with high RES-E
infeed to hours with low RES-E infeed. A different approach has been applied by
Bode and Groscurth (2006) and Sensfuss et al. (2008), who use computer models to
further assess the observed effects. Another dimension in the form of a market power
perspective was first introduced by Vasilakos and Green (2009), who show that the
level of price reduction depends on the number of participants in the market and their
market power exploitation. Nonetheless, the research presented in this thesis follows
the aforementioned approaches in assuming a competitive power market in order to
isolate the fundamental drivers of the price effects without stipulating additional as-
sumptions on market power behavior.
Wissen and Nicolosi (2008) and Miera et al. (2008) started discussions on capacity
adaptation within this context, though mainly on a qualitative level. However, in order
to assess the economic implications of the RES-E market value, a long-run perspec-
tive is required which takes system adaptations into account. Understanding the short
term effects is nevertheless of fundamental importance for the analysis. Hence, the
fundamental dispatch structure and the resulting market prices are of particular inter-
est. Therefore, in this thesis, the short-term effects are contextualized by analyzing
dispatch and prices on the basis of a capacity portfolio optimized over time. Conse-
quently, the following provides an overview on research concerning long-run capacity
development.
2.2 Long-Term Effects
Deriving an economic value of RES-E for a power system based solely on the static
perspective of a dispatch model or empirical data is not sufficient, since the evolution
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of RES-E includes by definition the long-term perspective of investment decisions.
Consequently, capacity adaptations of the remaining system must be included in the
analysis as well. The dynamic process in which new power plant investment decisions
are considered is critical in modeling the impact of RES-E on the power system. A
valid way to accurately capture the value of RES-E is therefore to compare a power
system without RES-E, and consequently without the adaptation effects due to RES-
E, to a system that adapts to the RES-E penetration through appropriate investment
decisions. Both optimized capacity mixes have a different quantity and a different
quality. The particular context defines the required attributes of the capacity mix. In
any case, the generating capacity must be sufficient to guarantee a reliable operation
of the system. The terminology of the reliability problem follows roughly Batlle et al.
(2007), who distinguish between security, firmness and adequacy:
• Security is understood to be the readiness of existing generating capacity to
respond, when needed, to meet the actual load. This means that the capacity
is capable of following the load pattern.
• Firmness is defined as the short-term generating availability resulting from the
operational scheduling of installed capacity. This definition is modified to incor-
porate the ability to provide sufficient reserve capacity and energy at the same
time. If the market is firm at a certain point, opportunity costs influence the
pricing mechanism. In the context of this thesis, this is especially important in
low demand situations, which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.1.
• Adequacy means the existence of sufficient available installed capacity to meet
demand at any time (the long-term effects will be discussed in section 3.2).
Despite the interrelation between short-term dispatch results and longer-term invest-
ment decisions, modeling the combined impact of both effects has proven challeng-
ing. Two general research streams exist in the literature: The first one is discussed
above and uses high-temporal resolution dispatch models (usually 8760 hours) to
capture the short-term price effects due to the variability of RES-E, whereas the sec-
ond approach uses capacity-expansion investment models to illustrate the longer-
term adaptation processes of the remaining power system. In order to capture longer-
term investment effects, dispatch models sometimes use power plant portfolios that
are generated from an investment model (see e.g. Vasilakos and Green (2009)), but
in other cases, impacts on investment decisions are ignored (e.g. NREL (2010a)) be-
cause the focus of the research lies on operational challenges. The altered dispatch
patterns and wholesale power prices, however, also impact the investment calculus
of new power plants as demand rises or existing plants retire, and those new in-
vestments further influence dispatch and pricing results (Dena, 2005). It is therefore
crucial to implement the capacity adaptation into the analysis.
Some studies have sought to explicitly combine dispatch and investment optimization
into a single modeling framework in order to more accurately capture the benefits and
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impacts of wind power on the power system. Due to the high computational demands
of accurately modeling the combined dispatch and investment optimization problem
in great detail, however, a reduction in model complexity is usually required. One typi-
cal way to do this is to reduce the temporal resolution of the modeling framework. For
example, rather than dispatching the system on an hourly basis over entire years, a
smaller number of broader time slices is selected instead. NREL (2008) investigates
the effects of a 25 % wind power penetration in the U.S. and applies 16 time slices
that are primarily based on seasonal and daily load patterns. The electricity market
module of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, which is used for the ’Annual
Energy Outlook’, uses nine representative time slices per year for the dispatch deci-
sions (EIA (2010b)). Pehnt et al. (2008) analyze the impact of adding offshore wind
power to the German power system and use 144 hours (6 typical months, 2 typical
days and 12 typical hours). However, in order to take the variability of wind infeed into
account, they use a stochastic approach with three different wind levels per modeled
hour. Dena (2010) models the system adaptation to a considerable rise in wind power
in the German power market until 2020 on the basis of typedays (4 seasons, 3 typical
days and 24 hours), which in total represent 288 typical hours per year. Neuhoff et al.
(2008) go further and consider 1040 hours in their analysis. They also integrate wind
power investments into their research, but reduce the amount of potential conven-
tional investment options to combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) and open cycle
gas turbines (OCGTs). Möst and Fichtner (2010) choose an alternative approach by
manually iterating a long-term energy system model and a heuristic model. In this
way, the long-term development is taken into account on the basis of a higher reso-
lution dispatch model. The intermediate results are checked after each iteration and
manually stopped, in general after two iterations.
With the exceptions of Neuhoff et al. (2008) and Möst and Fichtner (2010), who cap-
ture a significant amount of load and wind power levels, the temporal resolution is
quite low in the discussed approaches for modeling a high-level RES-E system. Re-
ducing temporal resolution in this manner may be appropriate in systems without high
penetrations of variable generation because, for example, every workday evening
within a season may have a relatively typical demand pattern that does not deviate
inordinately from one day to the next. Adding significant quantities of intermitting gen-
eration, however, can change the residual load substantially on an hourly basis. Since
e.g. wind power fluctuates between close to zero infeed on calm days and very high
infeed on windy days, this additional volatility should be considered by the methodol-
ogy. Capturing these effects requires either a model with a higher temporal resolution
is required or the addition of correction factors to try to approximate the correct result.
Until now, however, little research has been published on the impact of model-based
temporal resolution on modeling results in systems with high RES-E penetration.
The impact of intertemporal constraints on system operation and power prices on the
other hand is well documented. Since these constraints increase the computational
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complexity, Neuhoff et al. (2008) ignore them to be able to benefit from the higher
temporal resolution. In order to be able to model power block specific start-up de-
cisions, the implementation of a mixed integer problem is required. This approach,
however, is computationally quite expensive, as e.g. described in Wood and Wollen-
berg (1996). The linearization of intertemporal operational constraints is discussed
by Kuntz and Müsgens (2007). Abrell et al. (2008) compare different approaches
to model start-up costs and find that most approaches are unable to simultaneously
obtain price-spikes in hours of start-up as well as prices below marginal costs when
plants are kept online in demand valleys. The only exception found is the application
of the linearized approach. Also Kreutzberg (2001) reports a good match of observed
prices and modeled prices for the German power market in a linear setup. Even
though this discussion is particularly important for the operation of the power sys-
tem and therefore belongs to the short-run effect discussion, the example of Neuhoff
et al. (2008) shows that trade-offs are often required to keep the problem solvable. As
mentioned above, by now most dispatch models take intertemporal constraints into
account. The effects of adding intertemporal constraints to a high resolution invest-
ment and dispatch models on the other hand, has not yet been well documented.
2.3 Corresponding Market Design Discussion
The focus of the analysis in this thesis is to increase the understanding of fundamen-
tal market interrelations. Therefore an approach is used which assumes a competitive
power market. In this way, the price setting is based on short-term marginal costs in
combination with an optimized capacity mix such that the resulting short-term effects
can be correctly captured.1
However, as a consequence of this approach, the resulting price levels are not neces-
sarily sufficient to recover investment costs. Joskow (2007) explains that competitive
power markets produce prices which are not sufficient to cover investment costs and
therefore cause the ’missing money’ problem. Usually price caps at the wholesale
markets are referred to as one of the main reasons for the lack of fixed cost recovery.
Although, due to fundamental differences in market structures and market design, the
’missing money’ problem in the U.S. is not directly transferable to the situation in Eu-
rope, Traber and Kemfert (2010) confirm this phenomenon for Germany, especially
with increasing wind power penetration. A further issue which prevents sufficient price
signals is the lack of demand response. In order to provide incentives to recover in-
vestments, demand signals based on the ’value of lost load’ (VOLL) are required,
which trigger price spikes in a sufficient number of hours and therefore finance the
investment costs of the last required unit (Joskow (2007)). However, the assumed
1 For a discussion on long-run versus short-run marginal costs, see section 4.2.
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VOLL, in combination with the annualized investment costs of a peaking plant, de-
termine the amount of hours that are required to cover the investment costs.2 Since
the analysis focuses on the resulting price patterns induced by RES-E infeed, using
an approach which determines the number of price spikes would interfere with the
analysis. Price-setting based on short-term marginal costs in combination with an op-
timized power plant portfolio is the only way to capture the fundamental effects, which
requires fundamentally determined power prices. The resulting prices in this central
planner approach reflect the market results under perfect competition with sufficient
generation capacity. Therefore, this approach reflects a situation with a capacity ad-
equacy measure exogenous to the energy market, e.g. a capacity market. In reality,
hardly any energy-only markets exist. Most markets have some kind of capacity mar-
ket either in the form of reserve markets or bilateral contracts due to system adequacy
and security reasons.
Solutions for the ’missing money’ problem are discussed amongst others by Joskow
(2008); Cramton and Stoft (2008); Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga (2008); De Vries and
Heijnen (2008); Finon and Pignon (2008); and Roques (2008). In general, either
energy-only markets with particular design characteristics are proposed or capacity
markets are requested to support capacity investments. A further discussion on the
particular designs and requirements exceeds the scope of the present research.
Further market design discussions which touch the present research, but cannot be
included, are concerned with, e.g. the geographical scope and size of the market ar-
eas (e.g. Green (2008); Leuthold et al. (2008); Neuhoff et al. (2008); and Brunekreeft
et al. (2005)), the temporal scope in terms of gate-closure and corresponding forecast
issues (e.g. Holttinen (2005a); Müsgens and Neuhoff (2006); and Weber (2009)) as
well as RES-E support scheme designs which intend to trigger investments in an ef-
ficient way by setting either prices or quantities and are primarily based on Weitzman
(1974) (e.g. Hiroux and Saguan (2010); Klessmann et al. (2008); and Menanteau
et al. (2003)). Since the focus of the present analysis is on the market integration
of RES-E rather than on the financial incentives to invest into RES-E technologies,
only the effects of different support schemes on the power market are analyzed (see
3.1.4).
2 See e.g. Stoft (2002) for a more detailed explanation.
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3 Fundamentals of RES-E Market Integration
This chapter explains some fundamental interdependencies that motivate the partic-
ular modeling approach explained in chapter 4. Since wind is an intermitting energy
source, the power markets react strongly to the stochastic wind power infeed. In times
of high wind power infeed, the spot price at the wholesale market tends to be lower
then when compared to times without wind power in the system. This phenomenon
became popular under the term merit-order effect (see the literature discussion in
2.1). Since wind and solar power already covers a certain share of the load, the con-
ventional power market only needs to cover the residual load. This leads to a lower
interception of the merit-order curve with the demand function, and thus, to lower
power prices.
An increase of intermitting generation capacity from wind and solar energy sources
changes the requirements for the conventional energy market. In the long-run, in-
vestment decisions take this factor into account, leading to investments in generating
capacities that are better equipped to efficiently cover the stronger fluctuating resid-
ual demand. This chapter is partially based on Nicolosi (2010) and is divided into two
sections. First, the short-term integration effects are discussed. A general framework
on firm market situations is provided on the basis of a fundamental market structure
explanation and ensuing empirical examples of the German market illustrate the ef-
fects. Second, the long-term investment effects are explained in more detail.
3.1 Short-Term Effects and Empirical Evidence
The supply curve in the power market represents the marginal generation costs of the
power plant fleet in an adjacent order and is therefore called merit-order. In a compet-
itive power market, the power price is set by the marginal costs of the last generator
that is required to cover the demand. In more extreme situations at both ends of the
merit-order, in times of either very high or very low demand, the pricing structure devi-
ates from this pattern. In times of low demand and high wind power infeed, the market
reacts with bids below variable costs to avoid ramping-down base load power plants,
which would require a costly ramp-up later. Up until September 2008 in Germany,
the consequences included situations with a potential oversupply that needed to be
cut on an inefficient pro-rata basis. The European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig
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(now EPEX 3) reacted to this inefficiency by allowing for the possibility of negative
price bids. In October 2008, the EEX closed with a negative power price for the first
time. By December 2009, 86 hours with negative prices had been observed at the
EEX. Among those, 19 hours had significantly negative prices below -100 EUR/MWh.
The occurrence of negative prices is not problematic per se. However, they are an
indicator of a firm market situation that could lead to situations in which the market
does not clear at all if a proper market design is missing. Therefore, in this section,
these 19 hours are examined in detail by analyzing the factors limiting market flex-
ibility. Since the oversupply is currently the main issue, this section focuses on the
flexibility at the low demand side. The flexibility at the high demand side is discussed
in the long-run perspective in section 3.2. Before the empirical effects are shown,
some institutional market fundamentals are explained in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
Figure 3.1 shows one random week in 2009. The load is shown as the blue line,
the load negative wind power infeed is the green line and the red line represents the
power price at the EEX. At first sight, one can see that the load follows roughly the
same pattern every day of the week with the exception of the weekend days. The
difference between the blue and the green line shows the wind power infeed, which
varies strongly during this week. On the first Thursday, there is hardly any wind in
the system, while on Sunday, Monday and the last Thursday there is a significant
amount present. Consequently, the conventional power market has to supply a differ-
ent amount of energy every day to serve the residual load.
The power price reflects this pattern. On the first Thursday, with almost no wind in
the system, the power price is the highest during this week. The next Thursday has
a higher absolute load, but the power price is roughly 100 EUR below the previous
week, due to a high wind power infeed during that day. Also, the Monday has only
an average power price even though it shows the highest load during that time-frame.
This relationship shows an even more interesting market result on Sunday morn-
ing. The wind power infeed is significant, while the load is at the lowest point of this
week. Even though the residual load is still at 30 GW, the resulting market price is
-20 EUR/MWh. The next section explains the market fundamental behind this phe-
nomenon.
3.1.1 Power System Flexibility and Negative Power Prices
The flexibility of power markets is characterized by their ability to efficiently cover fluc-
tuating demand. This flexibility is influenced by various factors, such as the installed
3 The exchange recently merged with other exchanges and is now called Epex. The explanation and
empirical information is based on the earlier market data and market rules. Therefore, here it is still referred
as the EEX.
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Figure 3.1: Load and price curves
Source: own illustration, data provided by ENTSO-E (2010b), BDEW (2010) and
EPEX Spot (2010).
power plant mix and the interaction with other markets. A power system, consisting
of supply, grid infrastructure and demand, is adequately designed if it is able to cope
with its challenges. Furthermore, the reserve power markets are responsible for sys-
tem security in the real-time period. Since they require additional capacity, they also
influence the flexibility of the power market. Flexibility becomes an issue in times
with either very high or very low demand. In both cases, the market shows whole-
sale power prices which deviate from the usual variable cost based pattern (Cramton
(2004), Ockenfels et al. (2008)). In times with very high demand, the market oc-
casionally shows prices above variable cost, while in hours with very low demand,
the market shows prices below the variable costs of the power plants. This section
analyzes the flexibility restrictions concerning low demand cases by showing how dif-
ferent markets and market participants behave during these hours.
The system components supply, grid and demand have their own flexibility restric-
tions. This section abstracts from the grid infrastructure, since the price settlement at
the market under consideration (the German power market) does not take grid bot-
tlenecks into account. When internal grid bottlenecks occur within a price zone, the
transmission system operators (TSOs) redispatch power plants on both sides of the
bottlenecks after the market settlement of the wholesale market. In this case, the
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operation of power plants is not only based on economic principles, but also on post-
market system security measures.
The Demand Side
The most obvious flexibility requiring factor on the demand side is the fluctuating, but
almost inflexible, load itself (Strbac (2008)). Depending on the load structure through-
out the day and the year, either a flexible power supply system is required if the load
structure is very volatile, or a rather inflexible supply system is sufficient in the case of
low volatility. The second factor is the amount of must-run generation, which is sub-
tracted from the total load. Since must-run generation is independent from the level
of demand, the offset of both factors defines the residual demand, which needs to
be covered by the conventional supply system. In general, the more must-run instal-
lations, the more flexibility is required by the remaining power system. Furthermore,
the must-run generation can be subdivided: The most important differentiation is be-
tween the renewable and the conventional side, such as combined heat and power
(CHP). The focus of this thesis is the intermitting RES-E infeed, which is also placed
on the demand side. The more load that is covered by RES-E, the less it needs to be
covered by the conventional power market. The fluctuation of the demand, in addition
to the fluctuation of the RES-E, forms an increasingly challenging requirement for the
supply side of the system (Nicolosi and Fürsch, 2009).
The Supply Side
The flexibility of the supply side is determined by the mix of its installed capacities and
the design of its interrelated markets. Base load power plants have high investment
costs and low variable costs. Therefore, they require a high utilization throughout
the year to cover investment costs. In addition, these plants are not designed for
ramping-up and -down regularly since this reduces the lifetime of the parts that are
exposed to high levels of pressure and heat. Consequently, a high share of baseload
plants limits the flexibility of the power system. Furthermore, all thermal power plants
have a minimum load. Due to the steam stream, they are not able to produce elec-
tricity below a particular share (see e.g. Strauß (2006)). If they are willing to lower the
generation below this threshold, they need to shut-off the plant. This minimum-load
restriction limits the flexibility considerably, especially when big power blocks are re-
quired to stay online.
The integrated design of the interrelated markets can limit market flexibility in several
ways. First, the national market for reserve power strongly influences the power sys-
tem since it reduces the flexibility by the amount of reserve power which needs to
be held back for system security. If the auctions for the reserve power markets are
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not efficiently aligned with the wholesale power market, inefficient capacity commit-
ment could be a result. Second, the interaction with international markets through
interconnectors influences the power market. Again, if the auction of interconnector
capacities is not well aligned with the gate-closure of the spot markets, the auctioned
flow direction of the interconnector could deviate from the direction suggested by the
price delta between the two power markets. This reduces the efficiency of the market
results, and therefore market flexibility (for a more detailed analysis of market cou-
pling and market splitting see, e.g. Brunekreeft et al. (2005), Wawer (2009)).
Firm Market Situation
As explained previously, a market situation sometimes becomes critical due to a lack
of flexibility. Since this section focuses on negative prices, the situations under con-
sideration are characterized by potential oversupply. In the case of low load and e.g.
high wind power infeed, the residual load is consequently quite low, as illustrated in
Figure 3.1. The supply system needs to react to this situation by ramping down, or
shutting off, power plants. Up to a certain threshold, this is not uncommon. However,
at a certain point, this ’negative flexibility’ becomes firm. This means that there is a
lack of opportunities to further reduce conventional generation or to increase export.
A firm market situation occurs when plants that are online are not allowed to reduce
their generation because they are obligated to supply system services, e.g. through
commitments on the reserve power market. In reality, base load plants are also likely
to generate because they are unwilling to shut-off the plant due to very high start-up
and opportunity costs, arising when prices above variable costs occur in the following
hours and the plants cannot start up in time. The base load induced market firmness
varies by season. Since power plants need to be in revision once a year, they usually
choose to revise during the season with the lowest demand. During this season, a
lower base load share is available, meaning that the market becomes more flexible.
Negative Wholesale Power Prices
Although the possibility of negative prices seems to be counter-intuitive for an ’ordi-
nary’ good, the particular attributes of electricity, primarily the non-economic storage
possibilities of large amounts, in combination with the limited flexibility of demand,
leads to the occurrence of bids below variable costs, even negative ones. Before
negative price bids were allowed in Germany, oversupply was cut on a pro-rata basis,
which led to inefficiency (see the left side of Figure 3.2). This oversupply was due
to the fact that opportunity costs are marginal-cost relevant (Cramton (2004)), e.g. if
a power plant needs to ramp-down, additional costs occur for the later ramp-up (e.g.
Hofer (2008) quantifies a ramp-up of a combined cycle gas turbine with 2.500 - 5.000
EUR). Therefore, it is efficient to integrate these opportunity costs into the bid to avoid
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the ramp-down and generate, even though prices do not cover the short term variable
costs. As a result of these dynamics, the supply curve does not begin at zero, but
has a slope leading into the negative area until the negative price cap is reached (see
the right side of Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Pro-rata distribution versus negative price possibility
Source: Nicolosi (2010), adapted from Viehmann and Sämisch (2009).
With the occurrence of negative prices, as illustrated on the right side of Figure 3.2,
the new price is settled at p∗ instead of p0. The result of the negative price mech-
anism increases the overall welfare, since an efficient dispatch is possible and the
welfare loss in area C on the left side of Figure 3.2 is avoided. Allowing negative
price bids consequently leads to an efficient market result which takes opportunity
costs into account. Negative prices also have effects on the distribution between pro-
ducer and consumer rents. A brief explanation is provided according to Viehmann
and Sämisch (2009). In Figure 3.2, A is the consumer rent and B the producer rent.
As illustrated on the left side, the price limit of zero reduces the producer rent by C,
since producers would have been willing to bid differently into the market and are
forced to deviate from their optimal strategy and to run the power plants inefficiently.
With the occurrence of negative prices (right side of Figure 3.2), the consumer rent is
increased and the producer rent is decreased. The producers gain from changing to
their efficient operation strategy. Since they are allowed to bid their opportunity costs,
the overall efficient dispatch of the power plants increases welfare, while the negative
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price is also a market signal of the demand for flexibility. The consequences for the
investment behavior are discussed in section 3.2
3.1.2 The German Power Market
The German power market is the biggest market in Europe when it comes to con-
sumption. The four largest power producers are RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall and EnBW.
They account for a market share of between 70 and 85% (Lise et al. (2008); Weigt
and von Hirschhausen (2008)). The four TSOs have either been legally unbundled
from the four main power producers or have even been sold by now. When it comes
to bottlenecks within the grid infrastructure, the TSOs are obligated to redispatch the
power plant operation after the market settlement of a single price zone. This is com-
mon for most power markets in Europe. Other market designs, such as zonal or
nodal pricing are widely applied (e.g. Nordpool or PJM). However, the benefits of one
single, liquid and transparent market are presently valued higher than the more effi-
cient price-settling mechanisms which take grid constraints into account (for a more
detailed discussion on market designs in carbon constrained power systems, see
Green (2008)).
The German Wholesale Market
The German wholesale market is fragmented into an virtual over-the-counter (OTC)
market and the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig. While the OTC market
has a continuous trade, the EEX has a single auction with a gate closure for the day-
ahead market at 12 p.m. on the day before physical delivery. Although three fourths
of the trading volume are settled via bilateral OTC contracts, the EEX spot price is
of fundamental importance as a benchmark and reference point for other markets,
such as OTC or forward markets. Since buyers and sellers always have an arbitrage
option at the EEX, the price expectations on both sides cannot systematically deviate
from the expected outcome of the other markets. Nobody would accept an offer at
the OTC market if the expected outcome at the EEX was more beneficial. However,
it is still possible that forward prices deviate from the day-ahead EEX price, due to
different information or risk perceptions (see Ockenfels et al. (2008) for a discussion
on different auction designs). The price settling mechanism at the EEX is a uniform
price auction.
After the day-ahead market closure, trade is still possible at the intraday market.
However, the main share of the trades is settled with the gate closure of the EEX
(Viehmann (2011)). The intraday market still lacks liquidity and the resulting market
price is therefore not a valid benchmark. The hour before physical delivery falls into
the responsibility of the reserve power market, which is operated by the TSOs. Within
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this short time frame, they are obligated to balance the deviations between supply
and demand, which arise due to load and wind infeed forecast errors, as well as un-
planned power plant outages (Just and Weber (2008)). Since September 2008, the
EEX has allowed negative price bids, with the first negative market result occurring in
October 2008.
Market Interaction
The interaction with other markets influences the ability of the entire system to react
efficiently to new information and to adapt its generation accordingly. In this section,
international interactions through interconnectors will be discussed first, followed by
a description of the German reserve power market.
The German wholesale power market is influenced by its surrounding markets since it
has interconnectors to most of them with total net transfer capacities of 17 GW import
and 14.8 GW export capacities (ENTSO-E (2009a)). Transmission rights are required
to manage the international exchange between the power markets. Depending on
the individual interconnector, either implicit or explicit auctions settle the transmission
rights. The current trend is to integrate the markets as closely as possible to increase
the economic utilization of the interconnector capacities. In general, the individual
interconnectors serve as either additional supply in the merit-order in the case of im-
ports or as flexible demand options in case of exports. Since many interconnector
capacities are explicitly auctioned before the gate closures of the individual power
markets, the auction results do not reflect the market results and are therefore not
included in this analysis. However, the general trend is to implicitly integrate the auc-
tions into the settlement of the market results (market splitting). This is supported by
the increasing demand for the efficient utilization of the interconnector capacities.
Not only is the interaction of international markets of great relevance but the inter-
dependencies between intra-national markets is as well. The reserve power market
interacts with the wholesale power market, since generation capacities are required
for assuring security of supply (see Table 3.1 for an overview of the reserve products).
In the reserve power market, 5.7 to 7.2 GW of positive reserve and 4.3 to 6.2 GW of
negative reserve were auctioned within the time frame under consideration and were
therefore not available for the economic settlement of the wholesale power market.
These capacities were required for primary, secondary and tertiary reserve.
Primary reserve is required to react instantly in the case of frequency imbalances.
This product is responsible for the first five minute time frame and is substituted by
secondary reserve afterwards for the following 10 minutes. These two products are
22
3 FUNDAMENTALS OF RES-E MARKET INTEGRATION
Table 3.1: Overview of auctioned reserve power products (10/2008-12/2009 in MW)
Reserve products direction Min Max
Primary negative/positive 656 664
Secondary negative 2,064 2,340
positive 2,678 3,013
Tertiary negative 1,559 3,238
positive 2,285 3,508
Total negative 4,279 6,242
positive 5,619 7,185
Source: Nicolosi (2010), based on Regelleistung.net (2010).
automatically controlled by the TSOs. Since primary and secondary reserve power
are spinning reserves, these plants need to generate power to supply positive and
negative reserve. One exception is the provision of secondary reserve by non-
spinning hydro power plants with sufficiently quick start-up times. Tertiary reserve
needs to be online within 15 minutes and can therefore also be met by non-spinning
reserves, e.g. by open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs) with short start-up times. While
tertiary reserve is auctioned every workday for the following workday and weekend,
primary and secondary reserves are auctioned every month. In other words, the
power plants that win the auctions for primary and secondary reserve are obliged
to stay online for the entire month, independent of spot market results. The power
plants that supply negative reserve are required to generate according to the con-
tracted margin above their minimal load restriction in order to reduce the infeed when
required. In consequence, the flexibility of the German power generation was signifi-
cantly lowered by the negative reserve power requirements of 4,279 to 6,242 MW in
the considered time frame, of which 2,720 to 3,004 MW were auctioned monthly and
1,559 to 3,238 MW were auctioned daily. Because the tertiary reserve is auctioned
every workday, the auction results serve as an indicator for market tightness, since
the additional opportunity costs result in higher reserve power prices in tight market
situations. Therefore, these market results are analyzed in the hours of extremely
negative prices of below -100 EUR/MWh in section 3.1.3.
Due to its broad technology mix, the German power market is a good example for
an investigation of the flexibility of power systems. A substantial base load plant fleet
(see Table 3.2) satisfies the base demand throughout the year. Load following is
mostly conducted by hard coal plants and gas-fired power plants. Table 3.2 shows
the available conventional capacity according to the voluntary declaration of market
participants on the EEX transparency website between October 2008 and December
2009 as well as the installed RES-E capacity at the end of 2008 and 2009 respec-
tively.
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Table 3.2: Available capacities in Germany (MW)
Technology Min Max
Nuclear 10,914 18,266
Lignite 11,703 18,766
Hardcoal 8,986 16,675
Natural Gas 6,868 13,925
Oil 1,159 2,409
Hydro 3,463 4,574
Others 356 451
Wind 23,897 25,777
Photovoltaics 5,877 8,877
Biomass 3,973 4,429
Source: Nicolosi (2010).
The RES-E market growth has been substantial in the last 10 years. Germany started
in 1990 with a feed-in tariff system. The so-called ’Stromeinspeisegesetz’ was tech-
nology neutral and linked to the end consumer price. In 2000, the Renewable Energy
Sources Act (EEG) came into force and implemented a technology-specific, highly
diversified feed-in tariff structure to allow for deployment in less efficient locations on
the one hand and to lower the producer rents at favourable locations on the other.
The TSOs are obliged to purchase any amount of RES-E from the plants and inte-
grate them into the market (EEG (2008)). Beginning in 2010, the TSOs directly sell
RES-E to the EEX (before 2010, distributors were forced to integrate a fixed RES-E
share into their portfolio). This rule had to be followed at all times without consider-
ation of the demand. On the one hand, the fixed feed-in tariff, in combination with
the guaranteed purchase, has increased the investment security and thereby led to
a significant growth of installed capacities and market share. On the other hand,
the forced RES-E market integration, independent of the level of demand, covers an
increasingly high share of the demand and even leads to potential ’oversupply’ situ-
ations. Consequently, the market clearance is threatened due to this flawed market
design. This leads to challenging situations in low demand hours, which can easily
be identified via the resulting market prices.
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3.1.3 Empirical Investigation
The data for this investigation stem from a variety of sources which, in combination,
help to explain the market situation of supply, demand and market results. The market
result comprises spot power prices as well as the actual generation, and the available
capacity on the supply side has been provided by EEX. The time frame starts with
the first occurrence of negative prices at the EEX and ends in December 2009. From
2010 on, the German regulator installed out-of-market curtailment rules, which made
negative prices very rare.
The actual wind power infeed has been provided by the German Energy and Hydro
Association (BDEW). The day-ahead wind power forecast would have provided a bet-
ter explanation of the market results, since the actual wind power infeed is the value
every market participant tries to predict. There are numerous wind forecasts avail-
able and every market participant uses a different one or a combination of several.
Since, in this section, the actual market situation is analyzed, the realized values are
used. The fact that the spot price is settled day-ahead, and is therefore based on
slightly different information, is of minor importance for the investigation of tight mar-
ket situations. The same is true for the realized load which has been provided by
the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E).
BDEW also supplied monthly data on the total RES-E generation. Reduced by the
hourly wind power infeed, the RES-E data have been calculated as a monthly band in
order to take the must-run generation of other RES into account. Thus, load and wind
power infeed, in combination with a band of the remaining RES-E, form the residual
load. The reserve power market provides an additional hint of the market tightness.
The data of the auction results stem from the shared website of the German TSOs
(regelleistung.net). In the following subsections, the data are aligned in a way in which
the relative tightness of the market becomes apparent.
Overview of the Market Behavior in the Entire Time Frame
For a first impression, Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the data for the time frame
between October 2008 and December 2009. In Figure 3.3, the residual load is ex-
pressed on the x-axis and the power price on the y-axis. The scatterplots’ shape
resembles the merit-order curve. It can be seen that in tight market situations, on
both ends of the curve, the market reaction has deviated from the usual pattern.
All hours with negative prices have been found to have a residual load below 30 GW.
The reason why these dots are not aligned more smoothly is that the flexibility short-
age of the power market depends on power plants that are online, which strongly
depends on the season. When a significant number of base load plants is in revision,
the residual load can become much lower before a negative price occurs. Conversely,
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Figure 3.3: Spot prices and residual load
Source: Nicolosi (2010), data provided by ENTSO-E (2010b), BDEW (2010) and
EPEX Spot (2010).
if all plants are online, the system will be under pressure much earlier.
Next, the market behavior in the time frame is evaluated from the supply side. Figure
3.4 provides an overview of the utilization of the conventional generation from nu-
clear, lignite, hard coal and gas.4 The y-axis denotes the spot price and the x-axis,
the share of generation from a given energy source in the respective registered avail-
able capacity for each day. Through this approach, one can analyze how the relative
utilization has been without the previously explained seasonality effects.
Power generation from nuclear power plants (upper-left corner) shows very little fluc-
tuation. The total generation is never below 60% of the available capacity, with a
strong concentration above 90%. The generation from lignite (upper-right corner)
shows a little more flexibility. However, the share is never below 45% of the avail-
able lignite-fired capacity, whereas the concentration is above 80% utilization. The
distribution of hard coal-based generation (lower-left corner) and natural gas-based
generation (lower-right corner) is quite different from the two base load technologies.
While no energy source ever falls below a 10% share, the generation from hard coal
4 Due to data errors in December 2009 for lignite, this month is not included in the illustration.
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Figure 3.4: Utilization of capacity by energy source
Source: Nicolosi (2010), data provided by EEX Transparency (2010) and EPEX Spot
(2010).
fluctuates between 10% and 100%. In contrast, generation from natural gas is never
above 90% utilization, which is probably due to system security requirements. If the
entire power plant mix is highly utilized, natural gas-fired power plants are most likely
used to provide positive reserve power.
The Significant Negative Prices
Between October 2008 and December 2009, 19 hours exhibited extremely negative
prices (below -100 EUR/MWh). An overview of the conventional supply side in these
hours is provided in Table 3.3.
Generation from nuclear and lignite power plants were found to account for much
higher percentages of available capacity than hard coal and gas fired power stations.
Even at the lowest spot price of -500 EUR/MWh on October 4th, the total capacity had
an utilization of 46% (generation as share of available capacity), which corresponds
to a thermal generation of 26 GW in this hour. Nuclear power plants were utilized to
83% and lignite power plants to 71%. The relative utilization on December 26th was
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Table 3.3: Supply-side data of 19 hours with substantially negative prices
Index Day Date Hour Price Nuclear Lignite Hardcoal Gas Total
[MW] [%] [MW] [%] [MW] [%] [MW] [%] [MW] [%]
Mo 22.12.2008 Avail. Cap. 17,814 18,050 15,683 13,872 47,605
1 3 -101.5 12,938 72.6 8,462 46.9 2,085 13.3 2,523 18.2 29,102 40.4
2 4 -101.5 12,646 71.0 8,300 46.0 2,074 13.2 2,575 18.6 28,686 39.9
3 5 -101.5 12,904 72.4 8,713 48.3 2,121 13.5 2,606 18.8 29,424 40.9
Su 08.03.2009 Avail. Cap. 14,989 17,201 13,103 11,502 62,821
4 7 -110.0 13,629 90.9 13,112 76.2 3,907 29.8 2,771 24.1 36,239 57.7
Mo 04.05.2009 Avail. Cap. 14,453 16,819 14,000 10,660 63,123
5 2 -151.7 13,034 90.2 12.284 73.0 2,218 15.8 1,119 10.5 32,181 51.0
6 5 -99.7 13,478 93.3 13,344 79.3 2,789 20.0 1,285 12.1 34,275 54.3
Su 04.10.2009 Avail. Cap. 13,138 15,666 12,911 9,475 56,928
7 2 -105.8 11,136 84.8 11,089 70.8 1,809 14.0 1,061 11.2 26,690 46.9
8 3 -500.0 10,913 83.1 11,042 70.5 1,765 13.7 1,035 10.9 26,361 46.3
9 4 -100.1 10,842 82.5 10,942 69.8 1,763 13.7 1,034 10.9 26,175 46.0
Su 24.11.2009 Avail. Cap. 17,013 17,420 15,416 12,156 68,379
10 4 -149.9 14,098 82.9 11,608 66.6 3,103 20.1 2,292 18.9 32,703 47.8
Tu 26.12.2009 Avail. Cap. 17,213 17,137 13,979 10,363 65,347
11 1 -119.9 12,033 69.9 10,215 59.6 1,728 12.4 2,724 26.3 29,054 44.5
12 2 -120.0 11,470 66.6 10,005 58.4 1,684 12.0 2,531 24.4 27,990 42.8
13 3 -120.0 10,627 61.7 9,908 57.8 1,678 12.0 2,422 23.4 26,886 41.1
14 4 -120.0 10,705 62.2 10,151 59.2 1,702 12.2 2,401 23.2 27,207 41.6
15 5 -120.0 11,149 64.8 10,153 59.2 1,742 12.5 2,434 23.5 27,745 42.5
16 6 -120.0 11,256 65.4 10,152 59.2 1,780 12.7 2,484 24.0 27,968 42.8
17 7 -200.0 10,990 63.8 10,008 58.4 1,844 13.2 2,528 24.4 27,711 42.4
18 8 -199.9 11,469 66.8 10,288 60.0 1,852 13.2 2,531 24.4 28,678 43.9
19 9 -120.0 12,646 73.5 11,105 64.8 1,894 13.5 2,657 25.6 31,067 47.5
Source: Nicolosi (2010), data provided by EEX Transparency (2010) and EPEX Spot (2010).
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lower due to the longer duration of the negative price period.
A look on the demand side in Table 3.4 illustrates how the mix of load and wind in-
feed leads to the residual load, which the conventional market needs to cover. The
hour with the most extreme negative price of -500 EUR/MWh occurred on October
4th, 2009. The average wind power infeed was 4.5 GW within the considered time
frame. The wind power infeed on May 4th, 2009 was not considerably above that
average. However, the low load in these hours, in combination with the modest wind
power infeed, resulted in one of the most negative prices so far. In contrast, on Octo-
ber 4th, the wind infeed was quite significant, while the load was not uncommonly low.
Table 3.4: Demand-side data of 19 hours with substantially negative prices
Index Day Date Hour Price Wind Demand Res. Demand
EUR/MWh MWh MWh MWh
1 Mo 22.12.2008 3 -102 15,787 41,763 25,976
2 Mo 22.12.2008 4 -102 15,897 41,845 25,948
3 Mo 22.12.2008 5 -102 16,022 42,919 26,897
4 Su 08.03.2009 7 -110 8,722 38,488 29,766
5 Mo 04.05.2009 2 -152 4,965 34,922 29,957
6 Mo 04.05.2009 5 -100 4,786 36,973 32,187
7 Su 04.10.2009 2 -106 17,607 42,051 24,444
8 Su 04.10.2009 3 -500 17,188 40,874 23,686
9 Su 04.10.2009 4 -100 17,072 40,176 23,104
10 Tu 24.11.2009 4 -150 17,614 50,041 32,427
11 Sa 26.12.2009 1 -120 19,809 48,107 28,298
12 Sa 26.12.2009 2 -120 19,263 45,566 26,303
13 Sa 26.12.2009 3 -120 18,262 44,250 25,988
14 Sa 26.12.2009 4 -120 17,259 43,799 26,540
15 Sa 26.12.2009 5 -120 16,264 43,666 27,402
16 Sa 26.12.2009 6 -120 15,704 42,982 27,278
17 Sa 26.12.2009 7 -200 14,464 40,903 26,439
18 Sa 26.12.2009 8 -200 13,929 41,835 27,906
19 Sa 26.12.2009 9 -120 13,579 43,588 30,009
Source: Nicolosi (2010), based on EPEX Spot (2010), BDEW (2010) and ENTSO-E (2010b).
Nonetheless, this combination led to the lowest price observed in Europe so far. In
comparison, the residual load on November 24th was almost 9 GW above the level
of October 4th. On November 24th, a significant negative price occurred indepen-
dently from a weekend or a holiday for the first time. At that time, more plants were
online, such that the market became less flexible in terms of the possibility of further
reducing the generation, e.g. due to minimal load restrictions. These fundamental
flexibility reducing factors can also be observed as high capacity prices on the market
for negative tertiary reserve. Table 3.5 provides an overview of the market results in
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times of the extreme events.
Although the market for tertiary reserve has gate-closure at the last workday for the
next workday, the overall expectation of the market tightness is well illustrated in the
market results. It strikes the eye that the market was very tight on December 26th.
Together, the information from Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 provide an overview of the
main market characteristics which triggered the extreme negative price events. Low
demand with an eventually high wind power infeed in combination with an inflexible
power mix, observable as high negative reserve power prices, leads to highly nega-
tive spot market power prices.
Table 3.5: Tertiary reserve prices of 19 hours with substantially negative prices
Index Day Date Hour Price Positive Negative
EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR/MWh
1 Mo 22.12.2008 3 -102 0 31
2 Mo 22.12.2008 4 -102 0 31
3 Mo 22.12.2008 5 -102 0 29
4 Su 08.03.2009 7 -110 2 75
5 Mo 04.05.2009 2 -152 1 13
6 Mo 04.05.2009 5 -100 5 14
7 Su 04.10.2009 2 -106 0 81
8 Su 04.10.2009 3 -500 0 81
9 Su 04.10.2009 4 -100 0 81
10 Tu 24.11.2009 4 -150 1 68
11 Sa 26.12.2009 1 -120 1 100
12 Sa 26.12.2009 2 -120 1 100
13 Sa 26.12.2009 3 -120 1 100
14 Sa 26.12.2009 4 -120 1 100
15 Sa 26.12.2009 5 -120 1 185
16 Sa 26.12.2009 6 -120 1 185
17 Sa 26.12.2009 7 -200 1 185
18 Sa 26.12.2009 8 -200 1 185
19 Sa 26.12.2009 9 -120 1 16
Source: Nicolosi (2010), data provided by Regelleistung.net (2010) and EPEX Spot (2010).
Since the market showed the lowest price on October 4th, in order to get a better idea
of the market dynamics, Figure 3.5 shows the corresponding generation of the main
energy sources on the right axis as well as the spot price and the price for negative
tertiary reserve on the left axis.
The first observation in Figure 3.5 is that the spot prices and the price for negative
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tertiary reserve are negatively correlated. This led to the highest price for negative
tertiary reserve when the spot price had its negative peak at -500 EUR/MWh. The
second observation is that no energy source reduced its generation to zero. Nat-
ural gas- and hard coal-based generation were strongly reduced in the hours with
negative prices. Lignite-based generation was reduced quite significantly for a base
load technology. In contrast, the generation from nuclear plants was hardly reduced.
These observations confirm the lessons learned from Figure 3.4, illustrating, more or
less, the fluctuating generation of the different energy sources. In summary, one can
say that the flexibility of the aggregated supply side is probably lower than expected,
since all technologies show limited bandwidths of flexibility and altogether were not
able to reduce the generation below 46% of the available capacity. Especially base
load technologies showed thresholds which seem to be at relatively high levels.
Figure 3.5: Dispatch on October 4th, 2009
Source: Nicolosi (2010), data provided by EEX Transparency (2010) and EPEX Spot
(2010).
3.1.4 Impact of Support Schemes and Curtailment Regulation on
Market Prices
With the two predominant power system attributes of inflexible demand and forced
RES-E infeed, the conventional power capacity is the only flexibility option of the cur-
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rent German power system. If this was a static system, one would probably argue
that the limitation of wind power infeed in low demand hours would be the solution.
However, having the dynamics of the power system evolution in mind, it becomes ap-
parent that this approach is short-sighted, as it reduces the market signals that reward
flexibility and facilitates the necessary structural changes. Due to its climate policy,
Germany has ambitious targets for its renewable energy deployment.5 Therefore, a
more balanced approach is required to enable an increasing RES-E infeed on the
one hand and to provide market signals that trigger the right investments on the other
hand.
One step in facing this challenge has been the implementation of a market based
option in the EEG, which allows RES-E plant operators to sell their electricity directly
to the market. By now, the option has not been used to a great extent due to the
lack of a premium system as a profitable alternative to the FIT. In this support system,
RES-E operators would receive a premium on top of the market price for every sold
energy unit. As soon as a premium is available that is high enough to motivate plant
operators to switch to this EEG option, the amount of the premium would become
the lowest possible negative price these operators would bid into the market before
curtailing their generation. Without the premium option, TSOs would have to place an
open bid (which means at the negative cap of -3000 EUR) into the market, if it was
not for a last minute regulation change of the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur
(BNetzA). On February 22nd, 2010, an interim rule (valid until the end of 2010) was
published, which allowed some flexibility in the RES-E market integration (BNetzA
(2010b)). If 60% of the installed wind power capacity were utilized and the national
load was at the same time below 60% of the peak load of 2009, the TSOs were then
allowed to place restricted bids. The height of these bids needed to change randomly,
so that other market participants were not able to guess at which price wind power
was integrated into the market. If not all the wind power was sold, bilateral arrange-
ments with RES-E plant operators were possible to curtail their generation.
This interim rule increased insecurities about the actual amount of wind power in the
market. Therefore, in the medium-term, the premium system is strongly preferable
compared to the interim rule, since the placing of bids in the market would depend
on fundamental and publicly available data, which increases the transparency of the
market. The question about the optimal bid for wind power remains. From a static
economic perspective, the value of wind power is zero as soon as the wholesale
price is zero. However, RES-E has additional attributes, such as environmental ben-
efits, which are politically supported. Therefore, the value seems to be above the
wholesale power price. This would explain negative bids, but does not justify the
risk of lacking market clearance. Finding the exact value for a premium or an out-of-
market curtailment rule is nevertheless challenging, due to the interdependence with
the conventional part of the power market. According to various market participants,
5 The detailed technology-specific targets will be discussed in greater detail in section 6.1.
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negative prices below -100 EUR are fundamentally not explainable from the perspec-
tive of a conventional generator (BNetzA (2010a)). To answer this question requires
a complex analysis of detailed technical restrictions and market developments in the
consecutive hours in which the opportunity costs arise.
The empirical examples of the German power market show that the market design
in the considered time frame had a flaw, which could lead to a non-clearing market.
As already mentioned, due to this reason, the BNetzA implemented an out-of mar-
ket curtailment rule in Germany. As a result, in 2010 there were hardly any negative
prices observable. However, market participants strongly argued against this particu-
lar approach because it reduces the transparency of the market. Traders who rely on
wind forecasts do not know how much wind power is actually bid into the market. This
causes unnecessary friction in the market in addition to forecast deviations. However,
the flaw of the market design needed to be fixed in order to avoid a market failure.
The BNetzA has revisited this rule, such that from 2011 on, limited RES-E bids of
the TSOs are only allowed if a second auction is required due to a resulting market
price below -150 EUR/MWh. These bids must to be between the bandwidth of -150
EUR and -350 EUR. Each TSO is obligated to split the bids into ten equal pieces and
bid randomly within the bandwidth. This leads to 40 random negative bids for RES-E
from the four TSOs in total.
With the next amendment of the EEG in 2012, a premium system is likely to replace
the curtailment rule, since the premium level determines the amount of the nega-
tive bid. If, e.g. the premium for one MWh of wind power is 50 EUR, the operator
would sell the wind energy until the spot market reaches -50 EUR because the sell
is profitable until this level. If the power price is below -50 EUR, the operator curtails
the wind power infeed due to economic consideration. No out-of market rule would
be required to reach market clearance. Curtailment rules would only be required if
grid bottlenecks occur independently of the market results within one price zone. In
Germany, the TSOs redispatch conventional generators in this case. For RES-E, ad-
ditional rules are usually required.
The effects of a premium system can be observed in the ERCOT market in Texas.
Texas has a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) which sets minimum targets for RES-
E. However, the actual RES-E share is much higher than the current target. Conse-
quently, the RPS tradable certificate price is close to 0 USD/MWh. The majority of the
wind generation is deployed in the western Texas price zone, due to very favorable
wind conditions. This price area however has a very low demand, which makes it ideal
for this analysis. In addition to the RPS, a federal RES-E support scheme is in place.
The production tax credit (PTC) provides tax cuts for generated and sold RES-E. As
a consequence, the PTC has the same effect as a fix premium system, since it is paid
on top of the market price. The resulting bidding behavior can best be observed for
the year 2008 in Figure 3.6. The price duration curves are market results of one year
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in an anticlimactic order. Initially, one can see that a significant share of the power
prices in 2008 is negative. In addition, the negative power prices converge to a cer-
tain level. This level is the previously-explained level of the PTC or premium payment.
Figure 3.6: Price duration curves of the ERCOT market
Source: own illustration, data provided by ERCOT (2010a).
The price duration curve of 2009 shows a different pattern. Especially in the higher
priced hours, the price level is much lower than the price level of the previous year.
For this change, economic reasons such as a lower natural gas price are responsi-
ble. The focus of this section however lies on the lower priced region of the price
duration curve. During the year 2009, 850 MW of wind power capacity was added
to the portfolio. However, the price duration curve of 2009 shows significantly less
negative prices compared to the previous year. What first seems counter intuitive can
be explained by the previously-discussed regulatory changes. A significant share of
the wind power capacity is installed in McCamey county. Since this deployment hap-
pened at a very fast pace, the grid infrastructure could not carry all wind energy at
times of high infeed. Due to this reason, at the beginning of 2009, an out-of-market
curtailment rule was implemented. Since the wind power curtailment notice reduces
the amount of wind power bid into the market, the market-based curtailment was dra-
matically reduced compared to 2008.
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This section showed that as long as the grid infrastructure is sufficient to distribute
wind energy, a market-based curtailment rule can lead to market clearance and is
therefore favorable compared to other methods currently implemented in Germany.
However, if the grid infrastructure is insufficient, out-of-market curtailment rules are
required to ensure system security. In the Texan example, one can easily observe
that the presence of these rules can change market results and consequently mar-
ket signals significantly. However, correct market signals are necessary to trigger the
right investments. In the case of Texas, a transmission investment plan has been
established to enable the system to carry the high wind power share. Infrastruc-
ture investments are the result of a planning process within a regulated component
of most power markets. This thesis focuses on the competitive part of the power
market, which covers the wholesale market and also the investments in generating
capacities. Efficient power plant investments as a consequence of market signals
that are triggered by a high RES-E share are discussed in the next section.
3.2 Long-Term Effects
This section covers two different effects that explain a shift in the optimal power plant
portfolio: the utilization and the flexibility effect. The increasing RES-E share in a non-
growing system necessarily leads to a reduction in the utilization of the conventional
power plant capacity. In the long-run, under consideration of investment decisions,
this leads to a shift towards a lower base load capacity share since base load plants
require a high utilization due to their high fixed costs. If the system has an increasing
demand, it simply reduces the investment needs for base load plants.
Figure 3.7 shows probability distributions of the load and the residual load in Germany
for the above discussed time frame. Although both distributions represent the same
time frame, one can see how the requirements for the conventional part of the system
change due to the high RES-E share of 16.1% in 2009 (BMU (2010a)). As a reference
point, the red arrow indicates the load level at which the -500 EUR price occurred.
The peak load is reduced and the overall distribution is moved to lower load regions.
The lower slope of the residual load in the peak area indicates that the highest residual
load level materializes less often, while the high load levels have a higher probability
of occurring. This effect can also be shown by annual load duration curves, as done
in the lower right corner of Figure 3.86. Load duration curves show all load levels of
one year in an adjacent order. One can see that the peak load is hardly reduced,
while the lowest load changes substantially.
6 The data are from an ERCOT case with a high wind energy share, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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Figure 3.7: Change of load structure (solid line: load; dashed line: residual load)
Source: Nicolosi (2010), based on BDEW (2010) and ENTSO-E (2010b).
The Utilization Effect
Based on the load duration curves, one can derive a rough estimate on the optimal
structure of the optimal power plant portfolio for a given demand structure. Since
the load duration curves have no information on the structural requirements of the
chronological order of the load levels, the results are based purely on the utilization
of a generating technology.
The upper right corner illustrates streaming curves with annuity capacity costs as a
starting point at the ordinate. It can be seen that base load plants have relatively high
investment costs and low variable costs (i.e. fuel and CO2 costs). Peak load plants
have low investment costs and relatively high variable costs. The abscissa shows the
annual utilization time at which the plant types become efficient. Base load plants are
economically viable when a high utilization time can be reached. Peak load plants are
the efficient choice when the utilization remains at a low level (see, e.g. Stoft (2002)
and Nabe (2006)). In the lower right graph, the two annual load duration curves are
depicted. The shift of the shares of the different power plant types can be seen in
the lower left graph. This shift stems from the relationship between the relatively high
RES-E infeed, compared to its relatively low share of secured capacity of the total
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Figure 3.8: Capacity adaptation to RES-E increase
Source: own illustration, data provided by ERCOT (2010a).
RES-E capacity, since the RES-E generation is not guaranteed in the hours of peak
demand. However, because of regional distribution, it is also unlikely that there is
simultaneously no wind whatsoever in all regions. That means that a certain amount
of wind capacity can be accounted as guaranteed nonetheless. This guaranteed
capacity, which is called capacity credit, is able to substitute a certain amount of con-
ventional capacity in the power plant mix. Compared to the RES-E infeed however,
the share of substitutable capacity is relatively low. Dena (2005) has calculated that
a wind capacity of 14.5 MW in Germany in 2003 had a capacity credit of between
7% and 9%, meaning that between 1.0 and 1.3 GW of conventional capacity could
have been substituted. One important implication is that an increasing penetration
reduces the relative capacity credit. The above-mentioned study also calculated that
the considered 35.9 GW wind capacity in 2015 would be associated with a capacity
credit of only 5% to 6%. The result of a high intermitting RES-E share with a relatively
low capacity credit is an increase in peak load capacity and a decrease in base load
capacity.
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The Flexibility Effect
In addition to the utilization-based shift of the capacity mix, the previously-discussed
negative power prices catalyze this trend by penalizing less flexible generation capac-
ity. Since base load plants avoid unnecessary ramping, negative bids are one sign of
limited flexibility. Due to the inflexible demand, negative prices are a tool for finding an
efficient market result. However, if negative prices occur very often and are very high,
it can be interpreted as a sign of too little flexibility in the market. In addition to the
utilization requirements of particular plants, this additional sign of required flexibility
in the long-run leads to more investments in more flexible generating technologies
which are better equipped to follow the load.
With the increase of intermitting RES-E the gradient of the residual load can fre-
quently be steeper than in a system without RES-E. Especially in the morning hours,
when load increases and the wind power infeed decreases, more conventional power
plants are required to ramp-up within a short time frame to compensate both effects.
To cover these situations, sufficient quick starting capacity is required to serve the
load pattern which is eventually substituted by later ramp-ups of baseload plants.
Both effects, the steep load gradient and the penalty for running through load valleys
by accepting negative prices, lead to more demand for flexible units and penalize
base load units.
The utilization effect and the flexibility effect are separated in chapter 5, where at-
tributes of the optimization model and the effects of high RES-E penetration are ex-
plained.
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4 The High Temporal Resolution Electricity
Market Analysis Model
This chapter explains the ’The High Temporal Resolution Electricity Market Analysis
Model’ (THEA). As indicated in the motivation chapter, the aspired computation is too
complex to solve it in a global investment and dispatch model. Therefore, this chapter
explains the basic methodology which enables THEA to calculate the impact of RES-
E on the capacity mix in high temporal resolution.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, the general structure of Benders Decom-
position is explained in a simplified manner with a limited equation set to illustrate
the basic principles of the process. Second, the modeling framework of THEA is
explained in a qualitative way to provide an intuitive understanding of the method-
ology. Third, the technical model description provides insight into the equation sets
of the investment and the dispatch part of the model, which supplements the initial
explanation of Benders Algorithm.
4.1 Benders Decomposition Algorithm
To allow efficient solutions to the dispatch and capacity expansion problem in such
a high temporal resolution, an approach that was first presented by Benders (1962),
and is known as ’Benders Decomposition’, is implemented. Based on the duality
theory, large mathematical problems can be decomposed into smaller problems by
fixing the complicating variable in the subproblem (SP) and optimizing it in the master
problem (MP) through an iterative algorithm that converges when an optimal solution
is reached. Cote and Laughton (1979) presented an initial application of Benders
Decomposition to power system optimization and proved its advantages for a sim-
ple investment and operation problem in terms of memory requirements and solution
times.
In addition to Benders (1962) and Cote and Laughton (1979), a recent mathematical
proof is provided by Conejo et al. (2006), who show that
’if a linear programming problem has a decomposable structure
with complicating constraints, its dual linear programming problem
has a decomposable structure with complicating variables. And
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conversely, if a linear programming problem has a decomposable
structure with complicating variables its dual linear programming
problem has a decomposable structure with complicating constraints’
(p. 109).
This is the foundation of the Benders Decomposition approach. The information
transfer from the SP to the MP is possible due to the introduction of the function α,
which iteratively reduces the solution space of the MP by adding so called ’Benders
Cuts’. It is important to note that α is convex. Since the original linear problem has the
structure of a convex polytope, the structure of α is also convex, as it is restricted by
the fixed values of the previous capacity investment decisions, which are all solutions
of the constrained MP. This will be further explained in the following explanation of
the algorithm (for a more detailed discussion on the mathematical proofs, see Conejo
et al. (2006)).
The Benders Decomposition approach has been further applied for stochastic and
integer programming applications, while the challenge of utilizing the approach for
’real world’ power systems has been summarized by Wang (1996):
’Methods of Benders Decomposition are somewhat complicated,
and their application may be computationally impossible for large
power systems’ (p. 50).
Fortunately, the latter concerns have subsequently been addressed by the recent de-
velopments of the IT industry, thereby overcoming computational challenges. To the
knowledge of the author, THEA is the first application of Benders Decomposition that
utilizes a dynamic approach by computing investment decisions in five-year steps
rather than one single investment decision for the year under observation, while also
making those decisions on the basis of full dispatch years with 8760 hours each and
for multiple zones. The actual time saving due to the utilization of Benders Decom-
position is not easy to assess since large problems, as the one used in this research,
would not be solvable at all within a global model due to the limits of working memory
and acceptable computation time (less than a few weeks).7 Therefore, one way of en-
abling the complex optimization needs to be applied. As an example of a small case
study, Baíllo et al. (2002) compare two decomposition approaches for day-ahead bid-
ding in the electricity market, ’Lagrangian Relaxation’ and ’Benders Decomposition’.
Solving the case study with Lagrangian Relaxation required 614 seconds and with
Benders Decomposition, 41 seconds. However, each model structure consists of
its individual challenges, which makes a generalization of these findings not recom-
mendable. However, a general rule seems to be that in smaller problems, Benders
Decomposition is slower due to higher communication requirements and the time sav-
7 This research was enabled by utilizing the modeling server of the Berkeley Lab, which at that time had
16 cores and a working memory of 72 GB. Depending on the actual problem size, the scenarios in this thesis
required three to four days to solve.
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ing increases with the model size.
In the following, the principle of the algorithm is described step by step for a reduced
power market model before it is embedded in the entire technical model description
in section 4.3.8
The algorithm starts with the initialization of the iteration counter I, before the invest-
ment model starts, which is the master problem (MP) of this approach. The initial MP
is a reduced form of the later MP since no information on the capacity value from the
dispatch part is available yet. The objective function of the MP minimizes the invest-
ment costs,
Min
∑
t
fct ∗ CAPt (4.1)
with fct as annualized investment costs per technology and CAPt as capacity per
technology, subject to the minimum capacity restriction,
∑
t
CAPt ≥ maxload (4.2)
in order to provide sufficient capacity to cover the maximal load maxload for the
following first dispatch model run. Since no information on the structural requirements
of an optimal capacity mix is available in the initial MP, the least cost capacity is
deployed to fulfill the peak load requirement. At this point, the capacity mixed is
passed on to the dispatch model or sub problem (SP) via the following equation:
installedcapt = CAP
I
t . (4.3)
The term installedcapt is written in lower cases, since the variable CAPt becomes
a parameter in the dispatch problem.
Every time the MP solved, the lower bound (LB) of the algorithm is computed:
8 In the following, variables are expressed in capital and parameters in lower case letters.
41
4 THE HIGH TEMPORAL RESOLUTION ELECTRICITY MARKET ANALYSIS MODEL
LB =
∑
t
fct ∗ CAPt + α. (4.4)
The term α is explained below. It originates from an equation that does not show
up in the initial MP. Therefore, the LB from the initial MP is simply the aggregated
investment cost.
Next, the SP is initialized. The objective function of the SP minimizes the dispatch
costs,
Min
∑
h
∑
t
vct ∗GENt,h (4.5)
with vct as variable costs per technology, which incorporates fuel and CO2 costs per
technology and GENt,h as generation per technology and hour, subject to the en-
ergy market constraint
∑
t
GENt,h = demandh (4.6)
which requires that the demand demandh has to be met at every point in time. In
order to meet the demand, only the available capacity installedcap can be used.
Therefore, the capacity constraint, which originated from the MP, limits the amount of
available generating capacity, as follows:
GENt,h ≤ installedcapt. (4.7)
The dual of this equation provides the intrinsic value of the available capacity for the
next MP. For now, further dispatch constraints are dropped for this initial explanation
of Benders Algorithm.
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After the SP, an upper bound for the convergence of the algorithm is computed:
UB =
∑
t
vct ∗GENt +
∑
t
fct ∗ CAPt. (4.8)
The algorithm proceeds with a convergence check after the first iteration:
UB − LB
UB
< ǫ (4.9)
Since the initial MP had no information on the dispatch costs and α was zero, the
algorithm will not converge after the initial iteration, as the fraction is larger than the
predefined tolerance ǫ. In the second iteration, the Benders Cut is added to the MP
equation set in the form of an additional constraint:
α ≥ subcostsI +
∑
t
λ
I
t ∗ (CAPt − installedcap
I
t ). (4.10)
The Benders Cut computes the optimality of the capacity mix which was available in
the SP. Thereby, subcosts is the total dispatch cost of the SP and λt is the capacity
constraints’ dual, which contains information on the value of the particular technology.
α is then added to the objective function,
Min
∑
t
fct ∗ CAPt + α (4.11)
in order to enable a cost minimizing investment decision which incorporates the in-
formation from the SP. After a new capacity mix is calculated, it is passed on to the
dispatch problem once again to start the next iteration. The algorithm adds one Ben-
ders Cut per iteration and reduces the solution space until convergence is reached.
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4.2 Qualitative Model Description
THEA is a linear optimization dispatch and investment model. The hourly dispatch is
made possible by the implementation of the previously-explained decomposition tech-
nique. Investment decisions are computed in 5-year steps up to 2070, which enables
an economic interpretation until 2030 due to long investment lifetimes. THEA’s main
advantage is a high resolution investment decision based on a full dispatch year. Not
only does the investment decision consider all extreme situations of one year, but the
dispatch part of the model provides information on part-load and start-up costs based
on a full year allowing for a detailed analysis of typical as well as extreme contiguous
time frames.
Again, the capacity mix is determined by investment decisions in the MP. The invest-
ment decisions are optimized according to the results from the dispatch part of the
model, which provides information on efficient capacity adaptations in the form of du-
als of the capacity restriction. This investment decision is updated in every iteration
according to the SP results until the predefined convergence criterion is fulfilled.
The hourly dispatch considers fuel-type and vintage fleet capacities in order to keep
the problem linear (i.e., the model considers all CCGTs within one vintage class as a
single unit, and therefore does not evaluate distinct individual plants). This approach
follows e.g. Müsgens (2005) and Gatzen (2008) for applications in dispatch models
and Bartels (2009) for an application in a global typeday investment and dispatch
model.
All considered technologies in THEA are distinguished between endogenous and ex-
ogenous investment possibilities according to Table 4.1. For endogenous invest-
ments, the investment costs are annualized according to a predefined depreciation
time and interest rate. The age structure of the existing fleet is mirrored by vin-
tage classes, which take technology developments into account (e.g. increasing effi-
ciency). The coal fleet has six different vintage classes, the lignite fleet five, the CCGT
fleet four, the OCGT fleet three and the nuclear fleet two. Superpeaker, hydro stor-
age, pumped storage and CAES are aggregated in one fleet each. The total amount
of vintage classes is similar to Gatzen (2008), where a pure dispatch model was ap-
plied. Considering that the same temporal resolution is used and that the complexity
has been increased by an investment problem, it becomes apparent that HPC tools
in terms of Benders Decomposition and parallel computing (on the aforementioned
16 cores of the Berkeley Lab server) are necessary.
Existing hydro power capacities and exogenous investments are also included, but
new endogenous investments are not possible due to natural resource restrictions.
Each modeled year, the gap between incumbent generation and the peak load re-
quirement has to be met by endogenous investments.
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Table 4.1: Considered technologies
Technology Endogenous Investment Exogenous Investment
Nuclear yes yes
Lignite yes yes
Hardcoal yes yes
CCGT yes yes
OCGT yes yes
Superpeaker yes yes
Hydro Storage no yes
Pumped-Storage no yes
CAES yes yes
Wind Onshore no yes
Wind Offshore no yes
Biomass no yes
Biogas no yes
Bioliquid no yes
Running Hydro no yes
Photovoltaics no yes
Concentrating Solar no yes
Geothermal no yes
Ocean no yes
Others no yes
In the dispatch problem, THEA optimizes the dispatch of the installed conventional
capacities according to the residual load. Hereby, start-up costs and part-load losses
are considered. Additionally, technical ramping constraints are taken into account lim-
iting extreme ramp-ups for individual technologies. In accordance with section 3.1, the
ramping is further limited by minimum load restrictions. Spinning and non-spinning re-
serve requirements constitute further requirements to the dispatch problem. In times
of high RES-E infeed and low load, the minimum load limitations in combination with
reserve requirements force the dispatch solution into extreme situations. To enable
the match of supply and demand, RES-E curtailment options are implemented. Since
RES-E receive market independent support, the curtailment option is only chosen if
no cheaper way is feasible. In the case of oversupply, the typical ’first choice’ flexibil-
ity is the international exchange between market zones. This exchange is limited by
exogenously-provided net transfer capacities (NTC) and causes transmission losses.
Further flexibilities on the demand and supply side are storage technologies. In sit-
uations of oversupply, storage technologies increase the demand and store energy
for high demand hours. In these high demand hours, the storage technologies are
part of the supply side and reduce the demand for expensive peaking units. While
the capacities of pumped-hydro storage are exogenously provided, compressed air
energy storage (CAES) can also be commissioned endogenously.
45
4 THE HIGH TEMPORAL RESOLUTION ELECTRICITY MARKET ANALYSIS MODEL
Since OCGT is the only technology that is able to start-up within 15 minutes, it is also
able to provide tertiary reserve without being ramped-up. While the ’superpeaker’
technology can be interpreted as long-term system security investment or a capacity
adequacy solution, OCGT investments can be interpreted as a requirement for the
quality of the capacity.
The load and the RES-E structure are provided exogenously and are based on his-
toric data. Combined with annual load and RES-E targets for each year, the residual
load is computed as well as the required installed RES-E capacities. Since the cur-
tailment per technology is limited by the total infeed of this particular technology, the
individual RES-E infeed needs to be implemented in the dispatch problem as well.
Other exogenous parameters are the availability of plants and the hydro inflow into
the reservoirs. Figure 4.1 shows the overall structure of THEA.
Figure 4.1: THEA input-output structure
Source: own illustration.
To enable the computation of this complex problem in an iterative manner, THEA adds
one additional tool from recent high-performance-computing (HPC) developments:
the dispatch is calculated in a monthly decomposed parallel mode (see Figure 4.2
46
4 THE HIGH TEMPORAL RESOLUTION ELECTRICITY MARKET ANALYSIS MODEL
for a visualization of this approach within the Benders Algorithm). The advantage
of this latter approach is that while a global model utilizes only one processor core,
THEA uses all available cores of the modeling server in the SP. In this way, the IT
infrastructure can be utilized more efficiently and the overall solution time is reduced
substantially.
The main outputs of THEA are the technology choices of the investment decision in
the MP and the generation mix of the SP. These outcomes show on an aggregated
level how the market reacts to the increasing penetration of RES-E. These results
come with the underlying investment and generation costs. A further dispatch out-
come is the international exchange and the price level. Thereby, the main advantage
of THEA is the greater temporal detail of these outcomes which are available for ev-
ery hour of the year. Especially the extreme hours can be analyzed in detail in this
way.
Brief Discussion on the Implemented Methodology
One potential way to model RES-E integration is to optimize the entire generating
capacity, consisting of the conventional and the renewable part. The drawbacks are
summarized by Neuhoff et al. (2008), who show that the optimal renewable capacity
expansion is quite sensitive to various exogenous assumptions. In particular, prede-
fined maximal growth rates in terms of available resource potential and maximal ca-
pacity expansion limits per time period determine the deployment. In turn, the model
generates extreme results if these restrictions are not set correctly within realistic
boundaries. One additional crucial assumption is the cost development of RES-E
technologies. While conventional technologies are in general mature and assump-
tions on cost developments are relatively robust, the development of RES-E invest-
ment costs is usually determined by the uncertain learning curve approach and has
therefore a much higher uncertainty. Since RES-E developments are primarily driven
by political decisions, the technology mix is a result of technology specific support
schemes and not of economic considerations. Therefore, the present approach takes
the political deployment plans as exogenous assumptions into account and not as an
option for the optimization.
One way to reduce complexity and at the same time capture extreme residual load
situations is the usage of a stochastic approach. However, modeling extreme situ-
ations which have a probability of less than 1
8760
as applied by the high resolution
in THEA is not very efficient. Nevertheless, when it comes to the calculation of an
absolute minimal capacity requirement for i.e. detailed system security studies, it
is also reasonable to take into account extreme situations that have a lower proba-
bility is reasonable. This approach is not utilized here, since it would simply affect
the absolute capacity requirement, which is set in the case of THEA by the required
47
4 THE HIGH TEMPORAL RESOLUTION ELECTRICITY MARKET ANALYSIS MODEL
reserve amounts in addition to the maximal residual load. Adding further capacity re-
quirements equally in all scenarios would simply increase the amount of superpeaker
capacity but would not affect the remaining results in any way. Modeling stochastic
trees increases the absolute amount of modeled time periods significantly. There-
fore, a stochastic approach would also require subdividing the modeling period in
order to keep the problem solvable, e.g. into days wthat are then multiplied by their
predefined probability, which affects the intertemporal constraints. This is avoided
here, since the interpretation of the pricing behavior is of particular importance for the
present research. Additionally, the interpretation of stochastic results is quite chal-
lenging. Since the effects of particular sensitivities, i.e. policy option, are the focus of
this research, the results should not primarily reflect a stochastically set path.
One particular strength of THEA is the high resolution price information. Assuming
perfect competition and foresight of a well-informed benevolent planner, the invest-
ment and dispatch costs are minimized. In contrast, global investment and dispatch
models follow a different logic when it comes to interpreting the marginals of the en-
ergy market constraint (see, e.g Bartels (2009) for an example of a complex global
investment and dispatch model). In a global model, the marginal also reflects the in-
vestment costs that are required to fulfill the demand constraint, since all constraints
are optimized simultaneously. Therefore, the marginals can only be interpreted as
long-run marginal costs, which by definition increase as soon as investments are
required. Thereby, long-run marginal costs follow the logic of the peak-load pricing
model, but are not necessarily the market results of a market under perfect compe-
tition (see discussion in section 2.3). This is due to the fact that once investments
are undertaken, the bidding process does not take sunk costs into account. In an
oligopolistic market structure, companies could influence the market results to cover
the investment costs. This however deviates from the assumption of perfect compe-
tition which is chosen here to address the fundamental effects of high RES-E pen-
etration independent from ownership assumptions. One additional weakness of the
peak-load pricing approach is the arbitrary starting-point. All investments that are
undertaken previously to the starting year are not reflected by the marginals of the
energy market constraint; future investments however are taken into account. If one
would interpret the long-run marginal costs of global investment and dispatch models,
one could understand those as the price level required to cover the required invest-
ments, but not as competitive market prices. THEA treats all investment decisions as
sunk costs since capacities are passed as parameters from the MP to the SP. This
approach ensures that the marginals of the energy market constraint can be inter-
preted as short-run marginal costs or as market prices in a competitive market.
The Implementation of Benders Decomposition
The basic steps in the dispatch and capacity expansion problem solved by THEA are
presented in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Benders structure with parallelization
Source: own illustration.
First, the initial capacity of the power system is calculated in the master problem (MP),
representing a mix of existing incumbent generation capacity as well as any new in-
stallations that are required to fulfill the power system’s overall capacity requirements.
Any new installations required to meet overall capacity obligations under these initial
conditions are chosen based on a least cost algorithm in the first iteration without con-
sidering the dispatch problem. Second, this initial generation capacity mix is passed
on to the dispatch part of THEA, the subproblem (SP). Here, THEA solves the linear
dispatch problem considering all of the above explained constraints, such as start-up,
partload costs, ramp-up constraints as well as reserve requirements. The total dis-
patch costs that come from the SP as well as the capacity duals are then passed on
to the convergence check in the third step. Here, the algorithm measures the relative
cost difference between the lower bound (LB) and the upper bound (UB). Figure 4.3
shows an example of the model convergence throughout the iterations.
The lower bound is the target function of the master problem whereas the upper
bound is derived from the dispatch cost of the SP and additional cost factors from
the MP. Since the initial MP only has information on investment costs, and not on
the inefficiency of the dispatch problem that comes from fuel, start-up and part-load
costs as well as reserve requirements, there is no possibility that the algorithm can
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Figure 4.3: Example of convergence
Source: own illustration.
converge after only one dispatch run. Since the algorithm does not converge in the
third step, in the fourth step, the full MP receives the dispatch costs as well as the
capacity duals. The so called Benders Cut then calculates the change in the capacity
mix that leads to a lower cost solution on the basis of the capacity duals, which
are calculated in the SP and passed on to the MP. In every iteration, one additional
Benders’ Cut is added to further constrain the solution space. This new capacity mix
is then again passed on to the SP and the algorithm continues. It is observable in
Figure 4.3 that after only 13 iterations, the cost difference between the upper and
lower bound is already less than 1%. If the solution is within the predefined cost
tolerance (in this thesis 0.0001), the algorithm converges with the optimal solution.
4.3 Technical Model Description
This section explains the actual analytical THEA equation sets. The code is written
in GAMS and embedded in the Benders Algorithm explained in section 4.1. Due to
the decomposed structure of THEA, this section is divided in the investment and the
dispatch part of the model.
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4.3.1 Investment Problem
The objective function in the master problem (MP) minimizes the discounted fixed
costs FCy , the fixed operation and maintenance costs FOMy as well as the term
alpha αy :
TC =
∑
y
(FCy + FOMy + αy). (4.12)
The fixed costs are the annualized investment costs of the commissioned power
plants discounted by the parameter dfacy and multiplied by the number of year nyy ,
which are represented by the modeled year. Therefore, the investment costs icr,t
are multiplied with the annuity matrix anmatr,t,y,y1. The CAP_ADDr,t variable is
computed endogenously according to the optimization calculus and the capacity re-
quirements. The capaddexr,t parameters are provided exogenously and represent
projects that are already under construction or have a high probability of being build.
The fixed costs are calculated by
FCy = dfacy ∗
∑
r
∑
t
∑
y1
icr,t ∗anmatr,t,y,y1
∗(CAP_ADDr,t + capaddexr,t) ∗
nyy
103
(4.13)
with
anmatr,t,y,y1 =
i ∗ (1 + 1)deptimer,t
(1 + i)deptimer,t − 1
(4.14)
as annuity matrix and with a depreciation time deptimer,t per technology and region.
Fixed operation and maintenance costs apply to all existing power plants CAPr,t ac-
cording to the technology-specific cost factor FOMCr,t in every considered year:
FOMy = dfacy ∗
∑
r
∑
t
CAPr,t,y ∗ fomcr,t ∗
nyy
103
. (4.15)
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The Benders Cut calculates the change in the investment decision according to the
capacity dual λr,t ,y . Thereby, subcosts
I
y is the objective value of the subproblem.
The cut shows the optimization potential of the current iteration and chooses a new
investment mix according to this information:
αy ≥ subcosts
I
y +
∑
r
∑
t
λ
I
r,t,y ∗ (CAPr,t,y − installedcap
I
r,t,y). (4.16)
Capacities are fixed for the first year of the optimization according to the parameters
existcapr,t,y . These parameters are based on data of all existing power plants for
the region under consideration,
CAPr,t,2010 = existcapr,t. (4.17)
In the subsequent periods, capacities are commissioned and decommissioned ac-
cording to the optimization calculus with two exemptions. First, capacities that are
either under construction or have a high probability of being built are added exoge-
nously by the parameter capaddexr,t. Second, existing capacities are forced out as
soon as they reach their lifetime limit:
CAPr,t,y = CAPr,t,y−1 + capaddexr,t
+CAP_ADDr,t,y ∗ feascomr,t,y − CAP_SUBr,t,y. (4.18)
Investment options can further be limited by the parameter feascomr,t,y , which sets
commissioning possibilities. The variable CAP_SUBr,t,y is responsible for decom-
missioning the capacity. Thereby, capsubexr,t,y serves as a minimal decommission-
ing parameter. Power plants can also be decommissioned before they reach the end
of their lifetime if there are cheaper options to produce energy and fulfill the peak
requirement:
∑
y1≤year
CAP_SUBr,t,y1 ≥ capsubexr,t,y. (4.19)
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Installed capacities need to be able to cover the peak demand of each year. Thereby,
the peak demand which the conventional power market needs to cover is the ac-
tual demand for electricity reduced by the exogenous generation from RES-E. There-
fore, the peak reserve requirement needs to fulfill only the peak residual demand
maxresloadr,y . Furthermore, power plants have different seasonal availabilities
availr,t since revision cycles are usually organized in times with lower demand to
ensure that the plants are available during the season with the highest demand. In
addition to the maximal residual demand, reserve capacity requirements for spin-
ning reserve spinningreserver and tertiary reserve tertiaryreserver increase the
minimal capacity requirements since even in the hour of peak demand, sufficient
positive reserve needs to be installed to ensure system security. The parameter
standingreserver can be used to define further back-up capacity requirements in
addition to the auctioned reserve requirements for spinning and tertiary reserve:
∑
t
CAPr,t,y ∗ availr,t ≥ maxresloadr,y + spinningreserver
+tertiaryreserver + standingreserver. (4.20)
The peak requirement leads to feasible dispatch problems, since sufficient generating
capacity is ensured. However, the installed capacity may not be optimal from an eco-
nomic or technical point of view. Through the iterative approach of Benders Algorithm
the capacity mix is optimized stepwise on the basis of the evaluation in the dispatch
problem.
4.3.2 Dispatch Problem
The dispatch part of the model is the subproblem within the Benders Algorithm. The
value of the investment decision is evaluated in this part of the model. Besides the
capacity duals, the variable SUBCOSTS is a crucial component which is passed on
to the MP. As explained above, the SP is further decomposed into monthly dispatch
problems which are computed in a parallel manner. After the last SP has been solved,
the relevant terms are grouped and passed on to the convergence criterion and, if no
convergence is reached, again to the MP.
53
4 THE HIGH TEMPORAL RESOLUTION ELECTRICITY MARKET ANALYSIS MODEL
Objective and Cost Equations
The SP minimizes the SUBCOSTSy,m in the objective function:
Min
∑
y
∑
m
SUBCOSTSy,m (4.21)
with
SUBCOSTSy,m = V ARCOSTSy,m + V CRTOy,m
+V CPARTLOADy,m + V CCURTAILy,m. (4.22)
The objective function sums up the costs of the subproblem SP, which are the vari-
able costs V ARCOSTSy,m, the start-up costs V CRTOy,m, the partload costs
V CPARTLOADy,m and the curtailment costs V CCURTAILy,m. The variable
costs consist of the discounted generation costs GENr,t,y,m,h, load-shedding costs
LSr,y,m,h and the pumping costs of storage technologies PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h.
First, the variable generation block comprises the fuel costs fuelcr,t,y,m and other
variable generation costs ovarr,t per region and technology in each hour. Second,
the load-shedding costs are summed up over the regions and all hours, which will
be zero in the final iteration. By allowing load reduction to be penalized through the
parameter lspenalty, the SP iteration solves even if insufficient capacity is installed.
In this case, insufficient does not mean too little capacity, since the absolute amount
is ensured by the peak requirement in the MP. Instead, insufficient means that the ca-
pacity is not able to follow the load in every situation when taking into account start-up
costs and ramping constraints. Third, the variable pumping costs ovarcpump,r for
storage technologies are summed up over all regions, technologies and hours:
V ARCOSTSy,m
= dfacy ∗ (
∑
r
∑
t
∑
h
(fuelcr,t,y,m + ovarr,t) ∗GENr,t,y,m,h
+
∑
r
∑
h
LSr,y,m,h ∗ lspenalty
+
∑
r
∑
stortech
∑
h
ovarcpump,r ∗PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h) ∗
numyy
106
. (4.23)
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Start-up costs include the variable costs as well as the attrition costs of the equip-
ment per start-up. Thereby, the variable CAPUPr,t,y,m,h is calculated endoge-
nously and takes into account attrition costs startattrr,t in addition to the other
variable costs. Furthermore, the startt parameter is the linearized cool-down func-
tion. It is calculated exogenously to keep the model linear on the basis of the idle
time of each technology, which is derived from the the residual load structure. The
start-up costs of storage plants is the last term in the start-up cost calculation and
takes the amount of starts PUMPUPr,stortech,y,m,h and the variable cost parame-
ter startupcostpumpstortech,r into account:
V CRTOy,m
= dfacy ∗ (
∑
r
∑
t
∑
h
CAPUPr,t,y,m,h∗
(fuelcr,t,y,m + ovarr,t +startattrr,t) ∗ starttr,t,y,m,h
+
∑
r
∑
stortech
∑
h
PUMPUPr,stortech,y,m,h ∗ startupcostpumpstortech,r )
∗
numyy
106
, (4.24)
with
starttr,t,y,m,h = startdurr,t ∗
(
1− e
idletimer,y,m,h+0.01
τr,t
)
(4.25)
where startdurr,t is the required time per technology to start-up, idletimer,y,m,h is
the time in which the capacity was idle and τr,t is the cooling time per technology.
Partload costs arise when the generation is below its fully ramped-up capacity. When
the load is only lower for a short amount of time, partload generation can reduce the
amount of start-ups and therefore be the more efficient solution. Additionally, part-
load costs are especially relevant for the reserve requirements. Partload costs are
derived from the difference between the ramped-up capacity and the level of genera-
tion within this hour and are penalized by the reduced efficiency in partload mode,
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V CPARTLOADy,m
= dfacy ∗
∑
r
∑
t
∑
h
(CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h −GENr,t,y,m,h)∗
fuelcr,t,y,m ∗ η_lossr,t
ηr,t − η_lossr,t
∗
numyy
106
(4.26)
with ηr,t as efficiency per technology and η_lossr,t as partload efficiency loss. In
case of oversupply and no further export possibilities, THEA has the option to curtail
the RES-E infeed by technology. Without political subsidies for RES-E, the curtail-
ment penalty would be close to zero due to the very low variable costs of most re-
newable technologies. However, since a premium is usually paid on top of the market
value, the operator will only curtail its generation when the power price is below its
premium curtailpenaltyr,t,y (see section 3.1.4). Due to this behavior, the premium
determines the curtailment behavior of a particular technology,
V CCURTAILy,m
= dfacy ∗
∑
r
∑
t
∑
h
CURTAILr,t,y,m,h ∗ curtailpenaltyr,t,y ∗
numyy
106
(4.27)
with curtailpenaltyr,t,y as premium level per region, technology and year.
Energy Market Constraints
The energy market constraints are the core of the dispatch problem since supply must
meet demand at all times. Additionally, some flexibilities are implemented to enable
efficiency gains throughout regions and technologies. The energy balance constraint
provides the marginal value which can be interpreted as power price. Basically, in
every region, the total generation GENr,t,y,m,h from all technologies must meet the
residual demand resloadr,y,m,h at every point in time. In addition to the regional
generation, the demand can also be served by import through international exchange
PTy,m,h,r,r1 between the regions or increased by export. Further flexibilities on the
demand side are the compressing of storage technologies PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h
and curtailment options CURTAILr,restech,y,m,h if the residual demand needs to
be increased for technical or economic reasons:
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∑
t
GENr,t,y,m,h + LSr,y,m,h +
∑
r
PTy,m,h,r,r1 −
∑
r1
PTy,m,h,r1,r
tlossr1,r
= resloadr,y,m,h +
∑
stortech
PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h
+
∑
restech
CURTAILr,restech,y,m,h. (4.28)
The international exchange is limited by the amount of net transfer capacities tcapr,r1,y
and transmission losses tlossr,r1. Over time, the capacity can be increased exoge-
nously:
PTy,m,h,r,r1
tlossr,r1
≤ tcapr,r1,y. (4.29)
The curtailment flexibility is limited by the actual generation from the particular renew-
able technology resgeny,m,h which is curtailed. If the cheapest curtailment option is
exhausted, the next technology must be curtailed. Due to this reason, THEA carries
all technology-specific RES-E infeeds and not only the residual load:
CURTAILr,restech,y,m,h ≤ resgenr,restech,y,m,h. (4.30)
Availability Constraints
The generation from one particular technology is limited by its installed capacity
instcapr,t,y,m, which is passed on from the MP in every iteration in the form of the
parameter installedcapr,t,y. The capacity constraint’s dual provides the information
on the value of each technology and is therefore a crucial element of the algorithm:
instcapr,t,y,m = installedcapr,t,y. (4.31)
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The generation is further restricted by the availability of the technology at a certain
point of time AV AILCAPr,t,y,m,h. This applies for thermal technologies as well as
for hydro and storage technologies:
AV AILCAPr,t,y,m,h = instcapr,t,y,m ∗ availr,t,m,h. (4.32)
Operational Constraints
The maximal generation is constrained by the ramped-up capacity, which is ’ready-to-
operate’, CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h. Storage plants are also restricted in a respective way.
PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h is the amount of storable energy in one hour:
GENr,t,y,m,h ≤ CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h, (4.33)
PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h ≤ PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h. (4.34)
As explained in the partload cost equation reference, it is inefficient to have too much
capacity ready-to-operate. The calculation of the ramp-up costs depends on the pre-
vious hour CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h−1,
CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h
= CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h−1 + CAPUPr,t,y,m,h − CAPDOWNr,t,y,m,h (4.35)
with CAPUPr,t,y,m,h as the ramp-up variable and CAPDOWNr,t,y,m,h as the
ramp-down variable. The same approach is applied for storage ramping,
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PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h
= PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h−1 + PUMPUPr,stortech,y,m,h
−PUMPDOWNr,stortech,y,m,h (4.36)
with PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h−1 as the initial value, PUMPUPr,stortech,y,m,h as
the ramp-up variable and PUMPDOWNr,stortech,y,m,h as the ramp-down variable.
Furthermore, the ramping of conventional and storage capacities is constrained by an
upper bound which is provided by the currently available capacity:
CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h ≤ AV AILCAPr,t,y,m,h, (4.37)
PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h ≤ AV AILPUMPr,stortech,y,m,h. (4.38)
In case of low residual demand, the generation can only be reduced to the technology
specific minimum load parameter loadminr,t of the ramped-up capacity for conven-
tional and loadminpumpstortech,r for storage technologies. If the generation needs
to be reduced further, more capacity has to ramp-down and will be required to ramp-
up in future periods. Also storage plants have a minimum constraint for the energy
amount of storage per hour:
GENr,t,y,m,h ≥ loadminr,t ∗ CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h, (4.39)
PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h
≥ loadminpumpstortech,r ∗ PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h. (4.40)
In addition to the economic ramping costs, technical limitations apply for thermal ca-
pacities. Since thermal capacities are not able to increase output instantaneously a
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maximal ramp rate per hour rampupr,t is implemented to capture the complexity of
high load gradients. Especially in systems with a high share of intermitting RES-E
high load gradients are possible and the capacity mix needs to follow the residual
load pattern:
GENr,t,y,m,h −GENr,t,y,m,h−1 ≤ AV AILCAPr,t,y,m ∗ rampupr,t. (4.41)
If very high load gradients are present, this constraint forces quick starting units to
start-up and later to be substituted by ’slower’ technologies as soon as these started
up in the subsequent hours. In the worst case, the installed capacities cannot follow
the load and load therefore needs to be shed.
Storage Plant Constraints
Two different types of storage are utilized in THEA. First, hydro storage plants have
a natural inflow, a storage reservoir and generating capabilities. Second, storage
plants such as pumped hydro storage or CAES storage plants do not have a natu-
ral inflow but a pumping capability, which fills the storage. The stored energy vol-
ume of a hydro storage plants HYDSV OLr,y,m,h is based on the stored volume
of the previous hour HYDSV OLr,y,m,h−1 plus the additional inflow of the current
hour hydsinflowr,y,m,h. Energy is extracted either through generation or, in the un-
likely case of a full basin and oversupply through the spilling of water, through the
HYDSBY PASSr,y,m,h variable:
HYDSV OLr,y,m,h =
HYDSV OLr,y,m,h−1 + hydsinflowr,y,m,h
−HYDSBY PASSr,y,m,h −
GENr,HydS ,y,m,h
ηr,HydS
. (4.42)
A minimum water run-off minhyds into rivers is required due to environmental rea-
sons. This run-off can either be spilled or used for electricity generation:
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GENr,HydS ,y,m,h +HYDSBY PASSr,y,m,h
≥ minhyds ∗ instcapr,HydS ,y,m ∗ availr,HydS ,m,h. (4.43)
The availability of storage plants is determined by a ratio of storage capacity and
generation capacity, storecapturbratiostortech,r, to enable CAES investments with
a specific storage capacity:
AV AILPUMPr,stortech,y,m,h
≤ instcapr,stortech,y,m ∗ availr,stortech,m,h ∗ storecapturbratiostortech,r. (4.44)
To fill the storage of a storage plant HYDPSV OLr,y,m,h, energy must be pumped
into the reservoir or the cavern with the variable PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h. Only if the
storage has a certain amount of energy stored, either on the basis of the storage
volume of the previous hour HYDPSV OLr,y,m,h−1 or due to compressed energy,
can energy be generated according to
HYDPSV OLr,y,m,h
= HYDPSV OLr,y,m,h−1 + PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h ∗ η_pumpstortech,r
−
GENr,stortech,y,m,h
ηr,stortech
(4.45)
with η_pumpstortech,r as compressing loss and ηr,stortech as the efficiency of the
generation technology.
Fuel and CO2 Constraints
The amount of primary fuel consumed is calculated before a limitation on particular
fuel consumption can be implemented. Additionally, the CO2 emissions are also cal-
culated on the basis of primary fuel consumption,
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FUELUSEr,y,m,fuel
=
∑
t
∑
h
(
GENr,t ,y ,m ,h
etar,t
+
CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h −GENr,t,y,m,h
ηr,t − η_lossr,t
)
. (4.46)
The parameter fuelupr,y ,m ,fuel serves as the upper bound for the primary fuel
consumption,
FUELUSEr,y,m,fuel ≤ fuelupr,y ,m ,fuel . (4.47)
The CO2 emissions are then derived from the primary fuel consumption and its CO2
content co2facfuel:
CO2TOTr,y ,m =
∑
fuel
co2facfuel ∗ FUELUSEr,y ,m ,fuel . (4.48)
Reserve Capacity Constraints
As discussed in section 3.1, reserve capacity requirements restrict the dispatch of
the energy market. Sufficient spinning and non-spinning reserve needs to be able
to increase or decrease the generation to make up for load, RES-E forecast errors
and disturbances of the conventional plants. This capacity cannot be used for an
economic dispatch because system security measures are binding. Especially in firm
market situations of either very high or very low residual load, the reserve constraints
are binding.
The positive spinning reserve requirement can be fulfilled by quick starting technolo-
gies, according to the parameter validreservespinningt,posSpinning , which are able
to provide energy within a very short time frame, such as spinning units which oper-
ate in part-load mode or storage technologies which are in storing mode and could
reduce the storing process:
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∑
t
((AV AILCAPr,t,y,m,h − CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h)
∗validreservespinningt,posSpinning
+(CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h −GENr,t,y,m,h))
+
∑
stortech
(PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h − PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h
∗loadminpumpstortech,r)
≥ contractcapposSpinning,r. (4.49)
The tertiary reserve follows the same logic. The main difference is the quality of the
requirements, since units have more time to start-up when providing tertiary reserve:
∑
t
((AV AILCAPr,t,y,m,h − CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h)
∗validreservespinningt,posTR+
(CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h −GENr,t,y,m,h))
+
∑
stortech
(PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h − PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h
∗loadminpumpstortech,r)
≥ contractcapposTR,r + contractcapposSpinning,r. (4.50)
Technologies which fulfill the negative reserve constraints are required to be able to
reduce the generation in case of potential oversupply. Consequently, power plants
need to be in operation in order to reduce generation. The binding restriction in
this case is the minimum load requirement loadminr,t for ramped-up capacity. To
reduce the absolute level of this requirement for a specific fleet, capacity needs to
ramp-down, which induces later ramp-up costs. At a certain point, however, this re-
striction is binding and no technologies are able to further reduce the generation.
Storage plants can provide negative reserve through the possibility of starting the
storing process according to the parameter validreservepumpstortech,negSpinning
until the available storing capacity is reached, or through the increase of an active
part-load storing process and consequently an increase in demand:
63
4 THE HIGH TEMPORAL RESOLUTION ELECTRICITY MARKET ANALYSIS MODEL
∑
t
(GENr,t,y,m,h − CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h ∗ loadminr,t)
+
∑
stortech
((AV AILPUMPr,stortech,y,m,h − PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h)
∗validreservepumpstortech,negSpinning
+PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h − PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h)
≥ contractcapnegSpinning,r. (4.51)
Again, the same logic is applied for the negative tertiary reserve, which might differ-
entiate from the spinning reserve requirement through the quality of the technologies’
storing ramps.
∑
t
(GENr,t,y,m,h − CAPRTOr,t,y,m,h ∗ loadminr,t)
+
∑
stortech
((AV AILPUMPr,stortech,y,m,h − PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h)
∗validreservepumpstortech,negTR
+PUMPRTOr,stortech,y,m,h − PUMPr,stortech,y,m,h)
≥ contractcapnegTR,r + contractcapnegSpinning,r. (4.52)
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5 First Application of THEA - The Texas Case
This chapter shows the particular model attributes of THEA and compares the re-
sults to cases in which some constraints are dropped. Particular focus is laid on the
capability of high temporal resolution. The aim of this comparison is to evaluate the
influence of temporal resolution in modeling the impacts of high penetrations of RES-
E on the power system, and not to specifically evaluate any individual pre-existing
models. By learning more about how temporal resolution impacts results, it is hoped
that models might be improved, either by increasing temporal resolution, or where
modeling complexity does not allow increased resolution, by adding correction fac-
tors in order to approximate the true impacts of wind energy on power systems. A
better understanding of the impacts of RES-E on the power market might also as-
sist climate modelers taking these factors into account when evaluating alternative
approaches to reducing global carbon emissions and using models that, because of
their geographic and sectoral scope, are unable to apply high time resolutions. Even
where model changes are not possible, the results that follow may at least provide an
indication of how ’inaccurate’ low-temporal-resolution models might be in simulating
the impacts of high wind energy penetrations.9
In order to capture the temporal resolution effects, two specific scenarios (with three
temporal resolution cases of 8760 h, 288 h, and 16 time slices) are presented in the
following. The first scenario contains no additional wind power deployment after 2008
and the model is run under all three temporal resolutions. The second scenario adds
a substantial quantity of additional wind generation to demonstrate how that expanded
penetration of wind energy impacts investment decisions and dispatch results relative
to the first scenario, again under all three temporal resolutions. By this approach, the
temporal resolution effects can first be analyzed and then the particular wind energy
integration challenges can be analyzed under different temporal resolutions.
5.1 Input Overview
The model application presented here loosely simulates the power system in Texas
(ERCOT, in particular), home to the largest wind power market in the United States.
Except for the quantity of wind power deployed (which is exogenous input, and varies
9 Since the focus of this chapter is to explain and compare particular attributes of THEA, a reduced model
version is used, which only integrates wind power as a single renewable source and does not allow CAES
investments.
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between the two scenarios), all other inputs remain the same throughout the calcula-
tions.
Fuel prices and generation investment costs are based on EIA (2010a), whereas CO2
price assumptions are based on Synapse (2008) (see table A.1 and table A.2). Be-
cause it impacts wholesale power prices and wind energy curtailment decisions, an
assumption for the level of policy support per kWh offered to wind power plants is
required.10 Based on the current production tax credit (PTC) for wind energy in the
United States and on renewable energy certificate prices necessary to meet a poten-
tial future renewable portfolio standard (RPS), an incremental wind support payment
of 30 USD/MWh is assumed now and RPS certificate prices of up to 18.2 USD/MWh
in future years according to EIA (2007).
Assumed investment costs for the five alternative generation unit types considered
by THEA are presented in table A.2. The ’superpeaker’ unit type is intended to re-
flect generation units that are only utilized in very few hours per year. In the model
setup presented here, this unit is assumed to have the attributes of an oil turbine,
though in practice, the services provided by these plants could be met with load shed-
ding, demand-response programs, diesel generating sets, gas combustion turbines,
or other options. Other generation options considered in THEA are nuclear, hydro
storage, pumped storage, coal, combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT), and open-cycle
gas turbines (OCGT).
Figure 5.1 shows the amount of incumbent generation capacity that is still available
in 2030. With the exception of wind and hydro, the generating capacities that are re-
quired to meet the residual demand are added endogenously. The underlying lifetime
assumptions for existing technologies are 50 years for nuclear plants, 40 to 50 years
for coal plants, 30 to 40 years for CCGTs, 25 to 40 years for OCGTs and 40 years for
the superpeakers.
Overall annual electricity demand is assumed to increase from 312 TWh in 2008 to
427 TWh in 2030, which is derived from the estimated increase in peak load provided
in ERCOT (2010a). The overall temporal load pattern is assumed to remain constant
throughout the modeling period and is derived from ERCOT (2010b).
In the high-wind scenario, the wind share is assumed to increase from 4.8% in 2008
to 25% in 2030, while in the reference scenario wind generation is kept constant at
4.8%. Since much of the new wind power deployment in the high-wind scenario is
10 The effects of this support scheme on dispatch and market based curtailment decisions has already been
discussed in section 3.1.4.
66
5 FIRST APPLICATION OF THEA - THE TEXAS CASE
Figure 5.1: Incumbent capacity mix in Texas
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010), based on EIA (2010d) and ERCOT (2010a).
likely to occur in the western zone of the ERCOT market, away from major load cen-
ters, additional transmission capacity would be needed to serve load. Though THEA
does not directly address transmission issues, it is assumed in the present analysis
that new transmission is built such that for 98% of the time all wind generation is able
to serve load, while during the remaining 2% curtailment is applied based on trans-
mission limitations. This approach is consistent with ERCOT (2006), and follows the
reasoning that optimal (least-cost) transmission expansion for wind will not necessar-
ily seek to deliver each and every unit of wind electricity to load.
The high-resolution case has 8760 h per year, allowing for hourly dispatch decisions
to be considered when determining optimal capacity expansion and other results. The
medium-resolution case evaluates 288 h during the year, reflecting typical days by
season as has been used in Dena (2010). The low resolution case has just 16 broad
time slices, which follows the approach used by NRELs ReEDS model as used to
evaluate a high penetration wind scenario for the U.S. (NREL (2008)), but without the
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correction terms utilized by ReEDS.11 The analyzed cases represent the approaches
used in the identified literature. Different approaches can consequently lead to differ-
ent results. An overview on stochastic scenario generation and reduction approaches
is provided by Möst and Keles (2010).
The initial difference in temporal resolution can be observed in Figure 5.2 for the year
2030, which shows the load duration curves for the two wind penetration scenarios
under the different time slice approaches. The original load duration curves for the
low-wind reference case and high-wind base case are equivalent, such that the only
variation in the load duration curves comes in their temporal resolution (upper three
curves); the residual load duration curves of the low-wind and high-wind cases do
differ, and Figure 5.2 only presents the latter (lower three curves). At first sight, even
the load duration curve under the very low resolution case with only 16 time slices
matches the 8760 h case surprisingly well. The differences between the three tem-
poral resolutions are most obvious at both ends of the curves, but overall are not
substantial for load duration curves.
Since the conventional power system does not have to meet the full load, but only
the residual load, Figure 5.2 also highlights the three different residual load dura-
tion curves for the high wind scenario. As shown, the deviations between the three
temporal-resolution cases increase in comparison with the total load cases. In addi-
tion to the stronger deviations, which are especially observable at both ends of the
curves, the slope of the duration curves differs also to a higher degree compared to
the overall load duration curves. In summary, reducing temporal resolution does not -
visually - have a significant impact on the load (or residual load) curve when variable
wind generation is low. At a 25 % wind energy penetration level, however, the residual
load curve varies substantially among the three temporal resolution cases presented
in Figure 5.2.
5.2 Results
In the following, the modeling results for capacity and generation mixes are discussed,
followed by RES-E specific results, such as the market value of wind energy and the
development of required curtailment.
11 The 288 h resolution case assumes typical patterns for workdays, Saturdays and Sundays within each
season and therefore averages, e.g. the third Wednesday per month each season to create a ’typical’ workday.
The 16 time slice approach averages similar load situations per season in a broader approach, e.g. all night
hours within one season.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of different time slicing approaches
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010), data provided by ERCOT (2010b).
5.2.1 Optimal Capacity Expansion
Model results for total generation capacity in 2030 by unit type, under both scenarios
and all three temporal resolutions are presented in Figure 5.3. In the low wind sce-
nario, the main difference in generation capacity among the different temporal resolu-
tions comes from different deterministically calculated peak loads. This is a direct re-
sult of the observed difference in the left-hand-side of the load duration curves shown
in Figure 5.2, where one can see substantial differences in peak loads depending on
the temporal resolution used. The higher the temporal resolution, the more effective
the model is in capturing real peak load requirements, leading to greater quantities of
peaking unit capacity (i.e., the capacities of ’superpeakers’ and OCGTs increase as
temporal resolution increases). When it comes to the remaining capacities, however,
there are only slight differences among the three resolution cases in terms of nuclear,
coal, and CCGT capacity. Even the 16 time-slice low resolution case shows more
or less the same capacity development as the high resolution case apart from the
need for peaking capacity. Adding a ’superpeak’ time slice, as applied in the ReEDS
model (NREL (2008)), is likely a sufficient solution to close this gap, under the low
wind scenario.
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Figure 5.3: Capacity comparison of high and low wind penetration under different time slicing ap-
proaches in 2030
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
Optimal capacity expansion is substantially different in the high-wind penetration sce-
nario, and also varies significantly depending on the temporal resolution. Under all
three temporal resolutions, the peak capacity need in the high-wind scenario is sub-
stantially greater than in the low-penetration scenario. This requirement is met by sub-
stantially greater quantities of superpeakers and OCGTs, but correspondingly lower
amounts of nuclear generation capacity. This shift towards greater quantities of peak-
ing generation and lower quantities of baseload generation is consistent with other
analyses of high-penetration wind energy scenarios (Dena (2005)).
In comparison to the low-wind scenario, the remaining capacity mix in the high-wind
scenario also varies substantially depending on the degree of temporal resolution. In
addition to the greater investments in OCGTs, the higher temporal-resolution cases
with high wind also result in greater investments in combined cycle gas turbines
(CCGTs). When it comes to general baseload investments, even though the low res-
olution case has, in absolute terms, lower peak capacity requirements, the base-load
investments are found to be higher, even in absolute terms, than in the high resolution
cases. In effect, as temporal resolution increases under a high-wind penetration sce-
nario, the remaining conventional generation mix tends to shift towards intermediate
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and peaking plants that can cost-effectively meet the decreased capacity factor and
flexiblity needs of a high-wind scenario, while shifting away from conventional base
load units.
One additional outcome of this scenario comparison is the implicit capacity credit for
the additional wind capacity. In 2030, the wind capacity difference between the low-
and the high-wind scenarios is 32 GW. The difference in conventional capacity be-
tween the scenarios in the low resolution case is 3 GW, in the medium resolution
case 2 GW, and in the high resolution case 1.4 GW, which equals a capacity credit
of 9.3% in the low, 6.4% in the medium and 4.3% in the high resolution case. Using
lower temporal resolutions is therefore found to overstate the capacity value of wind
energy. In summary, these results demonstrate that higher temporal resolution plays
a significantly more important role in high wind energy penetration scenarios than in
traditional energy sector modeling. Scenarios with a relatively low amount of wind
energy, on the other hand, may be modeled with lower temporal resolutions without
sacrificing the accuracy of the results substantially, especially if peak load require-
ments are accurately modeled.
5.2.2 Generation Dispatch
Model results are presented in Figure 5.4 for generation utilization in 2030 by unit
type, under both scenarios and all three temporal-resolution cases. The generation
mix in the low wind scenario follows the observations above covering investment deci-
sions: only relatively modest differences result among the temporal resolution cases.
Some differences, however, are observable. Specifically, generation from nuclear
plants is somewhat higher in the low resolution case, while generation from CCGTs
is higher in the high resolution case. In addition, there is a small amount of genera-
tion from OCGTs in the higher resolution cases and virtually none in the low resolution
case. Even with low levels of wind generation, it is clear that lower temporal resolution
models are unable to fully capture the need for peaking and intermediate generation
in the power sector.
As with the optimal capacity mix, these differences become much more striking under
the high-penetration wind energy scenario. Regardless of the degree of temporal res-
olution, high penetrations of wind energy are found to increase the supply of peaking
and intermediate generation, and reduce the need for baseload generation. Perhaps
more importantly from a modeling perspective, however, is that temporal resolution
has a dramatic impact on model results in high wind penetration scenarios. In par-
ticular, the generation mix becomes much more peak oriented in the high resolution
cases: there is more generation from OCGTs, CCGTs and even the ’superpeaker’
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Figure 5.4: Generation comparison of high and low wind penetration under different time slicing ap-
proaches in 2030
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
category has up to 21 generation hours, whereas baseload nuclear generation de-
creases substantially. As with capacity expansion, these results demonstrate that
higher temporal resolution plays a significantly more important role in high wind en-
ergy penetration scenarios than in traditional energy sector modeling. These differ-
ences are, in part, simply an outcome of the different investment patterns but, as can
be seen in the cases of OCGTs, differences are also due to dispatch decisions.
5.2.3 Wholesale Power Prices
Differences in capacity expansion and generation mix are also reflected in estimated
annual average wholesale power market prices, as shown in Figure 5.5. The whole-
sale market power prices are assumed to be equal to the marginal values of the
energy market constraint as explained in section 4.3. The high wind scenarios tend
to have lower average wholesale prices than the low wind scenarios, while higher
temporal resolutions also tend to result in lower average wholesale prices.
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Figure 5.5: Price comparison of high and low wind penetration under different time slicing approaches
in 2030
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
The different price levels between the time slicing approaches in the low wind sce-
narios represent the differences in load volatility. Since in the 8760 h case, a base
load technology sets the price every once in a while, the prices are lower compared
to the lower resolution cases, where the price is most often set by medium load tech-
nologies. The effects of higher wind penetration are observable by the comparison
of both wind levels. During hours of high wind power generation, wholesale power
prices are driven below the average price level, resulting in an overall reduction in
average wholesale power prices under the high-wind penetration scenario, as shown
in Figure 5.5. Nevertheless, a second trend operates in the opposite direction: under
the high-wind scenario, a greater amount of intermediate and peaking generation is
used, generation that requires higher wholesale prices to support the variable costs
of those units relative to base load plants. Since the prices shown in Figure 5.5
present only the average effects, thereby masking these influences, Figure 5.6 de-
picts the wholesale price behavior in form of price duration curves, where both of
the above-mentioned trends are observable. To explain the price effects of high wind
penetration, only the highest temporal-resolution (8760 h) cases are compared in Fig-
ure 5.6.
As shown, the price duration curve of the low wind scenario is, most of the time, above
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of price duration curves in 2030
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
the one from the high wind scenario, especially in the lower price segment. During
very high-priced periods, however, the opposite trend is observable. Both effects are
more-readily seen in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, which focus on the particularly high-
and low- price sections of the price duration curve.
During the periods of high wholesale power prices, the price duration curve of the high
wind scenario is above the one from the low wind scenario, consistent with the higher
generation share of peaking and intermediate units in this scenario and the lower use
of base load units. Though these difference in the high-price periods are relatively
modest, the difference in the lowest price sections are more apparent. In particular,
the price duration curve in the high wind scenario drops to low and even negative
prices far earlier than in the low wind scenario. Thereby, the low but positive plateaus
represent the hours in which nuclear generation is the marginal unit, whereas nega-
tive prices are capped by the assumed support payment of 18.2 USD/MWh for wind
infeed. The support motivates wind operators to generate at wholesale prices at or
above -18.2 USD/MWh. As soon as the power price drops below this 18.2 USD/MWh
level, wind generation is curtailed; this negative threshold therefore indicates curtail-
ment, which of course occurs more often in the high wind scenario.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of price duration curves with particular focus on high prices in 2030
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
5.2.4 Market Value of Wind Energy and Curtailment Results
One additional metric that shows the advantage of high temporal resolution modeling
and that naturally follows the price discussion is the wholesale market value of wind
energy, relative to average annual wholesale prices (Figure 5.9). The market value
of wind energy is determined by the spot market price in each hour. This implies that
the value of the wind energy reflects the value of the alternative energy source that is
crowded out.
The general pattern over time shows that, after the transmission restriction is as-
sumed to be somewhat relaxed from 2015 onwards (as explained in the section 5.1),
the wholesale market value of wind energy increases until higher wind penetration
levels are reached, at which point the market value of wind drops due to the price-
depressing effects discussed in section 3.1. This pattern is observable in all cases,
regardless of the degree of temporal resolution, and can also be seen when compar-
ing the low- and high-wind cases in Figure 5.9.
In addition, the higher the temporal resolution, the lower the estimated wholesale
value of wind energy, since more extreme events, which are only present in the high
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of price duration curves with particular focus on low prices in 2030
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
resolution cases, have particularly strong price effects. As a result, in the low res-
olution case, the wholesale market value of wind is only slightly below the average
wholesale price, whereas the higher resolution cases show a stronger deviation be-
tween the wholesale value of wind and average wholesale prices.
The wind energy value is partially determined by curtailment, since if curtailment is
required, the power price reflects the negative premium price. Figure 5.10 presents
model results for wind energy curtailment which illustrate the interdependence with
the power price. Naturally, the higher wind penetration scenario also shows higher
relative curtailment levels. In addition, since the extreme events only show up in
the higher resolution cases, curtailment is found to increase with temporal resolution.
This finding, along with the previous finding on the wholesale market value of wind
energy, underline the conclusion that dispatch behavior is best matched with high
temporal resolution. The extreme events are not representative enough to show up in
typical days. Capturing these events therefore requires a higher temporal resolution
or at least the consideration of more days.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of wind values
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
5.2.5 The Separation of the Adaptation Effects
In section 3.2, the explanation of the long-run adaptation effect of high RES-E pen-
etration is divided into the utilization effect and the flexibility effect. To capture these
effects individually, three scenario comparisons are required. The overall adaptation
effect is already captured by the comparison between the high and the low wind sce-
narios. One scenario, which can purely follow the utilization effect, is required to
separate both effects. In this scenario, all ramping related constraints are ignored.
Therefore, the optimization purely follows the static merit-order approach without any
costs for ramping and without part-load costs. As soon as an additional technology is
required, the variable costs of this marginal unit sets the price. By this approach, only
the times when a particular technology is utilized purely on the basis of its position
in the merit-order count for the optimization of the capacity mix. Consequently, the
results of this scenario can only be compared to the high-wind scenario in order to
represent the difference between the pure utilization effect and the additional flexibil-
ity effect.
The difference between the ’no ramping scenario’ and the full high wind energy sce-
nario in Figure 5.11 is the difference with additional ramping requirements. Due to
the utilization effect, a shift towards less base load and more mid-merit as well as
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of wind energy curtailment
Source: Nicolosi et al. (2010).
peak load capacity is observable. In addition, the flexibility effect further reduces
the amount of base load capacity and increases the demand for peaking units. The
reason behind the higher demand for OCGT capacity in the full ramping scenario is
that they are more often required when ramping constraints are present, while the
superpeaker units are reduced because they are mainly deployed to fulfill the peak
requirement, and due to the high costs are only very rarely utilized.
The generation mix in Figure 5.12 reflects the capacity adaptation process. The main
effect can clearly be identified as the utilization effect. The flexibility effect adds com-
plexity to the dispatch problem, which causes more investments in peak-oriented
capacities. Clearly, CCGTs and OCGT are more strongly utilized compared to the
merit-order based scenario without ramping constraints.
The comparison of the price duration curves in Figure 5.13 focuses only on both high
wind scenarios. The highest price in the scenario without start-up costs represents
the highest variable fuel costs of the superpeaker, while the peak prices in the base
scenario also reflect start-up costs. One can easily see that the price duration curve
of the base scenario is above the other in times when ramping costs or part-load costs
are added to the pure variable costs of the marginal capacity. By the comparison of
the medium plateaus, it is observable that the price duration curve with intertempo-
ral constraints reflects the benefits of avoided shut-down and subsequent start-up
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of flexibility effect
Source: own illustration.
decision and thereby confirms the findings of Müsgens and Neuhoff (2006). On the
low price side, one can see by the long plateau that without ramping constraints, the
prices are often set by nuclear capacity. Only a few curtailment hours are responsi-
ble for the negative prices. In the ramping scenario, curtailment happens more often
to avoid the start-up costs of the conventional capacity. In addition, it is important
to note that the comparison between the two price duration curves reveals not only
different dispatch constraints, but also a slightly different capacity mix, as shown in
Figure 5.11.
Finally, the comparison of the wind energy values shows that if ramping constraints
are not accurately modeled, the wind energy value is overestimated. Although the
base load capacity in the ’no ramping constrains’ scenario is higher, the wind energy
value is higher in this scenario too. Adding the complexity of consecutive hours with
intertemporal ramping constraints changes not only dispatch results, but also capac-
ity investment decisions.
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of flexibility effect in generation
Source: own illustration.
5.3 Intermediate Conclusion
The modeling results presented in this chapter demonstrate the importance of tem-
poral resolution in evaluating high wind penetrations. The low wind scenarios show
relatively small capacity investment deviations when moving from high to low temporal
resolution. The corresponding results for the high wind scenarios, on the other hand,
differ significantly with temporal resolution. More specifically, under high wind sce-
narios, lower temporal resolutions are found to result in far-higher levels of base load
capacity (e.g. nuclear) than are found to be optimal with more accurate modeling.
The higher the temporal resolution, the lower the base load capacity. Consequently,
models with low temporal resolution may substantially overstate the amount of base
load generation that would be economically efficient in a high-penetration wind energy
scenario, while understating the need for peaking and intermediate generation units.
The same is true for modeling capacity expansion without ramping constraints, as
done by Neuhoff et al. (2008). Their intuition that adding ramping constraints would
lead to less base load and more peak load capacity investments can be confirmed by
the presented results.
When it comes to the dispatch part of the model, temporal resolution is also found
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of price curves with and without ramping constraints
Source: own illustration.
to play an important role, especially under high penetration wind energy scenarios.
Again, the higher the temporal resolution, the greater the reliance on peaking and in-
termediate generation supply and the lower the contribution of baseload generation.
Moreover, lower-probability power system events are only captured when temporal
resolution is high, so notable differences in the market value of wind and wind energy
curtailment are observed when temporal resolution changes. The market value of
wind as well as the curtailment behavior is best captured by high temporal resolution;
models with low temporal resolution will tend to overstate the market value of wind
and understate the prevalence of wind curtailment.
An important implication of these results is the need to model high-wind scenarios
with capacity expansion and dispatch models with high temporal resolutions. Where
high temporal resolution is not possible due to computing constraints, correction fac-
tors might be applied instead. Based on the results presented here, those corrections
would ideally have the effect of reducing base load (and increasing peaking and in-
termediate) capacity and generation with an increasing level of wind energy supply,
while also increasing the aggregate level of conventional capacity to meet peak sys-
tem loads. In addition, in the modeling presented in this thesis, wind power develop-
ment was established exogenously, and the value of that wind generation was found
to decrease with penetration. Though the degree of that decrease in value will depend
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Figure 5.14: Comparison of wind values with and without ramping constraints
Source: own illustration.
to a large degree on the composition and flexibility of the conventional generation mix
and will be highly system specific, correction factors to account for the decrease in
market value of wind with penetration are needed if low temporal resolution models
are used.
In conclusion, the additional requirements imposed on conventional power markets
with high wind penetration are also reflected in additional requirements for detailed
power sector dispatch and capacity expansion modeling. In general, the higher the
wind penetration, the more important the temporal resolution is in simultaneous dis-
patch and investment decision. Fortunately, progress in computational power enables
modelers to increase the degree of accuracy and to increase temporal resolution. Al-
though modeling at an hourly time step is not possible for all applications, stepwise
progress seems appropriate, with correction factors applied where necessary.
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6 The German RES-E Targets in High Resolution
In previous sections, the attributes of THEA were explained and compared to other
approaches. Now the German power market will be analyzed under consideration
of the surrounding markets. The impact of the RES-E targets on the German power
marked up to 2030 is modeled. The ambitious RES-E targets have strong effects
on the system component’s supply, grid and demand. To gain better insight into the
dynamics of the power market with increasingly high RES-E shares, the focus is laid
on the effects on the RES-E value and on the conventional supply side consisting of
different technology types. The impact on the grid is represented by the analysis of
the cross-border interconnector capacities, since individual power markets are mod-
eled as copperplates without internal grid bottlenecks. Even though this represents
only a small fraction of the grid infrastructure, the development over time as well as
the scenario comparisons provide an indication for the challenges of the grid infras-
tructure. Finally, the demand side is considered by taking into account the financial
burden which stems from energy and reserve markets as well as from exogenously
applied RES-E support payments.
The next section provides an overview of the input assumptions. The remaining sec-
tions discuss model results, which provide insight into the market adaptation and be-
havior due to the German RES-E targets, and analyze how the integration challenges
affect different system components. A more detailed analysis of various changes in
particular system attributes shows how RES-E integration can be eased or restrained.
6.1 Input Overview
This section provides an overview of the input assumptions for the German case
study. This overview consists of the applied model system boundaries and assump-
tions on the supply side, demand side and the interconnector infrastructure. Finally,
the individual scenario assumptions are explained.
Model Boundaries and Market Connections
In order to enable a feasible computation time and at the same time to capture im-
portant market interaction features, the modeled power system is limited to 11 zones
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as can be seen in Figure 6.1. The markets that have a direct interconnection with
Germany (Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, France and the
Netherlands) are modeled with all model attributes explained in Section 4.3.
Figure 6.1: Model regions (colored: full model regions; gray: remote zones)
Source: own illustration.
In order to reduce computation complexity, interconnector restrictions between Poland
and Czech Republic (PLCZ), as well as between Austria and Switzerland (Alps), are
neglected. Therefore, these country pairs form one power market each as can be
seen by the color coding in Figure 6.1. The same applies for the Nordpool area
(North), consisting of Finland, Norway and Sweden, the Iberian peninsula and the
UK and Ireland (UKIE). The latter pooled countries (North and UKIE), as well as Italy
and Belgium, are treated differently in the model. Since they are important for the
interregional exchange decision of the neighboring countries of Germany, they are
also modeled in full temporal resolution, but with a limited equation set (e.g. ramp-
ing constraints are removed). In this way, the exchange decisions of the surrounding
markets of Germany are taken into account, but instead of the full complexity, a pure
merit-order perspective is implemented in these remote zones.
As already mentioned above, the individual power markets are able to exchange en-
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Table 6.1: Net electricity consumption excluding own consumption and consumption of pumped-
storage plants [TWhel]
Zone 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Germany 557 547 525 525 525
France 494 503 513 513 513
Netherlands 116 123 130 130 130
Denmark 34 36 36 36 36
PLCZ 191 197 203 203 203
Alps 105 109 116 116 116
Italy 332 343 355 355 355
Iberia 319 357 403 403 403
Belgium 84 85 86 86 86
UKIE 373 382 391 391 391
North 373 382 391 391 391
Source: own assumptions, based on EU Commission (2010).
ergy to reduce costs. Although the western European power markets are closely
connected, the exchange is limited by net transfer capacities (NTC) (see Table A.3).
NTCs are an approximation of actual transfers possibilities, which are best reflected
by physical power flow analysis. These are usually conducted for a particular point in
time (i.e. one load situation) and cannot capture dynamic developments, such as in-
tertemporal dispatch. One simplification is the utilization of power transfer distribution
factor (PTDF) matrices, which capture the distribution of the power flows per node.
According to Duthaler (2007), the advantages of PTDF matrices are negligible when
they are applied in a zonal model instead of a nodal approach. Since the border ca-
pacities in a zonal model have to be defined before the actual market situation, they
follow the same assumptions as NTCs. Therefore, the NTC approach is sufficient for
the present analysis. The initial NTC values are based on ENTSO-E (2010c) and the
development is derived from (EWI (2010)). Grid losses further limit the physical and
economic utilization of the NTCs. On average, 10% energy loss is assumed for 1000
km transport distance.
Demand Side Assumptions
The net electricity consumption excluding plant consumption and consumption of
pumped storage plants is derived from the ’National Renewable Energy Action Plans’
(NREAP), which each country submitted to the EU Commission (2010). These plans
show the expected development by 2020. Since energy efficiency is one of the main
goals of the European energy strategy, it is assumed that the electricity demand will
remain on the 2020 level until 2030 (see Table 6.1).
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One important information of the NREAP is a detailed plan of how each country in-
tends to reach its renewable energy targets, whereas the ’EU Renewable Directive’
(European Union (2009)) only states overall targets for the renewable energy share
of the total energy consumption. The NREAP intend to show in detail how each coun-
try plans to reach its target, by sector and even by energy source. After 2020, the
German technology specific RES-E targets are derived from the ’Leitszenario 2010’
of the German Federal Ministry of Environmental Affairs (BMU (2010b)). The cor-
responding technology specific RES-E targets are shown in Figure 6.2. The RES-E
development for the other countries for the time frame after 2020 is assumed to in-
crease further, but by a reduced growth pace of 50% compared to the development
from 2010 to 2020. Additional exogenous generation is supplied by e.g. waste com-
bustion and inflexible chp plants. The total values are shown in Table A.4.
Figure 6.2: German RES-E generation targets
Source: own assumptions, based on EU Commission (2010) and BMU (2010b).
The RES-E infeed structures are based on historic weather data. For wind power
infeed, the same data source is used as for EWI (2010), where wind speeds from
various weather stations across Europe have been collected. Since the wind speeds
are collected at relatively low measuring points, they are first adjusted by applying a
power law adjustment to estimate wind speeds at hub heights. The wind speeds are
then converted into electricity by applying a modified wind farm power curve as done
in Holttinen (2005b) to estimate the power production across larger geographical ar-
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eas (for comparisons of actual versus modeled power generation from wind speeds,
see Fripp and Wiser (2008)). For the PV infeed structure, NRELs ’Solar Advisor
Model’ (NREL (2010b)) has been utilized. It converges measured solar irradiation
data into PV generation. The weather data are provided by the U.S. Department of
Energy’s ’Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy Program’ (DoE (2010)).
If an oversupply situation requires curtailment, a novel approach is applied. Most
RES-E integration studies (e.g. BMWi (2010b)) allow curtailment at a price of zero.
However, the analysis in sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 shows that the price level at which
RES-E is curtailed depends on the support scheme. In the case of Germany without
an out-of-market curtailment rule, the power price dropped to -500 EUR/MWh without
any curtailment. In theory, it could even have dropped to -3000 EUR/MWh. In the
case of Texas on the other hand, market-driven curtailment is observable at negative
power prices, which reflect the PTC price for RES-E support. In the present analysis,
a premium system for Germany is assumed. Since the currently implemented rule
would result in an extreme scenario, it is modeled separately as a sensitivity case. It
is likely that Germany will implement a premium system in the next EEG amendment
in 2012. The assumed premiums do not reflect the required support level, but serve
as a proxy for the market-driven curtailment. These premiums are derived from the
difference between levelized generation costs of the technologies and an average
power price level. Wind onshore receives a premium of 34 EUR/MWh; wind offshore
96 EUR/MWh; solid biomass 46 EUR/MWh; gaseous biomass 116 EUR/MWh; liquid
biomass 118 EUR/MWh; geothermal 96 EUR/MWh; and PV 414 EUR/MWh. These
premiums apply for all scenarios except the sensitivity scenarios for the curtailment
rule and remain constant throughout the modeling period to ease the interpretation
over time.
Supply Side Assumptions
The economics of individual conventional technologies are determined by various
technological and economic properties. Investment cost assumptions and efficiency
development follow IEA (2010). Table A.5 provides an overview of properties of cur-
rent technology design as well as assumptions for future investment options from
2020 on. The assumptions about storage technologies follow Dena (2010). Pumped
hydro storage can only be commissioned exogenously and has a round trip efficiency
of 76%. CAES12 on the other hand can be commissioned endogenously with a six
full load hours storage and a round trip efficiency of 70%. The required reserve for
system services follows ENTSO-E (2009b) and is assumed to be 8.2 GW for positive
and negative reserve, of which 50% are spinning and 50% non-spinning, respec-
tively. Even though this level is slightly higher than today’s levels, it is still a moderate
12 CAES in this case is an advanced adiabatic compressed air energy storage, which does not require the
co-firing gas and has a higher efficiency than diabatic compressed air energy storage. See, e.g. Gatzen
(2008) for an analysis of various storage technologies.
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assumption since the power system requires a certain amount of conventional gener-
ation online to supply grid stabilizing services, such as inertia, frequency control and
reactive power in addition to the pure reserve requirements. For the annualization, an
interest rate of 10% is assumed for the conventional power plant investments. Fur-
thermore, all costs in this analysis reflect 2009 values.
The assumptions about the lifetime and the depreciation time frame of the conven-
tional technologies are summarized in Table A.6. The fuel costs in 2010 are primarily
based on the 2009 values of IEA (2010) as well as the coal price assumptions in sub-
sequent years. Natural gas price assumptions after 2010 follow BMWi (2010a). CO2
price assumptions are based on the impact assessment of the European RES-E di-
rective (Capros et al. (2008)). Table A.7 shows the fuel and CO2 price assumptions.
As explained in section 3.2, these inputs can be converted into screening curves,
which initially provide a rough intuition on the system adaptation, purely based on the
input assumptions. Figure 6.3 shows this approach for the year 2020.
Figure 6.3: Screening curves for the year 2020
Source: own assumptions, based on data from IEA (2010).
Due to the economic assumptions, it can already be seen that coal and lignite are
unlikely to be commissioned. Since new investments in nuclear plants are not allowed
in Germany, the cheapest alternative energy technology above a certain utilization is
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CCGT.
6.2 Scenario Definitions
The scenarios are selected in a way that the effects on various system components
can be compared and directly attributed to particular assumptions. The particular
scenario designs are derived from findings in section 3.1, which indicate that particu-
lar system component designs have an impact on the flexibility of the power system.
Therefore, modifications of these system components are analyzed to see how the
remaining system is affected in the long run.
• Base Scenario: The ’Base’ scenario serves as the main reference point. The
results of the other scenarios are always compared to the results of the ’Base’
scenario. This scenario is characterized by a premium system assumption,
which allows marked-driven curtailment as explained in section 3.1.4. Due to
current RES-E integration challenges, it is highly likely that the next amendment
of the EEG will provide a premium system which internalizes the curtailment
decision. The conventional part of the market is characterized by the nuclear
phase-out according to a political agreement in 2002.13
• Low RES-E Scenario: The ’Low RES-E’ scenario assumes no further RES-
E deployment after 2010 and remains at this level for the considered period.
The comparison between the ’Base’ and the ’Low RES-E’ scenarios allows for
the identification of the market adaptation according to the additional RES-E
penetration in the base scenario.
• Lifetime and Friction Scenarios: Since an extension of the lifetime of nuclear
plants in Germany is currently under discussion, two nuclear lifetime extension
scenarios are calculated. The first simply assumes an average lifetime exten-
sion of 12 years, as targeted by the currently reigning coalition. The second
scenario adds an additional constraint to the equation set. Since the analysis
in section 3.1.3 showed that base load technologies stay at a certain gener-
ation level even if power prices are significantly negative, this scenario takes
this additional friction into account. It is assumed that the nuclear fleet cannot
reduce its generation below 60% of its available capacity and the lignite fleet is
required to generate above 40% of its available capacity according to the find-
ings in section 3.1.3. Since base load plant flexibility is an important factor in
the analysis of RES-E market integration, the ’what if’ question is raised. This
scenario does not intend to state that these plants are not flexible. But for some
reason, the plants have been operated in this way. Even though it is likely that
13 In fall 2010, when the scenario assumptions were set, the political discussion on nuclear lifetime exten-
sions was still ongoing. Therefore, the nuclear phase-out still serves as a business-as-usual assumption.
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the plants will be operated more flexibly in the future, this scenario is motivated
by the previous findings.
• Grid Extension Scenario: To increase the flexibility of the power market, in
the ’Grid Extension’ scenario NTC capacities are extended by 50% in 2015 and
doubled from 2020 onwards. This scenario allows for an analysis of the effects
of an increase in the grid infrastructure especially in firm market situations.
• Curtail0, Curtail150 and Curtail3000 Scenarios: It has been shown in sec-
tion 3.1.4 that the RES-E support scheme plays an important role in the RES-E
curtailment decision and therefore in the price setting in firm market situations.
To capture the extreme ends in addition to the premium system assumption of
the base scenario, three additional regimes are assumed. First, the ’Curtail0’
scenario does not allow negative bids for RES-E and therefore curtails the in-
feed as soon as the price is below zero, as assumed in most RES-E integration
studies. The ’Curtail3000’ scenario simulates a pure feed-in tariff system with
a TSO infeed obligation as it is defined in most FIT systems. The curtailment
level of -3000 EUR is defined by the floor of the Epex Spot. This design pro-
vides a strong investment security for RES-E, but has obvious weaknesses
in the system integration at high penetration levels. This is also the reason
why this current FIT design in Germany does not qualify as base scenario.
One additional scenario is designed, which represents the current German out-
of-market curtailment rule. The ’Curtail150’ scenario starts curtailing at -150
EUR/MWh. It is motivated by the rule of the German regulator BNetzA, which
states that when the spot price reaches -150 EUR/MWh, a second auction is
allowed with limited RES-E bids from the TSOs.
• RES-E Reserve Scenario: As shown in 3.1.3, tight market situations are also
influenced by reserve capacity requirements. Therefore, in this scenario, RES-
E are enabled to provide positive and negative reserve. In the case of negative
reserve requirements, the RES-E infeed can be reduced and, for positive re-
serve, only the previously curtailed amount can be used to provide positive
reserve. In this way, it can be analyzed whether this design option facilitates
the RES-E market integration in firm market situations.
6.3 Modeling Results
This section provides an overview of the scenario results on an aggregated level. The
results of particular system components are compared between all scenarios.
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6.3.1 Overview of Scenario Comparisons
First, the total costs of conventional generation (which represent primarily the supply
side) of all scenarios are compared with the ’Base’ scenario in Figure 6.4. The costs
include all considered markets and all model endogenous cost components (i.e. in-
vestment and generation costs). Initially, it strikes the eye that the costs of the ’Low
RES-E’ scenario are much higher than in all the remaining scenarios. This is sim-
ply due to the fact that in each scenario RES-E are added exogenously, which means
they are not considered as costs in the model and substitute conventional generation.
Consequently, the ’Low RES-E’ scenario has to provide much more conventional en-
ergy compared to the other scenarios, since the RES-E share stays at the 2010 level.
This leads to higher investment requirements and more variable costs. The biggest
cost-saving in the total system costs are observable in the ’Lifetime’ and the ’Friction’
scenarios. This result is also quite intuitive since additional base load capacity is
granted to the model for free, which on the one hand reduces the demand for invest-
ments, and on the other hand provides very low cost energy. The ’Grid Extension’
scenario also shows cost reductions compared to the ’Base’ scenario. Since the sys-
tem has more flexibility to optimize the dispatch between the different markets, the
power plants can be utilized more efficiently, which also has consequences for the in-
vestment decisions. The ’RES-E Reserve’ scenario is also cheaper compared to the
’Base’ scenario, since the whole system is more flexible due to the reduction of firm
market situations. If RES-E can be curtailed as soon as their market value is zero,
as assumed in the ’Curtail0’ scenario, system costs are also slightly lower than with
the assumed premium system in the ’Base’ scenario. In the ’Curtail3000’ scenario on
the other hand, the market is much more firm due to the extremely high curtailment
costs. This additional firmness is reflected by the higher total costs compared to the
’Base’ scenario.
The comparison of the total conventional generation costs shows, already in an ag-
gregated form, the direction of the individual scenario effects. How the costs develop
over time for the German market can be seen in Figure 6.5. The calculations include
investment costs, operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, variable generation costs,
import costs, partload costs and start-up costs. The comparison between the scenar-
ios follows the same logic as for the total system costs. One can see that the scenario
differences increase over time as the system adapts in the individual scenarios. For
instance, the ’Curtail3000’ scenario is much more expensive with a higher RES-E
share in later years. The costs in the ’Lifetime’ and ’Friction’ scenarios decline com-
pared to the ’Base’ scenario until the decommissioning takes place in later years.
Overall, one can see that the total costs in the energy market change according to
either direct political decisions concerning the conventional power market, such as
the nuclear lifetime extension, or due to market design decision, such as RES-E inte-
gration rules or the RES-E participation in the reserve power market. Changing the
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Figure 6.4: Cost comparison of conventional generation
Source: own illustration.
RES-E integration rule, from market bids based on the variable cost of zero to an
infeed obligation with a forced market clearing at -3000 EUR, increases the costs by
more than 20% in 2030. The following subsections discuss the effects on the individ-
ual market components in order to identify the changes in these segments before the
individual scenario differences are discussed in more detail.
The Supply Side
THEA optimizes the capacity mix and the dispatch according to the scenario at-
tributes. Therefore, Figure 6.6 shows the capacity mix development for each scenario
for the years 2020 and 2030 in addition to the starting point in 2010.
Overall, it is observable that the total capacity increases over time and that the de-
mand for conventional technologies is only slightly reduced due to reliability reasons.
However, since the superpeaker technology serves as an option to fulfill the capacity
requirements but is hardly utilized, differences in the quality of the capacity mix can be
observed. This is actually the main advantage of the usage of the superpeaker tech-
nology. Without this option, the amount of OCGTs would have been used to provide
sufficient capacity as, e.g. observed by Decarolis and Keith (2006). With the usage
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Figure 6.5: Total cost comparison for Germany
Source: own illustration.
of the superpeaker technology, the quality of the required peak capacity can addition-
ally be assessed. As soon as the utilization of the superpeaker technology reaches a
certain share, OCGTs are the more economic choice due to a more favorable ratio of
investment and variable costs. In other words, if the utilization of a peaker technology
is required and therefore does not primarily serve the capacity requirement, OCGTS
are installed. OCGTs are therefore required to a certain degree to cover the hours
of peak demand. Additionally, OCGTs are able to provide tertiary reserve since they
are quick-starting units. The superpeaker technology does not provide this quality. It
can be seen that the ’Low RES-E’ scenario requires fewer OCGT capacities.14 Also,
the ’Grid Extension’ scenario has less OCGTs since the peak hours can be more
efficiently met by international exchange, which is more flexible in this scenario. In
comparison, the ’Curtail3000’ scenario has almost no installed OCGTs. The peak de-
mand hours can be met by the enormous amount of CAES storage. This investment
is triggered by the assumption that RES-E can only be curtailed at a power price of
-3000 EUR. Consequently, it is cheaper to build CAES and store the RES-E than to
curtail it. CAES also serves the peak requirement to a certain degree.
14 Due to the assumed fuel and CO2 prices, the construction and operation of CCGT is the most economic
choice in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario to fill the gap which arises from plant decommissioning and lower RES-E
shares. With different assumptions, this gap could also be filled with other technologies, such as hardcoal or
lignite.
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Figure 6.6: Capacity mix comparison
Source: own illustration.
The ’Lifetime’ and the ’Friction’ scenarios also require CAES to provide additional
flexibility to the system. At first, it seems surprising that the ’Lifetime’ scenario has a
slightly higher CAES amount compared to the ’Friction’ scenario. The reason behind
this observation lies in the initial decommissioning of almost 7 GW lignite capacity
in the ’Friction’ scenario, which reduces the ’inflexibility’ of the market. As explained
in section 4.3.1, capacities can be decommissioned if it serves the overall efficiency.
The additional peak capacity requirement is then met by a higher amount of OCGTs.
Additional lignite and hardcoal decommissioning can also be seen in the ’Curtail3000’
scenario in 2030. The forced RES-E infeed strongly penalizes base load capacity
and requires the installation of flexible CAES capacity. The total utilized capacity is
the lowest in the ’Grid Extension’ scenario since higher import options are often avail-
able and can be used to avoid expensive peak load generation. The high amount
of superpeaker capacity is a sign that a higher share of the energy demand can be
met by cheaper imports from at least one of the surrounding markets most of the time.
As a consequence of the diverging capacity developments, the generation mix varies
significantly as well between most of the scenarios as shown in Figure 6.7. Without
further RES-E deployment after 2010, the ’Low RES-E’ scenario covers most of the
additional demand with natural gas based generation. Another prominent result is
the higher nuclear based generation in the ’Lifetime’ and the ’Friction’ scenarios. As
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a consequence, the market shows an increase in curtailment as well as in energy
storage. Since a source of low cost energy is available, the netimport is reduced
compared to the ’Base’ scenario.
Figure 6.7: Generation mix comparison
Source: own illustration and AGEB (2010).
Even more firm market situations are present in the ’Curtail3000’ scenario. The signif-
icant amounts of CAES storage and generation are a clear sign of flexibility demand if
RES-E is forced into the market. The higher netimport in the ’Grid Extension’ scenario
shows that most of the time at least one of the surrounding markets has less costly
generation options. Consequently, the total conventional generation is the lowest in
this scenario. Overall, Germany becomes a netimporting country throughout the sce-
narios, which confirms the findings of other recent studies such as BMWi (2010a),
BMWi (2010b) and BMWi (2010c). The effects in the remaining scenarios are not
dominant enough to show significant differences in this aggregated result overview
but will further be discussed in the context of their individual set-ups.
The shift in the generation structure has consequences for the profitability of the par-
ticular technologies. Therefore, the pure cost perspective is extended by an analysis
of the producer rent. Dependent on their economic and technical attributes, tech-
nologies have different values in the scenarios. Storage technologies have a better
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economic situation if the overall system is less flexible. In this case, the provided
flexibility of the storage technologies is very valuable for the system. Existing nuclear
capacities on the other hand have such a strong economic position due to their low
variable costs that they are quite robust to scenario assumptions. However, due to
their prominent position in the market, they affect the economics of the remaining
system. Figure 6.8 shows the producer rents (PR) per technology in all scenarios.
Figure 6.8: Producer rent comparison
Source: own illustration.
The calculation mirrors the short-term perspective, meaning that the energy and re-
serve market income per technology is reduced by the variable costs according to the
following equation:
PRt,y =
∑
h
(λspoty,h −vc
spot
t,y,h)∗Q
spot
t,y,h+
∑
h
∑
rp
(λreserverp,y,h −vc
reserve
rp,t,y,h)∗Q
reserve
rp,t,y,h (6.1)
with λ as marginal values for the spot and reserve market per reserve product rp and
Q as respective quantities supplied per technology t. The variable costs vc are given
per technology t, year y and hour h. Consequently, this analysis represents the prof-
itability of existing units and fixed costs are treated as sunk. Since each technology
receives the marginal cost based power price for their produced energy, which is set
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by the last dispatched unit, the PR are highest for base load technologies.
It is initially observable that the nuclear fleet generates high PR, especially under
both lifetime extension scenarios. In the ’Friction’ scenario, the PR is slightly lower
for the nuclear fleet, since the generation cannot be reduced below a certain level,
even if power prices are negative. As a consequence, lignite capacity is decom-
missioned and generates a lower PR. CCGT profitability suffers under the lifetime
extension while the profitability of storage technologies increases. Pumped hydro
storage is more profitable under the nuclear lifetime extension scenarios because it
provides flexibility to a firmer system. The system comes under even more pres-
sure in the ’Curtail3000’ scenario, where the flexibility of curtailment is penalized with
3,000 EUR. Consequently, the profitability of pumped hydro storage increases. In
four scenarios, additional flexibility is required for economic operation, which leads
to investments in CAES capacities. CAES profitability gains from the firm market sit-
uation in both nuclear lifetime extension scenarios. The demand and therefore the
profitability for CAES is even higher in the expensive curtailment scenarios. Here,
CAES profits from compressing energy at negative prices and generating at positive
prices. This is a clear sign that flexibility becomes highly valuable if other system
components are less flexible and therefore benefits from the higher price volatility. In
order to provide an overview of the future marginal cost based price volatility, Figure
6.9 shows the price duration curves of the ’Base’ scenario for the years 2010, 2020
and 2030.
The different levels of the price duration curves stem from different fuel price as-
sumptions in the different years. Especially in 2010, the fuel prices were relatively
low. Nonetheless, the main focus lies on the differences in the structures between
the years. The development towards higher RES-E shares leads to a steeper slope
of the price duration curve. This development has strong effects on all system com-
ponents and will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections.
The Demand Side
While certain technologies are more profitable depending on the scenario setting, the
consumer has to pay the corresponding market price. Therefore, the term consumer
cost is based on the resulting market prices. This analysis takes into account the
energy market price, the reserve market price as well as the RES-E support value.
Other consumer cost components, such as other grid fees and taxes, are not included
in the analysis. The energy market costs for the consumer is the demand in each
hour valued by the power price. The reserve market costs are part of the grid fees
in Germany and consist of the price of the reserve products multiplied by the reserve
requirements. The RES-E support costs are calculated as the difference between
the levelized generation costs of each technology, which mirrors the required support
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Figure 6.9: Price duration curves of the ’Base’ scenario
Source: own illustration.
payment, and the market price in each hour. To calculate the levelized generation
costs (see Figure 6.10) which are used to estimate the required support costs for the
scenario comparison, future investment cost assessments are taken from IEA (2010)
and variable biomass costs from BMU (2010b).
The costs do not entirely reflect the current cost structure. Especially the assumed PV
investment costs do not reflect the rapid cost decrease in the recent years. Neverthe-
less, since the analysis focuses on the differences between the scenario comparison
and not the absolute values, the deviations from current cost levels can be ignored.
To annualize the investment costs, a depreciation time of 20 years and an interest
rate of 8% is assumed.
It is assumed that in this support scheme design, the regulator knows how much cur-
tailment occurs each year and the levelized generation costs take the actual full load
hours into account. This means that the support payment is higher if a technology is
curtailed more often in order to enable the recovery of the fixed costs. This approach
avoids that the support scheme costs are lower if more curtailment occurs. The total
support scheme costs therefore depend directly on the value of the individual RES-
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Figure 6.10: German RES-E levelized generation costs
Source: own assumptions, based on IEA (2010) and BMU (2010b).
E in each hour.15 In reality, the FIT is locked in at the year of commissioning and
is valid for 20 years. In the present approach, the level is calculated for each year
individually in order to ease the interpretation without carrying costs resulting from
previous years, which cannot directly be attributed to particular effects. The support
costs which the consumer has to pay are the aggregated differences between the FIT
(here levelized generation costs) and the market value of RES-E. Figure 6.11 shows
the consumer costs, divided into market relevant costs (energy and reserve market)
and RES-E support costs according to the following equation:
CCy =
∑
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(λspoty,h ∗ q
spot
y,h +
∑
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rp,y,h ∗ q
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rp,y,h )+
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(6.2)
The first term indicates the energy and reserve market costs with λ as marginal values
for the spot and reserve market per reserve product rp and q as respective demand
per year y and hour h. The second term indicates the RES-E support costs with lc
as levelized generation costs per renewable technology rt per year y and hour h.
15 The previously defined curtailment penalties would in reality mirror the height of the particular premium.
In this modeling framework, this would require additional iterations to specify the height of the premium, since
the amount of curtailment has repercussions on the required support level. Therefore, the applied curtailment
penalty and the support costs can deviate in this approach.
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Figure 6.11: Consumer cost comparison
Source: own illustration.
Following the merit-order discussion in section 2.1, it is observable in the comparison
of the ’Base’ and the ’Low RES-E’ scenarios that the energy and reserve market costs
are indeed lower in the ’Base’ scenario. However, the RES-E support costs overcom-
pensate these savings even with this direct support cost approach. If support costs
from previous years had been included, the cost burden would even increase, since
earlier FIT levels tend to be higher. Besides this scenario comparison, the overall con-
sumer cost burden remains relatively stable between the different curtailment cases
with the exception of the ’Curtail3000’ scenario. The nuclear lifetime extension sce-
narios reduce the energy market costs for the consumer. Since this automatically
increases the RES-E support volume, the overall cost burden is only slightly reduced.
If RES-E participate in the reserve market, the overall market costs for the consumer
increase and the RES-E support volume decreases. This effect will be discussed
in more detail in section 6.3.6. Furthermore, The RES-E integration policy strongly
affects the cost distribution. RES-E support costs are the lowest in the ’Curtail0’ sce-
nario, followed by the premium system assumption in the ’Base’ scenario. The out-
of-market curtailment level of at least -150 EUR in the ’Curtail150’ scenario strongly
increases the support costs, but at the same time reduces the energy market costs
almost to the same extent. In summary it is slightly more expensive than the ’Base’
scenario. The ’pure’ FIT system assumption with the infeed obligation in the ’Cur-
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tail3000’ scenario not only increases the RES-E support costs, but also increases the
total consumer costs. It becomes apparent that the forced RES-E integration strongly
affects the entire system, which consequently leads to a higher cost burden for the
consumer. As explained above, the effects are compared to each other on the basis
of the required support costs based on levelized generation costs for each year. In
order to provide a better understanding of the effects, Figure 6.12 shows the support
cost differences between the scenarios per MWh for a wind power plant, which was
installed in 2010 and receives the same absolute FIT until 2030.
Figure 6.12: Support cost difference per MWh for a wind power plant installed in 2010
Source: own illustration.
The levelized generation cost, which represent the required FIT level, is 83.9 EUR/MWh
based on the previously discussed assumptions. The difference between the FIT and
the market value of the wind energy is the required support costs, which is passed
on to the consumers (as seen in Figure 6.11). Due to the increase of the fuel costs
after 2010, the required support costs are reduced in all scenarios. Since no further
wind power deployment is assumed in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario, this effect further
reduces the required support costs until 2030. All other scenarios assume a further
penetration of wind power. Therefore at a certain point in time, the value of wind
power is reduced due to its price depressing effect. This leads to an increase of the
required support costs. The particular value of wind energy depends on the scenario
assumptions. Overall, the support costs depend on the flexibility of the entire system
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and its ability to absorb the wind energy. The wind value in the ’Grid Extension’ sce-
nario is higher compared to the other scenarios due to the higher export possibilities
in firm market situations, and the required support costs are the lowest. The ’Cur-
tail3000’ and ’Curtail150’ scenarios reduce the flexibility of the market compared to
the ’Base’ scenario and therefore require higher support costs. The same is true for
the lifetime extension scenarios, where the lower power price compared to the ’Base’
scenario leads to higher support costs for wind energy. The reduced flexibility in the
’Friction’ scenario also results in higher support costs.
Impact on the Grid Infrastructure
The last system component in this overview, which is strongly affected by the increas-
ing RES-E penetration, is the grid infrastructure. The individual power markets are
modeled as copperplates without internal grid bottlenecks. In order to get an idea of
the effects on the grid infrastructure, the interconnector capacities can be evaluated.
The sum of all marginal values of the interconnector constraint within one year can be
interpreted as the grid value. In order to reduce the complexity of the analysis and to
avoid the interpretation for each connection individually, all interconnections’ values
are accumulated.
Gridvaluey =
∑
h
∑
i
λy,h,i ∗Qy,h,i
∑
i
NTCy,i
(6.3)
with λy,h,i as the marginal value of the interconnector i in hour h and year y. Qy,h,i
is the corresponding transferred energy and NTCy,i is the total capacity of each
interconnector per year.
In this way, the basic effect becomes clear and comparable between the scenarios.
Even though this approach does not lead to an assessment of absolute grid require-
ments within the power system, the comparison of the relative values is nevertheless
an indicator for the development between the scenarios. In this case, the value re-
flects the differences between individual power markets with individual prices. Figure
6.13 shows the development of the grid values in all scenarios relative to the ’Base’
scenario.
With the ’Base’ scenario as a reference point, the grid value of the ’Low RES-E’ sce-
nario drops significantly over time. This means that the increasing RES-E amount
leads to higher values for interconnector capacities. The grid values further increase
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Figure 6.13: Comparison of grid values
Source: own illustration.
in the nuclear lifetime extension scenarios. The generation capacity in these sce-
narios is less flexible compared to the ’Base’ scenario, which increases the value of
the flexible grid infrastructure. The grid value in the ’Grid Extension’ scenario is also
much lower than in the ’Base’ scenario. Since the overall interconnector capacities
are much higher, the constraint is much weaker, which decreases the relative value.
If RES-E can be utilized more flexibly, as in the ’RES-E Reserve’ scenario for the
reserve requirements, the firmness of the market is also reduced, leading to lower
grid values as well. The RES-E infeed is also more flexible in the ’Curtail0’ scenario
compared to the ’Base’ scenario since RES-E infeed can be curtailed for free. Conse-
quently, the grid values are higher in the ’Curtail150’ and the ’Curtail3000’ scenario,
where the RES-E is forced into the system with higher curtailment penalties. Over-
all, it can be seen that the grid values are an indicator for market firmness. On the
one hand, if the conventional capacities or the RES-E infeed are flexible, the value of
the grid infrastructure is lower than in the context of a firm market environment. On
the other hand, if the grid infrastructure is increased, the firmness of the market is
reduced.
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6.3.2 Impact of RES-E Increase
As already discussed on a highly aggregated level in the previous section and for the
ERCOT case study in section 6.3, the increase of RES-E has strong effects on the
remaining system. Within this section, a closer look at the individual system compo-
nents is provided by comparing selected model outputs between the ’Base’ and the
’Low RES-E’ scenarios for the German power market. Additionally, the analysis ap-
proach for the different system components is introduced, and will be used again in
the subsequent sections to estimate the effects of the other scenario modifications.
RES-E Impact on the Supply Side
The intermittent RES-E infeed covers a changing share of the demand in each hour.
Whenever RES-E is available, it is forced into the market, either by infeed obligations
or simply due to its low variable costs. Nevertheless, sufficient conventional capacity
is required for the times with low RES-E infeed. The capacity mix in Figure 6.6 shows
that the total conventional capacity in the ’Low RES-E scenario’ is not substantially
higher, even though much more energy must be generated. Therefore, the amount of
CCGTs is higher, while the amount of OCGTS and superpeakers is lower compared
to the ’Base’ scenario. Consequently, when the RES-E share increases over time,
the total conventional capacity is decreasingly utilized, as shown in Figure 6.14.
The capacity in both model runs is evaluated according to their utilization. While the
share of installed capacity with a utilization above 6,500 hours remains at roughly 40%
throughout the entire period in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario, the share drops to 18% in
2020, and in 2030 no capacity is utilized above this share in the ’Base’ scenario. The
capacity with a utilization below 3,000 hours increases from roughly 40% in 2010 to
roughly 55% in 2020 and 2030 in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario. In the ’Base’ scenario,
the share of low utilized capacity increases to 66% in 2020 and to 83% in 2030. In
other words, significant shares of the capacity mix only serve as back-up capacities
for times with low RES-E infeed. This applies also for former base load technologies,
such as old lignite and old coal capacities. Therefore, the high share of low utilized
generation adds a different dimension to the peak load definition. In addition to the
requirement for flexible capacities, which usually serve as peak capacities, back-up
capacities are also required, which also generate a few days in a row in times of low
RES-E infeed.
The higher share of peak oriented generation can also be interpreted as demand for
flexibility. An additional sign of flexibility requirement is the short-run profit of storage
technologies. The value of both storage technologies per installed MW can be seen
in Figure 6.15.
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Figure 6.14: Capacity utilization (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
Over time, as the conventional capacity mix adapts to the RES-E level in the ’Low
RES-E’ scenario, the value of storage as a means of flexibility decreases. Then, the
higher peak generation share in Figure 6.14 provides sufficient flexibility. In contrast,
the value of both storage technologies increases over time with the increasing RES-E
share in the ’Base’ scenario. Thereby, the value of CAES remains below the pumped
hydro value due to the lower overall efficiency. Even though the value increases, it
is still not sufficient to trigger significant CAES investments. The relative develop-
ment of the storage value compared between both scenarios nevertheless shows a
clear trend. As shown in section 3.1.2, the demand for flexibility in the system can
also be seen in the reserve power market. In THEA, as soon as a firm market situa-
tion occurs and opportunity costs arise due to part-load or start-up costs, a positive
marginal value occurs in the reserve requirement restriction. Therefore, the aggre-
gated reserve market volume is an indicator of the firmness of the market and can be
seen in Figure 6.16.
While the capacity optimization in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario leads to less firm market
situations over time, the rising RES-E share in the ’Base’ scenario leads to more than
a doubling of the reserve market volume from 2010 to 2020 and is even more than 17
times higher in 2030 compared to 2010.
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Figure 6.15: Profit of storage technologies (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
RES-E Impact on the Demand Side
Since RES-E are relevant for the consumer costs, a further analysis is also attributed
to the demand side. The development of the overall RES-E support volume has
already been show in Figure 6.11. Now, a more detailed analysis is conducted to
better understand the value development of individual RES-E, evaluated according
to the hourly power price. This means that the RES-E value in a particular hour is
equal to the wholesale power price which reflects the avoided costs. This is done for
every hour per year and then aggregated to receive the RES-E value of this year. The
remaining gap to cover the required support costs has to be paid by the consumers
via their electricity bill. The focus of the analysis lies on intermittent RES-E since the
value of the more base load-oriented generation reflects basically the base price level.
Figure 6.17 shows the relative RES-E value per MWh for wind onshore, wind offshore
and PV compared to the base price of the ’Base’ and the ’Low RES-E’ scenarios,
respectively.
The relative PV value in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario remains above the base price
level over the entire period. Since PV generation is the highest around noon when
energy consumption peaks, the positive value reflects the correlation of load and sun
irradiation. The typical evening peak, however, cannot be covered by PV generation.
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Figure 6.16: Reserve market volume (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
The PV value in the ’Base’ scenario falls below the base price already by 2015. At a
certain tipping point in the PV deployment, the PV infeed is high enough to basically
reduce the noon peak to an off-peak level on sunny days and thus the energy value.
Since the evening peak is more dominant and the former noon peak is now below
average load, the PV value further shrinks with each installed MW. The wind onshore
value starts below the base price, since the installed capacity in 2010 is already high
enough to have a significant impact on the power prices as previously discussed in
section 3.1. This trend continues with further deployment. The relative value in the
’Low RES-E’ scenario increases slightly with the optimization of the capacity mix until
it reaches almost the base price level. Figure 6.18 shows the season market income
per MW for all three technologies.
Figure 6.18 summarizes the market value per MW and season, which incorporates
the infeed structure and the total utilization (explaining the relatively low income of
PV compared to both wind technologies). Overall, the wind pattern has a seasonality
similar to the load pattern, which lowers the price-depressing effect slightly. PV on
the other hand has the strongest seasonal effect in the summer when demand is rel-
atively low in Germany, and a lower effect in the winter with high demand. In addition
to this seasonal effect, wind does not follow as strict a pattern as PV, with generation
only during the day. Wind generation is more stochastic and has, by trend, a higher
capacity factor compared to PV. This is also the reason why the wind offshore value
107
6 THE GERMAN RES-E TARGETS IN HIGH RESOLUTION
Figure 6.17: RES-E value relative to base price (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
remains above the base price in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario. First, the installed capac-
ity is too little to have an impact on the price. Second, the seasonal wind and demand
pattern is favorable for wind offshore. The wind offshore value nevertheless drops
in the ’Base’ scenario with higher deployment. However, since the capacity factor is
higher for wind offshore, the relative price-depressing effect per hour is lower, since
it affects the average base price in general. The relative value compared to the base
price does not necessarily explain the shift in consumer costs between energy mar-
ket and RES-E support costs in Figure 6.11. Thus, the absolute values are relevant
for the further analysis. Therefore, Figure 6.19 compares the absolute RES-E value
per MWh for wind onshore, wind offshore and PV as well as the base price in both
scenarios.
The values of all RES-E in both scenarios increase after 2010. The reason for the
value increase is the low base price of 35.6 EUR/MWh in 2010.16 Overall, it can
be seen that the base price in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario is higher than in the ’Base’
scenario. The relative comparison in Figure 6.17 therefore underestimates the price-
depressing effect, since the relative values in the the ’Base’ scenario have a lower
16 The reason for the low price level is the low fuel costs in 2009, which are assumed to be the same in
2010. At the EPEX, the average base price was 38.6 EUR/MWh in 2009. The model results are slightly lower
due to the assumption of a well informed benevolent planner.
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Figure 6.18: RES-E market volume per season and MW (’Base’ scenario)
Source: own illustration.
reference value. For example, in 2030 the absolute PV value in the ’Low RES-E’
scenario is 75% higher than the PV value in the ’Base’ scenario. Taking into ac-
count that the levelized generation costs are the same in both scenarios, the RES-E
support costs per MWh in the ’Base’ scenario are significantly higher. The average
base price comparison already shows that the further RES-E deployment suppresses
power prices. The structure of the prices, however gives a better indication of the
development in the market, especially when price signals are interpreted as market
signals which indicate conventional capacity requirements of the market. Figure 6.20
shows the price duration curves of both scenarios in 2030.
It is directly observable that the price duration curve of the ’Base’ scenario is much
steeper compared to the ’Low RES-E’ scenario. For the positive prices, more peak
oriented generation and more start-ups in the ’Base’ scenario lead to higher prices.
On the low price side, the ’typical’ merit-order effect first leads to lower marginal
values in the ’Base’ scenario. Later, the prices are set by curtailment decisions as
discussed in section 3.1.4. The price differences between both scenarios also ex-
plain the previously discussed increasing values of the storage technologies which
benefit from the higher price volatility.
RES-E Impact on the Grid Infrastructure
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Figure 6.19: Absolute RES-E value (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
The interconnections between the power markets remains the most efficient flexi-
bility option. If the exchange possibilities were unrestricted, power prices would be
the same in all price zones and the steep price duration curve would be avoided by
imports from and exports to neighboring markets. To understand how the RES-E in-
crease affects the exchange behavior, Figure 6.21 shows the development of import
and export amounts for the ’Base’ and the ’Low RES-E’ scenarios.
The import amount increases with the increasing RES-E share and is consequently
higher in the ’Base’ scenario than in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario. As discussed above,
the generation is increasingly peak-oriented, which means that the low RES-E peak
hours are quite expensive due to the high cost marginal units. Whenever one of the
surrounding power markets is able to export energy at a lower price, this option is
used. In the ’Low RES-E’ scenario, this trend is weaker, since the developments in
all markets follow the same economic pattern, with the exception that some markets
are allowed to invest in nuclear capacity, which is partially responsible for the moder-
ate import increase. Because of the stronger peak orientation in the ’Base’ scenario,
the export amount drops slightly. It remains above the ’Low RES-E’ scenario in later
years due to the high RES-E infeed which needs to be exported to an increasing
extent. The export amount in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario drops, since in future years
110
6 THE GERMAN RES-E TARGETS IN HIGH RESOLUTION
Figure 6.20: Price duration curves in 2030 (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
Germany only has a small amount of low cost generation which can efficiently be
exported.
The value of the grid infrastructure reflects this pattern. As the utilization of the grid
infrastructure increases, the value increases as well. Figure 6.13 already showed the
scenario comparison for the overall grid values. In order to examine the import and
export capacities separately, Figure 6.22 shows the marginal NTC values for the im-
port and export NTCs.
The marginal NTC values are the aggregated marginals of all interconnectors, divided
by the amount of interconnectors to neighboring countries. In this way, one average
MW of NTC import and export capacity can be compared between the scenarios. The
overall effect can be captured and discussed without requiring too detailed an analy-
sis of individual interconnectors, which are strongly affected by individual RES-E and
conventional deployment of all involved countries.
As a consequence of the absolute exchange amounts depicted in Figure 6.21, the
import NTC values in the ’Base’ scenario rise over time due to the increasing value of
111
6 THE GERMAN RES-E TARGETS IN HIGH RESOLUTION
Figure 6.21: International exchange (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
the imported energy. The increase depends also on the deployed capacity in the sur-
rounding markets. If, for any reason, the other markets do not invest in low variable
cost generation capacity, the value of the import capacity only rises to a lower level.
The NTC value of the import capacity remains more or less at the same level. The
value of the export capacity drops in the ’Low RES-E’ scenario due to the absence of
low cost generation in Germany. In the ’Base’ scenario, the value increases since the
occasional oversupply from intermitting RES-E relies on export capacities to avoid
curtailment or investments in storage technologies.
Conclusion on the RES-E System Impact
In this section, it has been shown that all system components are affected by an in-
creasing RES-E share. The supply side is characterized by a less utilized capacity
mix with a higher valuation of flexible technologies. The reason is that the appearance
of firmmarket situations increases, which has been shown by the strong rising reserve
market volume. The consumer benefits on the one hand from a reduced power mar-
ket price, but on the other hand pays higher reserve power costs and higher RES-E
support payments due to the strongly decreasing value of intermitting RES-E. In sum-
mary, the merit-order effect, which reduces the power market price, is not sufficient
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Figure 6.22: Marginal NTC value (’Base’ vs. ’Low RES-E’)
Source: own illustration.
to have a cost reducing effect for the consumer. The market interconnections gain
increasing importance, since they provide a flexible option to share national market
imbalances. The following subsections take these findings into account and analyze
the individual system components by changing either their absolute amounts or par-
ticular rules concerning their treatment.
6.3.3 Nuclear Lifetime Extension and More Friction
In this section, the ’Lifetime’ scenario and the ’Friction’ scenario are compared to the
’Base’ scenario. The aim of this section is twofold. First, the lifetime extension of the
German nuclear fleet is a likely scenario in the current political debate, which con-
sequently should also be discussed in an analysis that covers the German market.
Second, the lifetime extension allows for an analysis of how the remaining system
reacts to a higher share of low cost base load capacity. In addition to the lifetime
extension, the ’Friction’ scenario follows the findings in section 3.1.3, where limited
flexibility of the nuclear and the lignite fleet in hours with extreme negative prices was
observed. It is likely that these restrictions were simply company internal rules or un-
familiarities with the required market flexibility and have therefore been resolved over
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time. However, if additional restrictions exist, this scenario can be interpreted as a
worst case scenario.
Effects of the Nuclear Lifetime Extension on the Supply Side
As already discussed in the previous section, the value of storage technologies can
be used as an indicator of flexibility requirements. The capacity overview in Figure
6.6 showed that CAES is commissioned in both lifetime extension scenarios, 5 GW
in the ’Lifetime’ scenario and 3.5 GW in the ’Friction’ scenario. This is already a clear
sign that the market is firm enough to justify investment in this flexibility option due
to the higher price volatility. Figure 6.23 shows the short-run profits per MW of the
storage technologies for all three scenarios.
Figure 6.23: Profit of storage technologies (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
The values of both storage technologies increase in all scenarios. The extension of
the nuclear lifetime leads to higher profits for storage technologies compared to the
’Base’ scenario. This is not surprising since the low cost nuclear generation pro-
vides additional cheap energy which can be stored and released at higher prices. In
addition, if prices are negative, storage technologies also benefit from compressing
energy. The average value of CAES storage can only rise within a certain bandwidth
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since higher values would lead to additional investments, which would consequently
reduce the value again. Of course, this also affects the value of pumped storage.
If investments in CAES were not allowed, the value of pumped hydro storage would
have been much higher. The storage value in the ’Friction’ scenario is the highest,
since the base load fleets have minimum generation levels, which enforce generation
even at negative prices. The CAES capacity is nevertheless lower in the ’Friction’
scenario since the cheapest option proves to be the early decommissioning of lignite
capacity and investments in peak generating capacity to increase flexibility, before
CAES investments occurs in later years. An additional indicator of market firmness,
which has also been introduced in the last section, is the reserve market volume. Fig-
ure 6.24 shows a comparison of the reserve market volumes of all three scenarios.
Figure 6.24: Reserve market volume (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
As already indicated by the storage commissioning and the storage values, the mar-
ket is firm more often in both lifetime extension scenarios. In 2020, the reserve market
volume of the ’Lifetime’ scenario is 2.4 times higher than in the ’Base’ scenario and in
the ’Friction’ scenario even more than 2.6 times. The differences are lower in 2030,
since by then parts of the nuclear fleet are decommissioned and the overall capacity
mix is further optimized. While the market volume of the ’Lifetime’ scenario is 9%
above the ’Base’ scenario in 2030, the volume in the ’Friction’ scenario is still 30%
higher. Since all components in the system are interconnected, the interpretation of
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the individual values needs to take the reaction of other system components into ac-
count as well. One additional reason for the lower difference of the market volume is
that CAES is able to provide negative reserve and therefore reduces the firmness of
the market by providing the ability to store additional energy. As already mentioned,
without the ability to invest in CAES as a flexibility option, the power market would
show significantly higher signs of firmness.
Effects of the Nuclear Lifetime Extension on the Demand Side
The higher share of nuclear capacity also has effects on the consumer costs as
shown in Figure 6.11. It is observable that while the energy market costs decrease,
the RES-E support costs increase. Figure 6.25 shows the relative RES-E value com-
pared to the base price for all three scenarios.
Figure 6.25: Relative RES-E value (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
The relative RES-E value decrease is stronger in both lifetime extension scenarios
for all RES-E in comparison to the ’Base’ scenario. It is also observable that with
the deployment of CAES in 2030, the decreasing trend is reduced in both lifetime
scenarios since the oversupply can be stored, which reduces the price-depressing
effect. Without this additional storage possibility, the RES-E value would have been
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much lower. Benitez et al. (2008) show that hydro storage increases the value of wind
power in a constrained power market. The same effect can be seen for the absolute
RES-E values in Figure 6.26.
Figure 6.26: Absolute RES-E value (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
All absolute RES-E values in both lifetime extension scenarios are below their cor-
responding value of the ’Base’ scenario. For example, the value of wind onshore in
the ’Lifetime’ scenario amounts to only 85% of the value in the ’Base’ scenario and
only 74% in the ’Friction’ scenario. Also the base prices in the lifetime extension
scenarios are lower than in the ’Base’ scenario, which explains the lower consumer
costs on behalf of the energy market. The reason is the higher share of nuclear or
lignite generation as a marginal unit, which sets the price more often. In addition, the
power price is also influenced by the curtailment penalty. Figure 6.27 shows the de-
velopment of the absolute curtailment amount of all RES-E technologies for all three
scenarios.
The curtailment in all three scenarios starts in 2020 and rises strongly until 2030. Ap-
proximately 6 GW are curtailed in the ’Base’ scenario, and in the ’Friction’ scenario,
more than 9 GW are curtailed. In the ’Lifetime’ scenario, the curtailment amounts
to a little less than in the ’Base’ scenario because of the additional CAES storage
possibility. Since the curtailment sets the price in these hours, the price becomes
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Figure 6.27: Total curtailment comparison (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
more volatile with an increasing curtailment share. To illustrate this effect, Figure
6.28 shows a comparison of the three price duration curves for 2030.
The price duration curve of the ’Base’ scenario shows higher prices in the high price
area than both lifetime extension scenarios. At the low price end, all scenarios show
significant amounts of negative prices. In the ’Base’ scenario, the power price is
negative in 9% of all hours. This number rises to 10% in the ’Lifetime’ scenario and
even to 13% in the ’Friction’ scenario. Overall, it can be seen that the nuclear lifetime
extension increases the challenges to integrating a high share of RES-E. Without
CAES investments, the resulting market firmness signs would have been more se-
vere. Since the market flexibility is highly valued in the lifetime extension scenarios,
the grid infrastructure is likely to gain importance.
Effects of the Nuclear Lifetime Extension on the Grid Infrastructure
In both lifetime extension scenarios, the total low variable cost generation from RES-
E and nuclear is higher compared to the ’Base’ scenario. The share of peak oriented
generation is lower in both lifetime extension scenarios, with the exception of CAES.
This shift in capacity and generation has consequences for the utilization of the grid
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Figure 6.28: Price duration curves in 2030 (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
infrastructure as can be seen in Figure 6.29, which shows the development of the
international exchange amounts in all three scenarios.
The import amount is reduced in both lifetime extension scenarios due to the higher
share of low cost generation. At the same time, the low cost generation increases
the export amount, since RES-E in combination with nuclear generation forms a base
load energy band, which either needs to be consumed or exported to avoid costly cur-
tailment. In summary, this means that due to the lifetime extension, Germany does
not become a netimporting country until after 2015, and in 2030 the netimport is re-
duced by 26% in the ’Lifetime’ scenario and by 38% in the ’Friction’ scenario. In the
case of both lifetime extension scenarios, the possibility to store additional energy via
CAES relaxes the constraint on the export NTC since an additional option is available.
Why the investment in the CAES is necessary can be understood with the help of the
analysis of the average NTC values. Figure 6.30 shows the average marginal NTC
values of all three scenarios.
Compared to the average export NTC value of the ’Base’ scenario, the values from
both lifetime extensions scenarios are significantly higher. This reflects the firm mar-
ket situations, shown above in the discussion of the reserve market volumes. If one
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Figure 6.29: Development of international exchange (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
MWh cannot be exported, it needs to be either curtailed or stored. This means ad-
ditional costs for the system. The value of import NTC is relaxed by the lifetime
extension, since high residual load situations in which imports are necessary to avoid
start-ups of expensive peakload capacity are reduced. By now, it has been shown that
the grid infrastructure plays an important role in RES-E integration and that changes
in the power market have direct consequences for the exchange amounts and the
value of the NTC.
6.3.4 Grid Extension
While the market in the last scenario became more firm, the market in this section
is relaxed due to the higher exchange possibilities between the markets. The re-
sults overview shows that the non-utilized peak share of the capacity mix is strongly
increased and that the overall generation in Germany is reduced, which consequen-
tially increases the netimport share. This is in line with the overview of the producer
rent, which shows less profits in the ’Grid Extension’ scenario. Overall, the conven-
tional generation in Germany suffers from low cost imports from the surrounding mar-
kets due to the increased peak oriented generation capacity compared to the ’Base’
scenario. The more flexible market environment also makes investments in storage
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Figure 6.30: Average marginal NTC values (’Base’ vs. nuclear lifetime extension scenarios)
Source: own illustration.
technologies dispensable. Since these findings can already be derived from the dis-
cussion in in the results overview in section 6.3.1, the analysis in this section starts
with the impact on the RES-E value, which directly impacts the overall consumer
costs.
Effects of an Extended Grid Infrastructure on the Demand Side
It is observable in Figure 6.11 that the consumer has to bear lower costs in the ’Grid
Extension’ scenario compared to the ’Base’ scenario. The costs related to the energy
markets in the ’Grid Extension’ scenario are higher, while the reduced RES-E support
costs overcompensate this cost increase. To understand the effect on the RES-E
support, Figure 6.31 shows the relative RES-E value compared to the base price.
The relative RES-E values of all technologies remain at much higher levels through-
out the entire time period compared to the ’Base’ scenario. This already indicates
that firm market situations in which the RES-E value drops occur much less in the
’Grid Extension’ scenario. This assumption is confirmed by the reserve market vol-
ume which is 70% lower in 2020 and still 57% lower in 2030 compared to the ’Base’
scenario. To understand what these effects mean for the consumer costs, Figure
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Figure 6.31: Relative RES-E value comparison (’Base’ vs. ’Grid Extension’)
Source: own illustration.
6.32 shows the absolute results.
The comparison of the absolute RES-E values explains why the RES-E support costs
are much lower in the ’Grid Extension’ scenario. The value of PV is 12% higher in
2020 and 30% higher in 2030. Consequently, the support costs decrease substan-
tially. The same pattern is observable for wind onshore, for which the value is 9%
higher in 2020 and 28% higher in 2030, whereas the corresponding numbers for
wind offshore are 4% and 11% respectively. As already mentioned, the markets’ firm-
ness is dramatically reduced by the higher grid infrastructure. As a consequence, the
curtailment is strongly reduced to less than 900 GWh in 2030 compared to almost
6 TWh in the ’Base’ scenario. Since this also has strong effects on the prices, the
base price in the ’Grid Extension’ scenario remains 4% above the price of the ’Base’
scenario. This higher price has to be paid by the consumer, who on the other hand
benefits from the reduced RES-E support costs.
Effects of an Increased Grid Infrastructure on the Grid
The extension of the grid infrastructure allows international exchange to a much
greater degree. Figure 6.33 shows the import and export amounts of Germany.
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Figure 6.32: Absolute RES-E value comparison (’Base’ vs. ’Grid Extension’)
Source: own illustration.
As the scenario overview has shown, the netimport is increased compared to the
’Base’ scenario. The import is much higher, which is a result of the higher peak ori-
entation of the generation capacity. Most of the time, expensive generation can be
avoided by imports, which also leads to a higher share of base load generation in
some of the surrounding power markets. The export is also increased, but to a much
lesser extent than the import. As discussed above, most of the time, the RES-E over-
supply can be exported and curtailment strongly reduced.
To summarize, the increased grid infrastructure reduced the RES-E induced firmness
of the market significantly. All market signs indicate that this approach is able to
provide significant additional flexibility to the market. The reserve market volume is
reduced substantially due to the higher flexibility. The export possibility in times of
RES-E oversupply times increases the RES-E value while decreasing the required
curtailment. The direction of the effects is clear. Assessing the efficient amount of
grid extension in the interconnected system with various investment decision in re-
newable and conventional generation remains a challenging task.
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Figure 6.33: International exchange comparison (’Base’ vs. ’Grid Extension’)
Source: own illustration.
6.3.5 Effects of Support Schemes and Curtailment Regulation
The design of the RES-E support scheme and thus the applied curtailment rules are
an important element of power systems with a higher RES-E share as discussed in
section 3.1.4. The design has strong effects on the dispatch and on the power prices.
Therefore, the market adapts to the support scheme design when RES-E play a sig-
nificant role in the power market.
Effects of Support Scheme Design on the Supply Side
Power prices are directly influenced by the curtailment behavior, which sets the equi-
librium power price in firm oversupply situations. Consequently, investment deci-
sions concerning conventional capacities are directly influenced as well, as has been
shown in Figure 6.6 in the results overview. Overall, the generation capacity becomes
more peak oriented with higher curtailment costs. Therefore, to avoid high generation
costs, the netimport increases with higher curtailment costs as well. In the assumed
premium system of the ’Base’ scenario as well as in the free curtailment scenario
’Curtail0’, investments in OCGTs are required to provide flexibility in the energy and
the reserve market. If higher curtailment costs are assumed, as in the out-of-market
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assumption in the ’Curtail150’ case, the commissioning of 11 GW CAES crowds out
parts of the OCGT fleet and provides the required flexibility instead. If no curtailment
rule is applied and the market reaches its limit at -3000 EUR, as in the ’Curtail3000’
scenario, the effects are much more extreme. However, market rules would quickly
change if oversupply situations resulted in prices of -3000 EUR without market clear-
ance. Therefore, this scenario should not be interpreted as realistic. It simply shows
that forced RES-E infeed has its limits. In order to avoid the extremely high cur-
tailment costs, investments in 40 GW CAES can be observed that store the RES-E
oversupply and avoid curtailment costs that are too high. The immense CAES fleet
provides the entire flexibility requirement and replaces almost the entire OCGT fleet,
significantly reducing the required superpeaker capacity. Since the storage technolo-
gies benefit from storing energy at extremely negative prices and releasing it to the
market at positive prices, their profits increase as shown in Figure 6.8. Storage tech-
nologies benefit from market firmness, since they are able to provide flexibility on both
sides of the market, during the peak hours and the oversupply hours.
Figure 6.34 shows the reserve market volume as an indicator of market firmness.
Compared to the ’Base’ scenario, the ’Curtail0’ scenario shows less firmness due to
the ability to curtail the RES-E oversupply without any costs. This possibility is treated
as additional flexibility in the market.
This flexibility is reduced as soon as the curtailment penalty increases. As discussed
above, the market firmness increases in the ’Curtail150’ scenario to a level that re-
quires CAES to reduce the firmness. The reserve market volume increases never-
theless to 112% of the ’Base’ scenario in 2030. The forced RES-E infeed in the
’Curtail3000’ scenario increases the firmness further, which has been seen in the
high CAES investments as well as in the reserve market volume, which rises to 217%
of the volume of the ’Base’ scenario.
Effects of Support Scheme Design on the Demand Side
It is intuitive that the support scheme design affects the consumer costs, which can
be seen in Figure 6.11. While the RES-E support costs increase with the curtailment
penalty, the overall costs remain more or less the same, with the exception of the ex-
treme penalty assumption in the ’Curtail3000’ scenario in which the overall costs for
the consumer increase. The more RES-E is forced into the market, the lower the en-
ergy market costs. Therefore, the value of RES-E, and consequently the total RES-E
support costs, strongly depend on the support scheme design. Figure 6.35 shows
the scenario comparison of the relative RES-E value.
The increase of the curtailment penalties reduces the value of the individual RES-E.
In the ’Curtail0’ scenario, the individual RES-E value is the highest, since curtailment
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Figure 6.34: Reserve market volume (’Base’ vs. ’Curtail0’, ’Curtail150’ and ’Curtail3000’)
Source: own illustration.
is free of cost and the value reducing effect is primarily the merit-order effect. The
results of the premium assumptions in the ’Base’ scenario are primarily curtailment
decisions at slightly negative prices below -100 EUR/MWh. The RES-E value is there-
fore slightly lower than the one from the ’Curtail0’ scenario. The out-of-market cur-
tailment level of -150 EUR/MWh in the ’Curtail150’ scenario already shows stronger
value reducing effects. These effects are the highest in the ’Curtail3000’ scenario.
Even though the majority of curtailment is avoided by the CAES storage, the RES-E
values decrease dramatically. Figure 6.36 shows the absolute values, which directly
determine the total RES-E support costs for consumers.
The high curtailment penalty in the ’Curtail3000’ scenario leads to negative RES-E
values for PV and wind onshore. Even though the total RES-E curtailment is reduced
to 2.6% of the amount of the ’Base’ scenario in 2030, the impact on the value is high
enough to result in a RES-E value below zero. While in the ’Curtail150’ scenario the
total curtailment amount is reduced to 40% of the ’Base’ scenario in 2030, the value
of PV is reduced to 82% of the value of the ’Base’ scenario and the value of wind
onshore to 79%. The same logic applies in the ’Curtail0’ scenario, where the RES-
E values are above the ones from the ’Base’ scenario. Also the base prices reflect
the impact of the curtailment penalties. While the price in the ’Curtail0’ scenario is
5% above the one from the ’Base’ scenario, the prices for the ’Curtail150’ and ’Cur-
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Figure 6.35: Relative RES-E value (’Base’ vs. ’Curtail0’, ’Curtail150’ and ’Curtail3000’)
Source: own illustration.
tail3000’ scenarios are 6% and 23% lower, respectively. The scenario comparison of
the price behavior can be seen in Figure 6.37 by the price duration curves.
The overview of the price duration curves illustrates the impact of the RES-E sup-
port scheme designs and their corresponding curtailment rules. While the ’Base’
and the ’Curtail0’ scenarios show similar price patterns, apart from the lowest price
levels which are set by the different curtailment penalties, the patterns in the other
two scenarios deviate stronger. The ’Base’ scenario curtails at the individual RES-E
premium levels and shows overall negative prices 8.8% of the time. The ’Curtail0’
scenario curtails at a power price of zero, which is the market result 9.1% of the time.
Both scenarios show the same pattern at the positive side. The ’Curtail150’ scenario
starts curtailing at -150 EUR/MWh. However, the price also drops to lower values as
compared later to the ’Base’ scenario. This pattern has already been seen in section
3.1.4, where an out-of-market curtailment rule has been applied at the ERCOT market
in Texas. The reason for the delayed drop in the ’Curtail150’ scenario is the added
storage capacity, which reduces the market firmness in these hours. Even though
the effects look similar, two different flexibility options are responsible, namely out-
of-market curtailment in the ERCOT case and storage in the ’Curtail150’ case. Due
to the utilization of the additional CAES storage in the ’Curtail150’ scenario, negative
price results can be reduced to 4.8% of the time. This effect is strongly increased
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Figure 6.36: Absolute RES-E value comparison (’Base’ vs. ’Curtail0’, ’Curtail150’ and ’Curtail3000’)
Source: own illustration.
in the ’Curtail3000’ scenario, since the high curtailment penalty leads to much higher
CAES investments, delaying the price drop and leading to negative prices in less than
0.8% of the time. On the positive price side, the two lower curtailment cost scenarios
deviate in a few hours to higher prices. This pattern is avoided in the other two sce-
narios due to the utilization of the additionally stored energy.
A detailed analysis of the support scheme effects on the grid infrastructure is dis-
pensed at this point due to the repetition of the pattern. In short, the market firmness
increases with the curtailment penalties and leads to higher valuations of the grid
infrastructure. Also the exchange is increased, leading to the previously mentioned
increase of the netimport due to the higher peak orientation of the generation capacity
when higher curtailment penalties are applied.
In summary, the RES-E support scheme design strongly influences market behavior
as soon as critical penetration levels are reached which lead to firm market situations.
The generation capacity becomes more peak oriented with higher curtailment penal-
ties, requiring higher netimport amounts. At a certain point, even CAES investments
are required to provide flexibility to enable efficient market clearance. The consumer
has to bear higher RES-E support costs when RES-E are forced into the market,
but this requires benefits from reduced energy market costs until the distortions of
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Figure 6.37: Comparison of price duration curves (’Base’ vs. ’Curtail0’, ’Curtail150’ and ’Curtail3000’)
Source: own illustration.
the market become too extreme and costly flexibility options. On the one hand, the
market benefits from price signals, which reflect the requirement for flexibility, as dis-
cussed in chapter 3. On the other hand, too many market distortions through overly
ambitious RES-E integration forces result in higher costs and penalize the RES-E
value substantially.
6.3.6 RES-E Reserve Market Participation
In the previous section, the reserve market volume served as an indicator of market
firmness, since the market volume increases when firm market situations generate
opportunity costs due to reserve requirement constraints. It has been shown that this
volume decreases when additional flexibilities are available. As already discussed
in section 3.1.1, the reserve market requirements are also one of the drivers of firm
market situations. Positive reserve requires sufficient capacity in the market which
is able to increase the generation in a certain time frame. Negative reserve requires
a minimum generation level, which allows for a reduction. In situations with poten-
tial oversupply, this restriction forces conventional capacities to generate above their
minimum load level and therefore to increase the firmness of the market. A funda-
mental assumption in this scenario is that RES-E are able to provide reserve power.
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In order to do this, an IT infrastructure needs to be installed that enables the control
of the RES-E capacity.17 According to Dena (2010), only pitch controlled wind mills
are able to control the output and are therefore able to participate in the reserve mar-
ket. However, the majority of installed wind capacity and almost all new installed wind
mills are pitch controlled, so it is assumed that no further limitations are required for
the scenario assumptions. For a detailed analysis of the technical capabilities of wind
power to provide system services, see Ummels (2008).
Effects of RES-E Reserve Market Participation on the Supply Side
The ’RES-E Reserve’ scenario allows RES-E to participate in the reserve market. In
order to provide positive reserve, the particular infeed needs to be curtailed to in-
crease it again. Negative reserve can be provided as soon as a particular technology
generates electricity that can be reduced. If the reserve market would actually require
negative reserve to be triggered, the price for the actual reserve energy would be the
foregone alternative value on the energy market and the premium payment. While in
theory the opportunity costs can simply be attributed and calculated, in reality a com-
plex game theoretic approach is required, which may also take potential oligopolistic
market structures into account. The approach of this scenario is therefore in line with
the general orientation of this entire analysis, which focuses on fundamental interre-
lationships and not on behavioral aspects of the markets. Furthermore, this scenario
is not intended to actually model a particular reserve market with its corresponding
design features in detail, but simply to analyze the effects on the energy market if
RES-E are allowed to participate in the reserve market. One can interpret the set-up
as a reserve market design with two separate auctions. The first auction, which is
reflected by this scenario approach, is for the reserve capacity requirement. The sec-
ond auction is for the energy price if the reserve needs to be triggered. This reflects
roughly the current German reserve market design.
Before the results are discussed, a brief explanation is provided for the fundamental
interdependencies of the reserve market. First, the negative reserve market is dis-
cussed. Whenever RES-E is fed into the market, it can be curtailed. This possibility
fulfills the negative reserve requirement and can be provided without any additional
costs. If the energy reduction was actually required, opportunity costs would be the
energy market value plus the premium. In normal market situations in reality, the
opportunity costs for conventional generators are the avoided fuel costs. Therefore,
the conventional generator actually saves money if he has to reduce generation. In
17 Since the availibility of RES-E is a crucial assumption for this scenario, forecast errors are also important
in order to enable that only the guaranteed RES-E amounts participate in the reserve market. To take this
probability into account, a sensitivity case has been computed. In this case, only 50% of the curtailed amount
is allowed to provide positive reserve and only 50% of the RES-E infeed is allowed to provide negative reserve.
The results differ only to a negligible degree and therefore only one scenario discussion is sufficient.
130
6 THE GERMAN RES-E TARGETS IN HIGH RESOLUTION
the case of RES-E, the energy would be lost if the primary energy source were non-
storable.18 Therefore, intermitting RES-E would be quite an expensive choice in the
’merit-order’ of ’negative energy’ and would not be efficient under normal market con-
ditions. In the model, opportunity costs show only up in the extreme situations when
the conventional generation reaches certain limits, i.e. in cases of oversupply. Then,
it is efficient if RES-E provide negative reserve and, since the price at the energy
market isfrequently negative in oversupply situations, to reduce the energy infeed. In
this way, conventional capacities are allowed to ramp down and to avoid burning fuel
and paying the negative price at the energy market in order to generate above their
minimum load level. Additionally, the provision on negative reserve by RES-E re-
duces the amount of curtailment and therefore also additional RES-E support costs.
In summary, the situations in which it would be inefficient to ramp down RES-E do
not in reality show up in the model results, since in this case no opportunity costs
are present, the reserve price is equal to zero and THEA chooses a conventional
generator to provide negative reserve. Only firm market situations provide negative
reserve prices. In these situations, it might very well be efficient if RES-E, especially
with storable primary energy sources, provided negative reserve. Especially if their
premium is lower than the opportunity costs of the conventional generator.
The explanation of the positive reserve market follows a different logic, since actual
curtailment is required before RES-E can provide the possibility to increase the en-
ergy output. In all normal and high energy price situations this would not be efficient,
since RES-E is valuable at the energy market. However, in firm oversupply situa-
tions it might be different. In this case, the model does not show positive reserve
prices, since the reserve requirement restriction is not binding because all ramped-
up capacities in part-load mode can increase generation. If RES-E is curtailed in
these oversupply situations anyway, it can easily provide positive reserve. In combi-
nation with the possibility to also provide negative reserve, this allows conventional
capacities to ramp-down, leading to less curtailment, higher RES-E values and con-
sequently to lower support costs. If the energy were required in the market, it would
not generate any fuel costs. The ’merit-order’ of the positive reserve would start at
the negative premium level, since as soon as RES-E is fed into the grid, the premium
is earned. Figure 6.38 shows the effects on the reserve market volume with RES-E
participation compared to the ’Base’ scenario.
The main market firmness in the ’Base’ scenario is represented by the market volume
for negative reserve. This observation confirms the previous explanation since higher
RES-E shares lead to potential oversupply situations more often. Since these over-
supply situations occur due to high RES-E infeed, providing negative reserve omits
any opportunity costs, which reduces the market volume to zero in the ’RES-E Re-
serve’ case. The positive reserve volume in the ’RES-E Reserve’ scenario is even
higher compared to the ’Base’ scenario in 2025 and 2030. This might be surprising,
18 Only biomass uses storable primary fuels, wind and solar energy are non-storable and would be lost.
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Figure 6.38: Reserve market volume comparison (’Base’ vs. ’RES-E Reserve’)
Source: own illustration.
since the reserve requirement constraint has more options and should therefore be
more flexible. In addition to the reasons provided in the following, the adapted ca-
pacity mix is also partially responsible for this difference, as will be explained later.
However, as previously explained, due to the reduced firmness in the negative reserve
market, less capacity is required to stay online. Now, the only reason to generate in
part-load, and this even when negative prices occur, is to provide positive reserve.
This is only observable if insufficient curtailment is available to provide positive re-
serve. In comparison to the negative reserve, actual curtailment is required in the
positive reserve market when RES-E are used. The firmness-reducing effect is there-
fore much lower compared to the negative reserve and the overall costs are even
higher, since the positive reserve is now the only constraint which provides friction in
the energy market. An additional indicator for the overall lower market firmness is the
reduced producer rent of pumped hydro storage, which can be seen in Figure 6.8.
This is partially due to the lower amount of negative prices, which in turn explains
why pumped hydro storage might also be partially responsible for the higher positive
reserve prices. Since less energy can be compressed at negative prices, the oppor-
tunity costs increase, which partially set the positive reserve prices.
As mentioned before, the change in the reserve market requirements also affects
the capacity mix (Figure 6.6). Since additional flexibility is provided by RES-E, the
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conventional market requires less flexibility. For the year 2030, this leads to a re-
duction of almost 2.3 GW OCGT and roughly 0.6 GW CCGT. In order to fulfill the
peak requirement, this leads to an increase of almost 2.9 GW superpeaker capacity.
Superpeakers are not able to provide standing reserve as opposed to OCGTs and
are too expensive to provide spinning reserve. It has been noted above that OCGT
investments are a sign of required quality in the capacity mix, since they are cheaper
as superpeakers already at very low utilizations and are able to provide tertiary re-
serve even when they are not ramped up. Therefore, these results directly show that
the additional RES-E possibility in the reserve markets leads to lower quality require-
ments on the conventional capacity side.
Effects of RES-E Reserve Market Participation on the Demand Side
The consumer cost comparison in Figure 6.11 shows that the RES-E support costs
are reduced in the ’RES-E Reserve’ scenario compared to the ’Base’ scenario, while
the market costs increase. Figure 6.39 shows the absolute RES-E values of both
scenarios.
Figure 6.39: Absolute RES-E value comparison (’Base’ vs. ’RES-E Reserve’)
Source: own illustration.
The previously discussed reduction of market firmness leads to overall higher RES-E
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values compared to the ’Base’ scenario. In 2030, the PV value is 19% higher than
the one in the ’Base’ scenario, the wind onshore value 22% and the wind offshore
value 11% higher. Due to the higher flexibility, the total amount of curtailment is re-
duced by 65% compared to the ’Base’ scenario. This clearly shows that the reserve
requirement is one of the fundamental factors which limit further RES-E integration.
Since in the ’Base’ scenario conventional capacity is forced to stay online, RES-E has
to be curtailed more often. This leads to higher power prices in the ’RES-E Reserve’
scenario compared to the ’Base’ scenario of almost 7% in 2030. Figure 6.40 shows
a price duration curve comparison of both scenarios for 2030.
Figure 6.40: Price duration curves in 2030 (’Base’ vs. ’RES-E Reserve’)
Source: own illustration.
As discussed in the previous scenario comparisons, the additional market flexibility
leads to a delayed price drop in the ’RES-E Reserve’ scenario. While the price is
negative 8.8% of the time in the ’Base’ scenario, it is only negative 4.2% of the time
in the ’RES-E Reserve’ scenario. This in turn is in line with the reduced curtailment
as discussed above.
Under the assumption that RES-E are able and allowed to participate in the reserve
market, the market firmness is substantially reduced. Conventional capacity is al-
lowed to reduce its minimum generation level, which leads to higher RES-E infeeds
in firm market situations and thus to reduced curtailment. In addition, the conven-
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tional capacity has to provide less quality in terms of flexibility, which further reduces
the total costs.
6.4 Critical Discussion of Modeling Results
The modeled scenarios provide an overview on adaptation effects under different
policy scenarios in high temporal resolution. The advantages of high temporal reso-
lution, especially for high RES-E penetration cases, are already discussed in chapter
5 for the Texas case study. From the comparison between the ’Base’ and the ’Low
RES-E’ scenarios it can be seen to which degree the capacity mix and in particular
its utilization is affected by the increasing RES-E penetration. This finding confirms
the results of previous studies such as Dena (2005), Lamont (2008) and EWI (2010)
who show that less base load capacity is required in high RES-E power systems.
However, since a deterministic approach is applied, the results can still be consid-
ered as conservative. By trend a stochastic approach which incorporates uncertainty,
e.g. in terms of forecast errors, would lead to an even higher peak load share. The
present analysis extends the previous research by applying various curtailment rules.
The effects are noteworthy. Depending on the level of the curtailment penalty, the
power market adapts to the degree of flexibility the curtailment rule implies. Under
high curtailment penalties, substantial investments in CAES can be observed. De-
carolis and Keith (2006) showed that diabatic CAES is not competitive in a carbon
constrained system with a wind energy share of 70% of the load. Without knowing
how curtailment is treated in their analysis, this finding cannot be confirmed for ad-
vanced adiabatic CAES. Gatzen (2008) concludes that adiabatic CAES could be a
successful storage application. Nevertheless, he underestimates the increasing price
volatility due to intermitting RES-E and neglects curtailment penalties. Therefore,
he assumes a future flattening of the merit-order which cannot be confirmed by the
present research.
However, as seen in the comparison to the other scenarios, these findings depend
strongly on the settings of various system components. Even in a quite flexible pre-
mium system, which applies only modest curtailment penalties and which are com-
parable with current market observation in Texas (see section 3.1.4), investments in
CAES are the efficient solution if nuclear capacities are rewarded a lifetime exten-
sion. Therefore, this approach extends the findings of other studies, such as BMWi
(2010a) and BMWi (2010b), who also combine high RES-E penetration with nuclear
lifetime extensions in the German power market, but who apply curtailment at power
prices of 0 EUR/MWh as applied in the ’Curtail0’ scenario. These previous findings
substantially underestimate the integration challenges due to the assumed flexibility
of RES-E curtailment. One common finding is the price reducing effect of a nuclear
lifetime extension. As long as the the power price drops to at most 0 EUR/MWh,
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this price-depressing effect seems beneficial. If the price frequently drops to -150
EUR/MWh (as currently defined by the BNetzA), integration challenges are recog-
nized and seem much more alarming than a frequent price of 0 EUR/MWh.
Besides the findings for CAES and nuclear lifetime extensions, the curtailment rule
also provides significant insight into RES-E support costs. In fact, a trade-off is ob-
servable between high curtailment penalties on the one hand, which lead to system
adaptations, and lower RES-E support costs on the other hand, which are present
with relaxed curtailment penalties. A similar trade-off also applies to the nuclear life-
time extension, which leads to lower power prices but reduces the value of RES-E
and increases the firmness of the market. Overall, a balance between sufficient mar-
ket signals for triggering system adaptation and reasonable support costs must be
found. Both extremes, the ’Curtail0’ and the ’Curtail3000’, lead to politically unsus-
tainable results. A market-driven rule, which allows curtailment in extreme situations
and at the same time signals the demand for flexibility, is thus preferable to the current
support scheme and curtailment regulation. The fundamental challenge is already
observable in present firm market situations as discussed in the empirical investiga-
tion in section 3.1.3. The firmness of the power market would even be increased if
additional must-run generation restrictions, which are required for system services in
addition to reserve requirements, would be applied.
In addition to the discussed free curtailment option, other flexibility increasing mea-
sures can be implemented. If the grid infrastructure is extended, oversupply market
situations can be relaxed by additional export possibilities. This in turn leads to lower
RES-E support costs, since the power price does not fall below 0 EUR/MWh very
often. Market firmness can also be reduced via the participation of RES-E in the re-
serve market. Ummels (2008) shows that wind power is able to provide certain system
services. The possibility to reduce RES-E infeed decreases the required ramped-up
conventional generation, which leads to higher tolerance levels until curtailment is re-
quired. A similar effect can be reached if the total amount of required reserve capacity
can be reduced due to better forecast or a gate closure closer to physical delivery as
shown by Müsgens and Neuhoff (2006) and Weber (2009).
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The integration of large amounts of RES-E challenges the operation of the power sys-
tem and leads to long-run adaptations. In the short-run, the interactions of the energy
and the reserve market indicate that the German power market is already firm today
when low demand meets high RES-E infeed. The market firmness is observable in
negative power prices and high prices for negative reserve products. These market
results signal additional demand for flexibility in the market and therefore already in-
dicate requirements for system adaptation.
The negative correlation of RES-E infeed and power prices has already been dis-
cussed in the literature but still calls for additional modeling applications in real-scale
power systems with international exchange. Open research questions are further
found to concern long-run system adaptations, especially in set-ups which reflect the
complexity of intermitting RES-E infeed and operational power market requirements.
The present work adds various details to the discussion on power system modeling
in general and RES-E integration in particular:
• First, the long-run system adaptation of real-scale power systems with 8760
hours in a multi-year, multi-zonal set-up is modeled for the first time.
• Second, the discussion on the value of RES-E is enriched by a dynamic ap-
proach, which takes system development into account and further adds com-
plexity by international exchange options.
• Third, for the first time in capacity expansion power system modeling, particular
curtailment policies of RES-E support schemes are taken into account.
• Finally, several scenario settings, which either reduce or increase system flexi-
bility, are analyzed to inform the current debate on various flexibility increasing
options.
Compared to the latest literature, the applied approach captures a significant part of
the complexity which RES-E infeed places on the power system. Nevertheless, fur-
ther research is required to fill open spaces, which were not addressed in detail in the
present analysis. It has been shown in this research that the grid infrastructure plays
a crucial role in the long-run system adaptation to increasing RES-E penetrations.
Future research is required on the optimal grid development and how it relates to
changes of other system components. Additionally, the distribution grid perspective,
which mirrors the flexibility of the demand side, can be captured in greater detail by
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gathering data and analyzing in which ways a smart grid connected to flexible indus-
tries and households could provide flexibility to the system.
The research has been conducted from the perspective of a well informed benevolent
planner to capture the fundamental system adaptations. Nevertheless, the real world
is usually characterized by more friction than a purely linear optimal world. Therefore,
a magnitude of different approaches can be applied to the analysis of RES-E integra-
tion challenges. Besides game theoretic assumptions about the behavior of more or
less dominant market participants, more detail can also be applied in the operation of
the system. While the present research captures fleet-wide operational constraints,
specific power blocks can be modeled for a more detailed analysis. While block spe-
cific dispatch models are used for short time periods (e.g. the day-ahead market),
long-run system adaptations are not yet analyzed with such detail. From an IT techni-
cal point of view this is currently quite challenging; future IT solutions however might
enable this degree of detail.
The research provided in this thesis utilizes a state of the art IT infrastructure to ana-
lyze the economic developments in a large-scale power system. Therefore, the find-
ings provide deeper insight into the economics of RES-E market integration. These
findings are summarized in the following:
By the utilization of THEA, it has been shown that the reduced temporal resolution
approaches used in the current literature lead to different results and tend to under-
estimate the impact of large-scale RES-E penetration. Overall, the capacity mix tends
to be more base load-oriented when lower temporal resolutions are applied. Since
the variability increases with temporal resolution, more extreme situations are cap-
tured. This leads to an optimized capacity mix which is characterized by a higher
share of peak oriented generating capacity. A reduced temporal resolution also leads
to an overestimation of the value of RES-E and an underestimation of the required
curtailment.
Additionally, modeling operational constraints such as start-up and part-load costs,
adds further complexity to the optimization, which also leads to adjustments in the
results. It has been found that modeling with a pure ’merit-order perspective’ which
ignores the intertemporal complexity of start-up and ramping decisions, also tends to
overestimate the demand for base load capacity. Furthermore, the value of RES-E
and the required curtailment is incorrectly assessed without operational constraints,
since the intermitting nature of wind and solar irradiation is one of the drivers for in-
creasing integration challenges, which must be reflected by the modeling set-up.
The value of RES-E has been shown to be strongly affected by the particular scenario
setting. If, e.g. more international exchange is possible due to an increased grid in-
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frastructure, the RES-E value increases and curtailment can often be avoided due
to higher exports. These findings underline the importance of international exchange
for RES-E integration. Additionally, the literature showed high price differences in
the merit-order effect discussion with and without RES-E in modeling set-ups without
international exchange, whereas the present analysis shows that these price spikes
can often be avoided due to higher imports. Overall, the consumer costs induced by
the power market are reduced due to a higher RES-E share. However, the required
RES-E support costs lead to higher total costs for the consumers compared to a low
RES-E scenario. Figure 7.1 shows the dimensions which should be considered by
policy makers for the long-term development of the power system.
Figure 7.1: Renewable integration triangle
Source: own illustration.
One finding which has not yet been discussed in the literature is the importance of
the RES-E support scheme, and in particular its corresponding RES-E integration
policy for the long-run system adaptation. The RES-E integration policy is one ma-
jor flexibility design criterion in power systems with a high RES-E penetration. It has
been found that if RES-E is forced into the market by heavily penalizing curtailment,
substantial flexibility requirements are forced upon the remaining system, which even
results in substantial investments in CAES. This finding is not only important from a
market design perspective, but also for modeling RES-E integration in general.
Furthermore, the value of the grid infrastructure increases due to the higher value
of diverging system imbalances. If RES-E can be curtailed without much additional
costs, e.g. based on a premium payment, the integration challenges are relaxed since
RES-E provides additional flexibility to the system. This on the other hand leads to
lower market signals which could trigger system adaptation.
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If the lifetime of the nuclear fleet in Germany is increased, the overall costs in Ger-
many are reduced due to the ’free’ additional low variable cost generating capacity.
The firmness of the market, however is increased. This can be seen in higher market
volumes of the reserve market and higher RES-E curtailment. Also the value of the
RES-E is reduced, which in turn leads to higher support costs for the consumers. To
increase the flexibility of the system, significant CAES capacity is required.
One set-up which showed reduced firmness of the market is the participation of RES-
E in the reserve power market. Since the reserve requirements are one source of
market firmness in high RES-E infeed situations, the market participation of RES-E
allows conventional generation to ramp-down and therefore leads to more efficient
solutions. As a result, less curtailment is required and the RES-E value is higher,
which consequently leads to lower support costs and reduced quality requirements
for the conventional generation capacity.
In conclusion, it is shown by this research that high temporal resolution plays an
important role in modeling high RES-E penetration scenarios, and that the design
of all system components which affect the flexibility of the market requires careful
consideration in order to enable a system adaptation which allows for higher RES-E
shares.
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Table A.1: Variable cost input assumptions
Technology Unit 2008 2015 2020 2025 2030
Nuclear USD
mmBtu
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Coal USD
mmBtu
2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Natural Gas USD
mmBtu
8.9 6.3 6.6 7.0 8.0
CO2 USDtCO2 0.0 19.5 30.8 42.1 53.4
Wind Support USD
MWh
30 3.9 18.2 18.2 18.2
Source: own assumptions, based on EIA (2010a), EIA (2007) and Synapse (2008).
Table A.2: Power plant investment cost assumptions
Technology USD
kW
Nuclear 3,820
Coal 2,223
CCGT 968
OCGT 648
Superpeaker 500
Source: own assumptions, based on based onEIA (2010c).
Table A.3: Overview of NTC capacities
Direction Import Export
Country 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030
Germany 18,650 21,266 21,266 13,825 16,267 16,267
France 10,130 14,501 17,191 15,350 18,662 22,267
Netherlands 7,100 8,909 8,909 7,000 8,784 8,784
Denmark 2,530 3,173 3,173 4,750 5,419 5,419
Poland/Czech Rep. 3,200 3,661 3,661 5,500 5,981 5,981
Alps 10,555 11,984 11,984 14,360 15,813 15,813
Italy 7,110 9,300 10,505 3,090 5,812 5,812
North 4,400 5,000 5,000 1,700 2,300 2,300
Iberia 1,300 2,566 3,966 500 2,310 4,000
UK/IE 2,000 2,102 3,102 2,000 2,102 3,102
Belgium 5,800 6,359 6,359 4,700 5,372 5,372
Source: own assumptions, based on ENTSO-E (2010a) and EWI (2010).
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Table A.4: Total exogenous generation [TWhel]
Zone 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Germany 189 230 282 332 380
France 66 94 132 152 171
Netherlands 71 88 111 122 134
Denmark 40 45 49 50 52
PLCZ 58 63 65 66 67
Alps 56 59 61 63 64
Italy 139 155 173 182 191
Iberia 127 160 203 224 245
Belgium 15 24 34 39 44
UKIE 76 109 169 199 230
North 113 122 136 143 150
Source: own assumptions, based on EU Commission (2010) and AGEB (2010).
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Table A.5: Conventional technology endogenous investement input assumptions
Technology Parameter Unit 2015 from 2020 on
Nuclear Investment Cost EUR
kW
2,735 2,735
Fixed O&M Cost EUR
kW∗a
54.7 54.7
Variable O&M Cost EUR
MWhel
0.6 0.6
Efficiency % 33 33
Lignite Investment Cost EUR
kW
1,368 1,576
Fixed O&M Cost EUR
kW∗a
49.8 54.2
Variable O&M Cost EUR
MWhel
1 1
Efficiency % 43 48
Coal Investment Cost EUR
kW
1,368 1,576
Fixed O&M Cost EUR
kW∗a
27.4 31.7
Variable O&M Cost EUR
MWhel
1 1
Efficiency % 46 50
CCGT Investment Cost EUR
kW
648 648
Fixed O&M Cost EUR
kW∗a
13 13
Variable O&M Cost EUR
MWhel
0.7 0.7
Efficiency % 57.8 61
OCGT Investment Cost EUR
kW
389 389
Fixed O&M Cost EUR
kW∗a
7.9 7.9
Variable O&M Cost EUR
MWhel
0.1 0.1
Efficiency % 35 40
Superpeaker Investment Cost EUR
kW
370 370
Fixed O&M Cost EUR
kW∗a
7.9 7.9
Variable O&M Cost EUR
MWhel
0.1 0.1
Efficiency % 35.4 35.4
Source: own assumptions, based on information from electric utilities and IEA (2010).
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Table A.6: Life time and depreciation time assumptions
Technology Life Time Depreciation Time
Nuclear 40 35
Lignite 40 20
Coal 40 20
CCGT 30 20
OCGT 25 15
CAES 40 20
Superpeaker 25 20
Source: own assumptions.
Table A.7: Fuel price assumptions
Fuel Unit 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Nuclear EUR
MWhth
3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Lignite EUR
MWhth
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Coal EUR
MWhth
8.6 8.6 9.4 9.7 9.9
Natural Gas EUR
MWhth
18.2 25 23 24.5 26
CO2 EURtCO2 15 33.8 42.7 45.6 48.5
Source: own assumptions, based on BMWi (2010a), IEA (2010) and Capros et al. (2008).
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Table A.8: Capacity mix of scenarios in 2020 (GW)
Technology Base Low RES-E Lifetime Friction Grid Extension Curtail0 Curtail150 Curtail3000 RES-E Reserve
Nuclear 2.6 2.6 13.3 13.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
Lignite 15.5 10.0 15.5 8.9 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5
Hardcoal 22.1 19.1 22.1 22.1 22.1 22.1 22.1 22.1 22.1
CCGT 16.6 28.2 8.3 8.3 8.3 15.2 15.8 13.6 16.5
OCGT 4.1 1.8 3.7 4.7 1.1 5.6 4.4 1.9 4.8
Superpeaker 14.5 18.2 12.4 18.2 25.8 14.3 14.8 15.9 13.7
CAES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0
Hydro 13.2 12.8 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2
Wind Onshore 35.7 27.5 35.7 35.7 35.7 35.7 35.7 35.7 35.7
Wind Offshore 10.0 0.2 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Biomass 8.8 6.3 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8
PV 51.8 15.8 51.8 51.8 51.8 51.8 51.8 51.8 51.8
Geothermal 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Source: own calculations
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Table A.9: Capacity mix of scenarios in 2030 (GW)
Technology Base Low RES-E Lifetime Friction Grid Extension Curtail0 Curtail150 Curtail3000 RES-E Reserve
Nuclear 0.0 9.5 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lignite 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 4.5 7.6
Hardcoal 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0
CCGT 15.1 37.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 14.7 13.8 11.6 14.5
OCGT 13.7 7.1 8.8 12.2 5.3 14.9 4.8 0.7 11.5
Superpeaker 33.6 25.8 32.9 32 51.1 32.9 32.8 15.7 36.4
CAES 0.0 0.1 5.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 11.1 40.4 0.1
Hydro 13.2 12.8 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2
Wind Onshore 41.2 27.5 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2
Wind Offshore 25.5 0.2 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5
Biomass 9.0 6.3 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
PV 63.0 15.8 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0
Geothermal 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: own calculations
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Table A.10: Capacity mix of scenarios in 2020 (TWh)
Technology Base Low RES-E Lifetime Friction Grid Extension Curtail0 Curtail150 Curtail3000 RES-E Reserve
Nuclear 19.4 19.5 97.0 97.2 19.5 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.5
Lignite 86.4 88.4 79.6 73.0 95.7 88.5 88.7 88.7 92.9
Hardcoal 32.2 61.5 29.0 35.2 42.0 34.2 34.5 39 33.8
Natural Gas 116.3 224.6 59.8 59.2 67.9 108.9 113.1 101.4 117.6
CAES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Hydro 21.6 18.9 21.8 22.6 20.3 21.8 21.6 21.7 22.0
Wind Onshore 72.7 44.4 72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7
Wind Offshore 31.8 0.3 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8
Biomass 49.5 32.8 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5
PV 41.4 9.5 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4
Geothermal 1.7 0.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Other 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Netimport 44.6 15.8 33.7 35.2 73.3 47.8 43.1 46.1 39.4
Hyd PS Pump -2.4 -0.8 -2.6 -3.8 -0.4 -2.6 -2.3 -2.5 -2.6
CAES Pump 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0
Curtailment -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: own calculations
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Table A.11: Capacity mix of scenarios in 2030 (TWh)
Technology Base Low RES-E Lifetime Friction Grid Extension Curtail0 Curtail150 Curtail3000 RES-E Reserve
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 62.8 66.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lignite 49.1 62.8 42.8 50.8 47.5 49.7 49.8 44.2 49.0
Hardcoal 18.2 25.2 16.7 16.9 16.4 18.3 18.1 13.5 18.0
Natural Gas 75.4 261.1 38.0 38.5 35.3 74.5 69.4 64.9 71.2
CAES 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 7.6 0.0
Hydro 23.4 18.9 25.1 26.1 21.8 23.4 24.7 25.2 26.9
Wind Onshore 87.0 44.4 87.0 87.0 87.0 87.0 87.0 87.0 87.0
Wind Offshore 95.0 0.3 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0
Biomass 51.6 32.8 51.6 51.6 51.6 51.6 51.6 51.6 51.6
PV 55.2 9.5 55.2 55.2 55.2 55.2 55.2 55.2 55.2
Geothermal 6.6 0.1 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
Other 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Netimport 64.3 60.3 47.7 39.9 102.1 62.4 67.3 82.4 66.5
Hyd PS Pump -5.0 -0.7 -7.4 -8.9 -2.6 -5.0 6.9 -7.6 -5.0
CAES Pump 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -10.9 0.0
Curtailment -5.9 0.0 -5.6 -9.1 -0.9 -4.0 -2.4 -0.2 -2.1
Source: own calculations
1
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A APPENDIX
Table A.12: Base prices in all scenarios (EUR/MWh)
Scenario 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Base 35.6 52.4 56.4 55.3 52.0
Low RES-E 35.6 54.5 59.7 61.1 61.7
Lifetime 35.6 50.7 53.9 50.0 47.5
Friction 35.6 50.3 53.4 48.5 45.7
Grid Extension 35.6 53.0 58.4 57.5 54.0
Curtail0 35.6 52.4 56.8 56.6 54.6
Curtail150 35.6 52.4 56.6 52.6 48.2
Curtail3000 35.6 52.4 55.4 49.8 40.2
RES-E Reserve 35.9 52.7 57.3 57.3 55.5
Source: own calculations
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